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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to I Jtah Code Ai in § / 8-2 2(3)(j) 1 1 ic 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals. Appellant is wrong 
in saying that this is an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court's June 14, 1996 order 
indicates that Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was instea* . is 
a NuLici \;n after a Rule 54(b) certification. (R. 714) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment oi I appellant's 
lega : aims when appellant failed to comply with the trial court's discovery 
cutoff order? 
2. Did the trial court err in issuing a discovery cutoff date b> * • hid i. the 
appellant had to designate an expert witness on his legai malpractice claims and provide 
the same for deposition? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On revie1 \ of a si n n i i lary ji ldgment, the party against whom the judgment has been 
granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom, considered in J liyhi nmsi lavorahlt* lu linn 1 n sustain -i sumni-itv IIUJIMIIHII 
the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorabl) to 
the losing party, must show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the 
prevailii lg pai (:> is entitled to a judgment as a i natter of la (v:v English v. Kienke, 77 1 P,2d 
1 
1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989): Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844P.2d949, 954 
(Utah 1992). 
These issues were preserved for appeal when the trial court issued a Rule 54(b) 
certification on March 18, 1996, certifying the partial summary judgment of September 
25, 1995. (R. 682-683 and 439-441) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the primary determinative 
authority on appeal. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
There is no issue of fact as to whether Appellant had an expert retained and ready 
to testify by the trial court's deadline of October 28, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant and Appellee, Preston & Chambers, will 
hereafter be referred to as "Preston & Chambers," or "Preston." Furthermore, 
Defendant, Counterclaimant and Appellant, Evan Koller, will hereafter be referred to as 
"Roller." 
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Logan attorney George Preston, of Preston & Chambers, represented Evan Koller 
on a variety of legal matters prior to 1979 and until approximately 1988. (Affidavit of 
Evan Koller, R. 200) In May of 1992, Preston & Chambers filed suit against Evan 
Koller for $6,735.00 in outstanding attorney's fees. (Preston & Chambers' Complaint, 
R. 2) Koller counterclaimed on the theories that Preston & Chambers overbilled Koller 
and that George Preston committed legal malpractice in the handling of Roller's legal 
matters. (Roller's Answer and Counterclaim, R. 14-17) Over the next 34 months, 
Preston repeatedly asked Koller to designate his expert witnesses, and the substance of 
their opinions. Preston's requests were in the form of two sets of interrogatories, 
correspondence, and questioning of Evan Koller in a deposition. Koller consistently 
responded that he had not consulted with any experts, retained any experts, or determined 
if he would retain any experts on the counterclaim malpractice allegations. On July 5, 
1995, Preston & Chambers filed its motion for partial summary judgment asking for the 
dismissal of Koller's counterclaims for legal malpractice because of Koller's failure to 
retain an expert. (R. 71-72) On August 29, 1995, oral argument was heard on Preston 
& Chambers' motion for partial summary judgment, and the trial court gave Koller a 60-
day deadline by which to retain an expert as to the legal malpractice allegations and 
provide the same for deposition. (Transcript of the 8/29/95 hearing and attached as 
Exhibit 1; R. 820) Koller failed to retain an expert by the cutoff date of October 28, 
3 
1995, and therefore the court's order for partial summary judgment on Roller's legal 
malpractice claims took effect on that date. (R. 440) 
B. Statement of Facts, 
1. On May 12, 1992, Preston & Chambers filed suit against Koller to collect 
outstanding legal fees of approximately $6,735.00, which arose out of George Preston's 
representation of Koller in a variety of legal matters between approximately 1979 and 
1988. (Preston & Chambers' Complaint, R. 2-5; Affidavit of Evan Koller at R. 200) 
Some of these legal matters have been on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Cornish 
Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988); appeal after partial remand 798 P.2d 753 
(Utah 1990). 
2. On November 10, 1992, Koller answered Preston's complaint and also 
counterclaimed. (R. 6-13) The counterclaims included the theories that Preston had 
overbilled Koller and that Preston had committed legal malpractice in the handling of 
various legal matters for Koller. The legal malpractice allegations included: 
(a) That Preston was confused about issues and negligent in work done, 
i.e., in a trial between Koller and the Town of Cornish, Utah, in Cache County. This 
trial was in February of 1983. It was to determine the water rights in two springs. 
Koller alleges that Preston was negligent in his examination of a witness on the issue of 
how much water Koller was entitled to from the Pearson and Griffith Springs. (Roller's 
Counterclaim R. 11; Affidavit of Evan Koller, August 18, 1995, R. 204-208) 
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(b) That Preston failed to adequately prepare and complete follow up 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree in a matter originally filed in 
1993 in Cache County, which failure compounded lawsuits and caused Koller thousands 
of dollars in unnecessary legal fees, i.e., despite Preston having successfully represented 
Koller at trial in 1983 against the Town of Cornish as to water rights from the Pearson 
and Griffith Springs, Koller wanted an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court claiming the 
trial court had, in error, allowed the Town of Cornish to connect the Rollers to the town 
water supply instead of using the waters from the Pearson Spring. (See Cornish Town 
v. Koller, 758 P.2d at 920) Koller alleges that after the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court and remanded the matter for modifications to the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, that Preston was negligent in drafting the same and in failing to anticipate and 
object to the Town of Cornish's motion on remand as to the location of the water tap 
controlling water from the Pearson Spring. (Roller's Counterclaim, R. 11; Affidavit of 
Evan Koller at 210-211) (See Cornish Town v. Koller. 798 P.2d at 755) 
(c) That Preston failed to adequately argue the law on legal matters to 
the detriment of Koller, i.e., that in Roller's 1983 trial with the Town of Cornish, 
Preston failed to lay a proper foundation to the Court about state regulations regarding 
water pressures and pipe sizes as they applied to a town such as Cornish which has over 
60 service connections. This lack of foundation allegedly resulted in a improper and ill-
5 
informed decision by the Court. (Roller's Counterclaim at R. 11; Affidavit of Evan 
Roller at 210-211) 
(d) That Preston failed to raise certain issues and defenses which would 
have been to Roller's advantage and likely would have saved time and attorney's fees and 
improved the outcome of legal matters, all to Roller's detriment, i.e., in 1986, the Town 
of Cornish sought to condemn Roller's property in order to control both the Pearson and 
Griffith Springs. Despite Preston having successfully represented Roller in forcing the 
Town of Cornish to switch its complaint from one of condemnation to one of perpetual 
easement of property around the two springs, Preston was allegedly negligent for failing 
to argue bad faith/fraudulent conduct against the Town of Cornish; failing to lay an 
adequate foundation to defend the Town of Cornish's claim under U.C.A. § 78-34-9 for 
immediate occupancy; and failing to adequately garner and present evidence as to the 
value of mineral deposits on Roller's land around the springs. (Roller's Counterclaim 
at R. 11; Affidavit of Evan Roller at 212-223) (Co-counsel with Preston was Byron 
Fisher of Fabian & Clendenin) 
(e) That Preston had conflicts of interest that interfered with his zealous 
representation of Roller on various legal matters resulting in a loss of time, property and 
other damages to Roller, i.e., despite disclosure by Preston of each and every conceivable 
conflict of interest, Roller alleges that Preston had a conflict of interest in representing 
Roller against the Town of Cornish, when his law firm had a relationship and owned 
6 
stock in Lewiston State Bank, of which Verl Buxton was an officer and stockholder, 
when at the same time Verl Buxton as Mayor of the Town of Cornish were adverse to 
Koller; that Preston had a conflict of interest in dealing with the Town of Cornish's 
attorney, Jody Burnett, while Attorney Burnett had also represented Cache County in a 
case adverse to Thatcher Chemical when Preston was affiliated with Cache County and 
was also a named defendant in that action; that Preston had a conflict when he 
represented Koller in an action adverse to A. J. Simmonds, and was sympathetic to 
Simmonds in that action because they were allegedly "drinking buddies;" that Preston had 
a conflict in wanting to drop a Bryan Dixon as a defendant in a civil rights case while 
Mr. Dixon was involved in advising the Town of Cornish to pursue a condemnation 
action against Roller's property; that Preston had a conflict when he met with a Bruce 
King while representing Koller when Preston had represented Mr. King on other matters. 
(Roller's Counterclaim at R. 11; Affidavit of Evan Koller at 224-225) 
(f) Tftat Preston failed to timely pursue discovery issues which gave 
opposing parties time to sanitize records, to Roller's detriment, i.e., in litigation with the 
Town of Cornish Preston failed to vigorously pursue records of the State Health 
Department and the Town of Cornish regarding water sources, uses of water, tests of 
water, water quality and quantity data, and water system studies resulting in the Town 
of Cornish having ample time to sanitize its records before Preston obtained them. 
(Roller's Counterclaim at R. 11; Affidavit of Evan Koller at 226) 
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(g) That Preston failed to enforce Roller's contract rights with respect 
to certain water rights and issues, which was to Roller's detriment, i.e., in Roller's 
litigation with the Town of Cornish over his water rights, Preston failed to timely obtain 
studies by a Von Hansen in the minutes of the Town Cornish regarding the potential of 
the Rofoed Spring. (Roller's Counterclaim at R. 11; Affidavit of Evan Roller at 226-
229) 
(h) That Preston failed to ask appellate courts for attorney's fees when 
Roller was the prevailing party, i.e., Preston failed to ask for attorney's fees on Roller's 
successful appeal to the Utah Supreme Court rising out of the 1987 order between Roller 
and the Town of Cornish regarding the location of the point of diversion of Roller's 
culinary water line. That appeal was argued by Attorney Byron Fisher of Fabian & 
Clendenin. (Roller's Counterclaim at R. 12; Affidavit of Evan Roller at 229) 
(i) Roller claims that because of the alleged legal malpractice he is 
entitled to special damages in the amount of $40,000 and general damages in the amount 
of $60,000. (Roller's Counterclaim at R. 12) 
3. Preston & Chambers served its first set of interrogatories on Roller on July 
12, 1993, asking for the identity of Roller's expert witness on the legal malpractice 
claims and the substance of the expert's opinion. On September 29, 1993, Roller 
responded that he had not determined who his expert would be. (Roller's Response to 
Interrogatory No. 19 of Preston & Chambers' First Set of Interrogatories, attached as 
8 
Exhibit C to Preston & Chamber's Memorandum Supporting Partial Summary Judgment, 
R. 75) 
4. On July 27, 1994, Preston's counsel, Glenn Hanni, sent a letter to Preston 
& Chambers' counsel, Raymond Malouf, requesting the identity of experts consulted or 
retained as to the counterclaim of legal malpractice. (The July 27, 1994 letter to 
Raymond Malouf, at p. 6, is attached as Exhibit 2) 
5. Preston & Chambers served a second set of interrogatories on August 5, 
1994, and specifically in interrogatories 1 and 2, asked for the disclosure of each and 
every expert that Koller had retained, or consulted with, in regards to the legal 
malpractice counterclaim. On December 6, 1994, Koller responded that no experts had 
been retained or consulted with. (Roller's Response to Interrogatories 1 and 2 of Preston 
& Chambers' Second Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit E to Preston & Cambers' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 75) 
6. At Evan Roller's deposition of May 10, 1993, Preston's counsel, Glenn 
Hanni, asked Roller's about his efforts regarding an expert witness on the legal 
malpractice claim and received the following response: 
Q. Have you got any witness, a lawyer, that's goin^ 
to get up and testify about that? 
A. Well, I don't know if I need a witness d|r 
lawyer. I think I can testify to it myself. 
Q. That isn't the point. 
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A. And document it. 
Q. Do you have a lawyer that's going to get up 
there and testify that Mr. Preston deviated from the standard 
of care in the way that he handled the water appeals cases for 
you? The water cases for you? 
A. The standard of care as delineated in the rules 
of the Bar Association. I can read them for the court. 
Q. Mr. Koller, please answer my question. I don't 
care what you can read or what you can testify to. 
A. I have not engaged a lawyer to this day to do 
such a thing. 
Q. Have you talked to any lawyers about that? 
A. I have not talked to any lawyers to get up there 
and testify to that effect. 
Q. Do you have any witnesses other than yourself 
that you are aware of as we sit here today that you're going 
to call on in support of your claims that Mr. Preston was 
negligent in some way in the way he handled your water 
cases? 
A. I don't have any lawyer witnesses such as that 
that you're referring to. (Deposition of Evan Koller at pp. 
58-59 - Evan Koller's deposition is attached as Exhibit 3) 
7. On August 29, 1995, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District Judge of 
Cache County, had oral argument on Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary 
judgment as to Koller's legal malpractice counterclaims. Judge Hadfield indicated his 
preparation for the hearing as follows: 
10 
I've done some speed reading this morning between hearings! 
but I don't think I have reviewed more than half of what's 
there. I've reviewed all of the memoranda, but the exhibits 
and affidavits and supporting documentation I've only 
partially worked through. 
Counsel, I'm going to give you a partial ruling right now] 
I've read, as I've indicated, all the memoranda. I've 
reviewed some, but not all, of the supporting documentation] 
As counsel has pointed out, there's certainly an abundance 
being provided, (emphasis added) (The August 29, 1995 
Transcript of Oral Argument on Preston & Chambers' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 808-809, 825) 
Judge Hadfield ruled from the bench: 
I want to make a couple of observations. It's been 34 months 
since the defendant's counterclaim was filed. Thirty-four 
months. It's difficult for me to comprehend when the 
defendant and counsel were going to get around to having the 
case ready for trial. In other words, when one alleges 
malpractice, at some point one has to have one's proof. 
Usually that's lined up at the time one makes one's 
allegations. 
I recognize that there's not a discovery cutoff, but eveti 
the eminent domain issue that counsel has cited, the statute 
you referred to, counsel, 78-34-2, in the court's opinion 
requires a certain level of expertise possibly even beyond 
50% of what those who are licensed members of the Bar, who 
have no background whatsoever in condemnation, eminent 
domain, and wouldn't be qualified to address those issues 
even though they're licensed attorneys. So to suggest that it's 
so obvious that no attorney or expertise would be necessary 
is, in the court's mind, not credible. Even that illustration 
seems to me to make the point that the plaintiff has raised. 
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I'm going to do the following. There has not been a 
discovery cutoff. I'm going to conditionally grant the request 
of plaintiff as follows: I will allow the defendant 60 days 
from today's date in which to not only obtain an expert, but 
also to make that expert available to be deposed by plaintiff's 
counsel. That deposition has to occur within 60 days. If that 
is not done, plaintiff's motion is granted. 
If that occurs, I'll allow you to revisit these issues. 
I'm not going to go through the file at this point and read his 
32 page affidavit, plus all the interrogatory answers and other 
things, and start identifying [that] this issue doesn't need 
expertise, this one does, this one doesn't. I'm not going to 
get into that kind of exercise at this point. 
If the attorney is not retained, the expert is not 
retained, and the deposition given within 60 days, then the 
motion is granted. That still leaves the defendant ample 
opportunity to make his case, (emphasis added) (Transcript 
of August 29, 1995 Oral Argument on Preston & Chambers' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 825-826) 
8. On September 25, 1995, Judge Hadfield issued the following order: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
is hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant on all legal malpractice claims 
asserted in the counterclaim unless the defendant on or before 
October 28, 1995, designates an expert witness or witnesses 
who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to 
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case, and unless 
within said time the expert witness or witnesses are made 
available for their deposition to be taken by plaintiff. 
2. The deposition or depositions of defendant's 
expert witness or expert witnesses shall be completed within 
the time frame stated above, (emphasis added) (Judge 
Hadfield's September 25, 1995 Order is attached as Exhibit 
4, R. 448) 
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9. At the oral argument of August 29, 1995, Roller's attorney did not indicate 
that the 60-day deadline was too short a time to retain an expert and provide the expert 
for deposition. The attorney did not ask for more than 60 days. (R. 807-829) 
10. Koller did not retain an expert, or provide the same for deposition, by the 
cutoff date of October 28, 1995, issued by Judge Hadfield. In an October 24, 1995 
affidavit, supporting a motion and memorandum for extension of time to get an expert, 
which was ultimately denied by the Court, Koller, rather than his attorney, gave the 
following excuses for failing to comply with the Court's Order: 
(a) The order was issued during the Roller's harvest 
season. He was engaged in the harvest from early morning 
until late at night up to September 29, 1995. 
(b) After September 29, 1995, Koller was busy 
getting the Fall wheat seeded. 
(c) Koller had to take "field trips" with water rights 
attorneys to Idaho regarding water right filings. 
(d) Koller was busy on "field trips" with the Idahp 
Fish & Game regarding wildlife damage. 
(e) Koller was preoccupied with a canal company 
that called and needed several days of his help breaking and 
loading old sugar factory foundations to be used as "rip-rap" 
in their system. 
(f) Koller had to deal with day-to-day problems djf 
people that had to be accommodated or serviced. 
(f) Koller said that he himself, as opposed to his 
attorney, spent four days in Salt Lake contacting experts and 
13 
working with them to try to comply with the Court's Order. 
(R. 506) 
11. The trial court's Order granting partial summary judgment as to Koller 
counterclaim took effect October 28, 1995. (R. 439-441) Subsequent to the entry of the 
partial summary judgment, Koller filed a motion for a new trial, motion to reconsider, 
and an alternative motion for Rule 54(b) certification. (R. 567-568) On March 18, 1996, 
Judge Hadfield issued an Order denying Roller's motion for new trial and motion to 
reconsider and granting defendant's motion for Rule 54(b) certificate. (R. 682-683) 
12. Koller now appeals from the trial court's partial summary judgment dated 
September 25, 1995. 
13. The Utah Supreme Court, on June 19, 1996, ruled that Roller's petition for 
interlocutory appeal should instead be treated as a "notice of appeal" pursuant to a Rule 
54(b) certification. (R. 714) 
C, Specific Inaccuracies in Roller's Statement of Facts, 
Preston & Chambers would like to point out specific inaccuracies in Roller's 
version of the facts as found in Roller's brief. 
1. Roller alleges on page 12 of his brief that at the August 29, 1995 oral 
argument on Preston's motion for partial summary judgment, Judge Hadfield indicated 
that he had not reviewed all the memoranda and affidavits. This is incorrect. A 
complete review of the trial transcript, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to this brief, shows 
that Judge Hadfield specifically stated that he had read all of the memoranda filed but 
14 
only partially reviewed the exhibits and affidavits supporting the memoranda. (R. 808-
809, 825) 
2. In Koller's brief at page 12, it is asserted that Judge Hadfield admitted that 
some of the claims in the legal malpractice counterclaim may not require expert 
testimony. A review of the entire transcript of the oral argument on August 29, 1995 
shows no such statement by Judge Hadfield. (R. 807-829) 
3. It is correct that Preston's attorney, Glenn Hanni, stated in an August 31, 
1995 letter to the Court (R. 375 and attached as Exhibit 5 to this brief) and copied to 
Koller's attorney, that attached was the proposed order regarding the 60-day deadline to 
get an expert, with added language that the witness must be prepared to express final 
opinions. Koller argues that such language was not part of the Court's August 31, 1995 
oral order. That is not true. The Court required that Koller's expert be provided for 
deposition by the 60-day deadline. (R. 826) Clearly, a deposition of an expert is 
worthless unless final opinions are provided. Furthermore, the Court signed the proposed 
order, with this language included. (R. 440) 
4. Page 8 of Koller's brief claims that after the August 29, 1995 hearing, he 
realized that he could not have an expert ready with final opinions within 60 days. The 
implication being that the judge had not initially required final opinions. As stated, the 
Court's requirement that the expert be provided for deposition within 60 days inherently 
requires the expert's final opinions. Also, the proposed language of the Court's order 
15 
was provided to Roller's attorney by September 1, 1995. (R. 371) Thus, Roller's 
attorney was on notice by that early date of the requirement that final opinions of his 
expert were required by the 60-day deadline. 
5. Page 8 of Roller's brief indicates that Roller reminded the court on October 
24, 1995 that it had not imposed a discovery cutoff date. In reality, the Court's August 
29, 1995 oral order from the bench gave a precise 60-day discovery cutoff for Roller to 
provide an expert witness for deposition. (R. 826) 
6. Page 13 of Roller's brief claims Roller was familiar with all the matters and 
facts of the case, thus allowing him to serve as his own expert. That is not accurate. 
Roller did not know what the standard of care was for each of his legal malpractice 
counterclaims or how or when the standard was breached. 
7. On page 13 of Roller's brief, he alleges that over the 34 months after the 
lawsuit was filed, neither Roller, Preston & Chambers, or the Court had advanced the 
case. Not true, the record shows that Preston & Chambers issued two sets of discovery 
requests, correspondence asking for discovery, and took Roller's deposition on May 10, 
1993. It was Roller's failure to define his legal malpractice counterclaims, and to get an 
expert, that bogged down the case. Preston's initial complaint was for only $5,732.43, 
plus interest. (R. 3) Preston & Chambers' evidence was the legal bills he issued, no 
discovery was necessary. It was Roller's counterclaim of at least $80,000, or more, that 
constituted the bulk of the lawsuit. (R. 10-12) Roller did nothing to pursue that 
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counterclaim. Rule 26, U.R.C.P., makes clear that it is the claimant's burden to pursue 
discovery and move the case along. 
8. On page 13 of Roller's brief, he infers that the case lagged for 34 months 
because of settlement discussions. There were no settlement discussions of any 
significance. There was definitely no formal or informal agreement to hold off discovery 
because of a possible settlement. 
9. Roller claims on page 13 of his brief that he was only on notice of the need 
to have an expert starting August 29, 1995, the date of the hearing. (R. 826) That is not 
correct. Roller had an attorney from the time his counterclaim was filed. The attorney 
is charged with knowing the law. As discussed in the argument below, the evidence 
code, case law, and common sense make clear that an expert is needed for complex legal 
malpractice claims. Furthermore, Roller was told repeatedly by Preston & Chambers' 
attorney that Roller needed to get an expert and provide the same for deposition. 
10. Roller claims on page 13 of his brief that affidavits filed August 21, 1995 
and October 11, 1995 created issues of fact preventing summary judgment. Not true. 
Those affidavits made clear either that Evan Roller was going to serve as his own expert, 
or that he had been too busy to get an expert by the Court's deadline. There is no 
dispute on that fact. Without an expert, Roller could not prevail on the partial summary 
judgment motion. 
17 
11. Page 14 of Roller's brief states that the Court's 60-day deadline had not 
been supported by specific findings that there were no disputed facts. Not true. The only 
fact that counted, and which was undisputed, is that if Koller did not have an expert in 
60 days, ready to be deposed, the partial summary judgment would take effect. (R. 826) 
12. Roller's brief at pages 14 and 15 discusses issues of fact that existed on the 
accounting question and that his motion for partial summary judgment should have been 
granted. As will be discussed in the argument below, the accounting issue is not a part 
of the appeal and did not receive Rule 54(b) certification. (R. 440, 682-683) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only issue on appeal, and that has received Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., certification 
is whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment on Roller's legal 
malpractice counterclaims. 
The trial court properly granted Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary 
judgment because: 
It was within the trial court's discretion to order a 60-
day discovery cutoff for Koller to get an expert, and provide 
the same for deposition, when Roller's legal malpractice 
counterclaims were both complex and convoluted. Thirty-
four months had passed without Koller responding to Preston 
& Chambers' requests that he retain and provide for 
deposition an expert on the legal malpractice issues. At the 
time that the court orally gave the 60-day deadline, Roller's 
attorney did not assert that the 60 days was too short of a 
time or that because of Roller's busy schedule as a farmer 
that he needed more time. 
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It is undisputed that at the end of the 60-day deadline* 
Koller had ignored the court's order, did not have an expert 
and did not ask for an extension of time until October 241 
1995, four days before the court's deadline. Instead of 
getting an expert, Koller was more concerned with farming, 
taking field trips to Idaho, and dealing with "day-to-day 
problems. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ONLY ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PRESTON & CHAMBERS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE COUNTERCLAIMS. 
While a case is still ongoing in the trial court, the only issue that can be taken up 
on appeal, is an issue that has received Rule 54(b) certification. In this case, that issue 
is whether the trial court correctly granted Preston & Chambers' motion for partial 
I 
summary judgment as to KoUer's legal malpractice counterclaim. The issues presented 
in KoUer's brief also include whether the trial court erred in finding that Koller cannot 
serve as his own expert on the issue of improper "billings" by George Preston, and 
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant KoUer's motion for partial summary 
judgment on the "accounting issues." (KoUer's Brief at pp. 31, 37) The billing and 
accounting issues did not receive Rule 54(b) certification and are not issues on this 
appeal. In fact, discovery is still ongoing on the accounting issue. At this time the trial 
court has set January 14, 1997, for oral argument on KoUer's motion to set aside the 
court's order to compel discovery. With Roller's motion for summary judgment and the 
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accounting issue having been denied, coupled with continued discovery on that issue, it 
is inconceivable that the accounting issue at this time is one to be considered by the Court 
of Appeals. 
On March 19, 1996, the trial court entered the 54(b) certification order when it 
stated: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Motion to 
Reconsider are denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Rule 54b Certificate is 
granted. The Court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay in entering this Court's Partial Summary 
Judgment [which only dealt with the legal malpractice 
claims], dated September 25, 1995, as a final Judgment, and 
the Clerk of this Court is directed to enter said Partial 
Summary Judgment as a final Judgment. 
3. The plaintiffs Motion for the Sanction of 
Attorney's Fees under Rule 11 is denied. (R. 683) 
Thus, as to the legal malpractice counterclaims, the court entered final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). And that is the only issue to which Rule 54(b) certification has 
been granted. 
The Appellate Rules clearly show that a Rule 54(b) certification gives Koller an 
appeal as a matter of right, as opposed to an interlocutory appeal. Rules 3 and 4, 
U.R. A.P. Thus, Roller's appeal in this case is as a matter of right from the trial court's 
Rule 54(b) certification of the granting of the partial summary judgment on the legal 
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malpractice counterclaims. There are no other issues on appeal. This is confirmed by 
the Supreme Court's notice of June 19, 1996, where the Court stated: 
The Court finds that the summary judgment was certifiablfe 
under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and its 
therefore, final and the petition for interlocutory appeal shoul|l 
be treated as a notice of appeal. (R. 714) 
Clearly, the Supreme Court only accepted on appeal the Rule 54(b) certification 
of final judgment on the legal malpractice counterclaims. Thus, the accounting issue 
should not be considered by this Court. 
POINT II, 
IT IS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO 
ORDER DISCOVERY CUTOFF DATES AND TO DISMISS 
THE CLAIM OF A PARTY WHO HAS NOT COMPLIED 
WITH THE COURT'S ORDER. 
A. Limitations On Discovery Within Trial Court's Discretion. 
The reason Roller's counterclaims for legal malpractice were dismissed is simple. 
Koller failed to comply with the trial court's discovery cutoff order that his experts be 
provided for deposition on or before October 28, 1995. It was within the trial court's 
discretion to set that date, and to dismiss Koller's legal malpractice claims for failure to 
comply with it. 
Rule 26, U.R.C.P., allowed Preston & Chambers to pursue the basis of Roller's 
legal malpractice counterclaims through written interrogatories and depositions. After 
Koller filed his legal malpractice counterclaims on November 10, 1992, Preston & 
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Chambers pursued discovery on July 12, 1993, and August 5, 1994, with written 
interrogatories specifically asking Koller to disclose his expert witnesses on the legal 
malpractice counterclaims. Furthermore, there was correspondence on July 27, 1994, 
asking the same question. The response from Koller was that there had been no decision 
on whether an expert would be retained or not. Then on May 10, 1993, the deposition 
of Koller was taken. He was again asked to identify the experts he intended to use on 
the legal malpractice counterclaim. His response was not only that he did not have an 
expert witness, but that he did not think he needed one. On that issue, Koller specifically 
stated, ". . . 1 don't know as I need a witness or lawyer. I think I can testify to it 
myself." (Deposition of Evan Koller at p. 58 - attached as Exhibit 3) 
It was clear to Preston & Chambers that the claims of legal malpractice were so 
complex and convoluted that Koller would need an expert to not only clarify the legal 
malpractice counterclaims, but to also establish the standard of care that George Preston 
was to meet and whether that standard had been breached. Because Koller refused to 
acknowledge this fact, and to retain an expert, Preston & Chambers filed its motion for 
partial summary judgment on July 5, 1995, which essentially forced the issue, i.e., 
required Koller to get an expert in the legal malpractice counterclaims. 
At the August 29, 1995 hearing on Preston & Chambers' motion for partial 
summary judgment, it was also obvious to Judge Hadfield that Koller needed an expert 
to pursue his legal malpractice counterclaims. The trial court specifically stated: 
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It has been 34 months since the defendant's counterclaim was 
filed. Thirty-four months. It is difficult for me to 
comprehend when the defendant and counsel were going to 
get around to having the case ready for trial. In other words, 
when one alleges malpractice, at some point one has to have 
one's proof. Usually that's lined at the time one makes one's 
allegations. 
* * * 
. . . to suggest that it's so obvious that no attorney or 
expertise would be necessary, in the court's mind [is] not 
credible . . . . 
* * * 
. . . I'm going to conditionally grant the request of 
plaintiff as follows: I will allow defendant 60 days from 
today's date in which to not only obtain an expert, but also to 
make that expert available to be deposed by plaintiffs 
counsel. That deposition has to occur within 60 days. If that 
is not done, the plaintiff's motion is granted. (R 825-826) 
Clearly, the trial court was as frustrated as Preston, in Roller's refusal to get an 
expert and to allow discovery to go forward by providing that expert for deposition. The 
trial court did not immediately grant Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary 
judgment. The trial court, as Preston expected, gave Koller a discovery cutoff date by 
which to retain the expert and provide the same for deposition. In light of the fact that 
the counterclaim had been pending for approximately 34 months, coupled with Roller's 
assertion that Preston & Chambers' legal malpractice was so obvious that even he could 
testify to it, the court's granting of an additional 60 days in which to provide an expert 
for deposition was reasonable. Interestingly enough, Koller did not object to the 60-day 
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extension of time nor did Koller ask for a longer period of time, which Preston & 
Chambers believes the court may have granted. A review of the August 29, 1995 
transcript shows that after the 60-day deadline was given, there was no further comment 
on the issue by Roller's attorney other than to say, "Thank you, your Honor." (R. 827) 
It was clearly within the trial court's discretion to order a 60-day deadline for 
Koller to get an expert and provide the same for deposition, i.e., a discovery cutoff date. 
Rule 26(b)(1) and (f)(3), U.R.C.P., show that a trial court can limit discovery either 
under its own initiative, or based upon the motion of one of the parties. 
Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P., states in part: 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set 
forth in Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it 
determines that: . . . (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought . . . The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under 
Subdivision (c). 
Rule 26(f), U.R.C.P., states in part: 
Discovery Conference. At any time after commencement of 
an action, the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to 
appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery. 
The court shall do so upon motion by the party for any 
attorney if the motion includes: 
. . . (3) Any limitations proposed to be placed on 
discovery. 
In the present case, Preston & Chambers motion for partial summary judgment 
clearly informed the court that Koller had failed to respond to Preston & Chambers' 
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request that he needed an expert and that one should be retained and his or her opinions 
provided. It was within the court's discretion to limit or expand discovery. The court 
used its discretionary power to put a time limit of 60 days for Koller to obtain and 
provide an expert for deposition. The court may have given a longer period if Koller had 
made a timely request. 
The Supreme Court of Utah stated in the case of Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, 
Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983), that: 
Time, place, and manner requirements relating to discovery 
are committed to the discretion of the tribunal. 
Id at 1144. 
Outside of Utah, there are numerous cases which confirm that the trial court has 
broad discretion in expanding or limiting discovery. See Blazek v. Superior Court in and 
for County of Maricopa, 869 P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, 1994) (trial court has 
broad discretion over discovery matters, and the Arizona Court of Appeals would not 
disturb that discretion absent a showing of abuse); Avila v. Wahlquist. 890 P.2d 331, 335 
(Idaho 1995) (control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court); Hill v. 
Boatright, 890 P.2d 180, 184 (Colo. App. 1994) (pretrial discovery issues are committed 
to the discretion of the trial court and only in cases of clear abuse of discretion will the 
trial court's decision be overturned); Manhattan Mall Co. v. Shult, 864 P.2d 1136, 1139 
(Kan. 1993) (control of discovery is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and orders concerning discovery will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was clear 
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abuse of discretion); J. L. v. Kienenberger. 848 P.2d 472, 476 (Mont. 1993) (trial court 
has inherent discretionary power to control discovery based on its authority to control 
trial administration); Hewitt v. Hewitt. 896 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1995) 
(trial court's order regarding the scope of discovery for a party opposing summary 
judgment motion is discretionary and reversible only for manifest abuse of discretion). 
The trial court's 60-day deadline for Koller to retain and provide an expert for 
deposition was not, as Roller's brief claims, abusive and burdensome. If it was, then 
why did Koller not file his Motion for Extension of Time to provide expert witnesses 
until October 24, 1995, four days before August 28, 1995 deadline? (R. 499) The 
reason is clear, Koller was more concerned with harvesting his crop, planting his Fall 
wheat, taking "field trips" to Idaho regarding water right filings, and helping a canal 
company break and load foundations from an old sugar factory. (Affidavit of Evan 
Koller dated October 24, 1995, in support of his Motion for Extension of Time - R. 506) 
Furthermore, Koller was on notice as of July 5, 1995, the date Preston & Chambers filed 
its motion for partial summary judgment, that he would likely need an expert. 
Once Koller failed to comply with the trial court's deadline of October 28, 1995, 
the automatic entry of Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary judgment on the 
legal malpractice counterclaim was an appropriate sanction within the court's discretion. 
There was no disputed issue of fact; Koller did not have an expert. 
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B. Sanctions for Violating Discovery Orders Within Trial Court's Discretion, 
Rule 37(b)(2), U.R.C.P., makes it clear that it is within the trial court's discretion 
to enter a sanction of dismissal of an action or enter judgment against a party who fails 
to comply with the court's discovery order. This was confirmed in the case of G. M. 
Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975), when the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an order of court or for 
failure to respond are set out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are 
discretionary with the court . . . . 
* * * 
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we should not 
undertake to substitute our idea of what is proper for that of 
the trial court. The law is stated in 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & 
Error, as follows: 
. . . Decisions reached in the proper exercise of such 
discretion have frequently been said not to be within 
the proper scope of appellate review, and it is clearly 
the ordinary practice of the appellate courts to refuse 
to review the exercise of such discretion except for 
abuse. 
. . . [A] discretionary determination may be 
"reviewed" only in the case of a "gross," "clear," 
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest" abuse of discretion 
Id, at 1245. 
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It was clearly appropriate, and discretionary, for Judge Hadfield to establish the 
60-day cutoff within which Koller had to provide his expert for deposition, and to grant 
Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary judgment on the legal malpractice 
counterclaims as a sanction for Roller's failure to comply with the court's order. 
POINT III. 
IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
REQUIRE KOLLER TO HAVE AN EXPERT BEFORE HE 
COULD PROCEED ON THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
COUNTERCLAIMS. 
The law is clear that when a claim of legal malpractice is made, expert testimony 
is required to establish the standard of care that was breached. The only exception to that 
rule is when the legal malpractice is so obvious that a jury could easily identify a 
lawyer's breach of a duty. Roller's brief argues that an expert is not needed in this case 
if one would only read Roller's 32-page affidavit which establishes that George Preston's 
legal malpractice was both obvious and easily testified to by Koller as opposed to an 
expert. 
First, if the legal malpractice was so obvious, then why could Koller not obtain 
an expert within the 60-day time deadline? Secondly, if the legal malpractice was so 
obvious, then why did Koller need a 32-page affidavit to explain it? The answer is 
simple. Roller's claims of legal malpractice are both complex and convoluted. A reading 
of Roller's 32-page affidavit is not required to reach this conclusion. A simple review 
of Roller's legal malpractice counterclaims shows how complex they are. (R. 11) 
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At the time of the August 25, 1995 oral argument on Preston & Chambers' motion 
for partial summary judgment, Judge Hadfield had before him, and had reviewed, Preston 
& Chambers' memorandum supporting summary judgment which clearly stated the law 
of this case requiring expert testimony for complex legal malpractice claims. (R. 75-158 
and 161-168) A case on point is Brown v. Small. 825 P.2d 1209 (Mont. 1992), which 
states that an expert is needed when the legal malpractice counterclaims are more than 
obvious. IcL at 1212. 
An example of how to determine when expert testimony is required in a legal 
malpractice claim, was set out in 14 A.L.R. 4th 170, Section 2[a]: 
The most clear-cut example of legal malpractice in which 
courts have found it unnecessary to introduce expert testimony 
. . . seems to be that in which the attorney has allowed the 
statute of limitations to run . . . . On the other hand, the 
cases in which the courts seem most reluctant to uphold a 
finding of negligence on the part of an attorney in the absence 
of expert testimony . . . are those in which the alleged 
negligence involves the attorney's choice of trial tactics, an 
area generally conceded to involve questions of judgment too 
fine to be decided by laymen. 
In other words, if the claim of legal malpractice is not obvious and easily 
understandable by a jury, then the claim cannot proceed without expert testimony. 
In Brown v. Small, supra, the plaintiff sued his former attorneys for legal 
malpractice. Plaintiff had hired his attorneys to assist him in recovering payment from 
his insurer for a fire at an apartment complex. Plaintiff sued the defendant attorneys 
because in settling the matter, they had failed to properly determine the total amount of 
29 
coverage available for the loss. The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
attorneys on the basis that plaintiff had failed to obtain expert testimony to establish the 
legal malpractice of the attorneys. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. In addressing 
this issue, the Court stated: 
. . . In Carlson v. Morten (1987), 229 Mont. 234, 745 P.2d 
1133, we held that expert testimony is ordinarily required in 
legal malpractice cases. We said: 
To expect a jury to sit through hours of examination 
and cross-examination, without the guidance of an 
attorney's expert testimony and then arrive at a verdict 
consistent with the evidence is asking much. This is 
not because the average juror is not capable of 
understanding such matters but only because he or she 
has never had the occasion or desire to study such 
matters. The attorney standard of care depends upon 
the skill and care ordinarily exercised by attorneys, a 
criteria that rarely falls within the common knowledge 
of laymen. . . . 
It is true that there are instances in which legal 
malpractice actions have been submitted for fact 
determination without the use of expert testimony. 
The theory in such cases is that the attorney's 
misconduct is so obvious that no reasonable juror could 
not comprehend the lawyer's breach of duty, [emphasis 
added] Carlson, 745 P.2d at 1137. 
* * * 
In analyzing Brown's argument that the case is too simple to 
require expert testimony, the district court said: 
The allegations of Count One are very complicated. 
The allegations deal with matters of insurance coverage 
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and an attorney's duty to seek out maximum coverage 
possible for his client for a loss . . . . 
* * * 
We hold that the district court did not err when it granted 
summary judgment against Brown on his professional 
negligence claim on the basis of Brown's failure to provide 
expert testimony. 
ML at 1212 and 1213. 
Brown makes clear that an exception to the requirement that the expert testimony 
is needed in a legal malpractice is when the negligence of the attorneys is so obvious that 
a jury could reasonably comprehend the lawyers' breach of a duty. 
In Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, n. 8 (Utah App. 1989), this 
Court indicated that the complex nature of professional malpractice claims almost always 
requires expert testimony. In Wvcalis, a former beneficiary under a trust deed brought 
an action against the trustee based upon the trustee's breach of a duty in reconveying trust 
property based upon a forged request. The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
trustee. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded. The basis for the reversal was 
that the trial court had incorrectly determined that the standard of care for the trustee had 
been established in Utah "as a matter of law." Instead, the standard of care had to be 
established at trial based upon the standard in the industry. IdL 826 at n. 8. On that issue 
this Court referred to the importance of expert testimony when it stated: 
Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating the 
standard of care applicable here. Where the average person 
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has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades 
or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be presented 
to establish the standard of care. For instance, expert 
testimony has been required to establish the standard of care 
for medical doctors, Chadwickv. Nielson. 763 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Architects, Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Assoc. 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 
(1970); Engineers, National Housing Indust.. Inc. v. E.L. 
Jones Dev. Co.. 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ct. 
App. 1978); Insurance Brokers, Darner Motor Sales. Inc. v. 
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.. 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 
388, 403 (1984). . . .; and Professional Estate Executors . . 
Id. at 826 (emphasis added). 
The case of Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1993), addressed the 
issue of expert testimony in a legal malpractice case in Utah. In Harline. the plaintiff 
brought a legal malpractice action against plaintiffs former bankruptcy attorneys for 
failing to comply with a court order requiring the plaintiff to file amendments to his 
bankruptcy schedules. The defendant attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment, 
claiming that based upon the facts of the case, they did not breach their duties as 
attorneys and they were not the cause of the bankruptcy court's refusal to grant the 
plaintiffs bankruptcy discharge. The Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County granted summary judgment to the attorneys, however, this 
was reversed on appeal by this Court. In reversing the entry of summary judgment, this 
Court found that there were questions of fact for a jury on whether malpractice had been 
committed. However, the Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of the plaintiffs 
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failure to retain an expert to establish malpractice. Unlike the present matter, this need 
for an expert had not been raised by the defendant attorneys in their motion for summary 
I 
judgment but was first raised on appeal. For this reason, the Court of Appeals rejected 
the argument as grounds for affirming summary judgment, however, the Court did 
address the legitimacy of the argument when it stated: 
Defendants for the first time on appeal claim summary 
judgment was appropriate because Harline failed to produce 
expert testimony that defendants had breached their standard 
of care. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, . . . (acknowledging 
expert testimony must ordinarily be presented to establish 
standard of care in cases dealing with duties owed by a 
particular profession); see also Brown v. Small, . . . . 
(holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal 
malpractice cases to establish the standard of care). We 
refuse to consider this issue for the first time on appeal 
because Harline was never given the opportunity to respond 
to this issue before the trial court, nor was the trial court 
given the opportunity to consider it. 
Id. at 598 n. 2 (emphasis added). 
Though summary judgment was reversed and remanded in Harline v. Baker, this 
Court implied that if the issue of the plaintiff failing to provide an expert on legal 
malpractice claims had been raised at the trial court level, and the trial court given an 
opportunity to rule on it, then summary judgment may have been appropriate. Unlike 
Harline v. Baker, in the present case not only was the trial court given the opportunity 
to consider Roller's failure to get an expert witness, the trial court also considered 
Roller's complete refusal to comply with the trial court's order to get the expert. 
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Roller's reliance on the case of Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982), is 
misplaced. Koller correctly points out that that case dealt with legal malpractice and that 
the summary judgment entered for the defendant attorney was reversed because ordinarily 
an allegation of a breach of required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. 
Id^ . at 615. What makes Jackson v. Dabnev inapplicable to this case is that the need for 
an expert on the standard of care was not an issue. It was not an issue because the 
attorney's alleged negligence was obvious. The attorney had been hired by the plaintiff 
to stop a foreclosure on her house. In the plaintiff's presence, the defendant attorney 
contacted the opposing attorney who was pursuing the foreclosure. They agreed on the 
telephone that a $400 payment by the plaintiff would put a stop to the foreclosure. The 
plaintiff gave the $400 to the defendant. The attorney then did nothing with the money. 
He did not deliver it to opposing attorney or the judgment creditor. He did not reduce 
the agreement to writing, or take any steps to ensure that the foreclosure did not occur. 
I± at 615. 
Clearly, an expert was not required in Jackson v. Dabnev, and furthermore, the 
facts in that case did not involve a claimant who refused to follow the court's discovery 
order to get an expert. 
The trial court in this case was correct in following clearly established case law 
that complex legal malpractice claims require expert testimony. That is why Rule 702, 
U.R.E., provides for expert testimony at trial. If this case had gone to trial without an 
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expert, then the jury would be left to rely on Koller himself to establish the standard of 
care, and the breach of that standard, by George Preston on the following issues: 
1. Whether George Preston was negligent in his cross-examination of 
witnesses, and trial tactics, in the water rights cases. 
2. Whether George Preston failed to adequately prepare and complete follow 
up findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree arising out of a 1983 trial 
against the Town of Cornish over water rights. 
3. Whether George Preston adequately argued the law and laid a proper 
foundation regarding state regulations on water pressures and pipe sizes in the 
condemnation case with the Town of Cornish. 
4. Whether George Preston failed to raise legal defenses in the condemnation 
case with the Town of Cornish. 
5. Whether George Preston had conflicts of interest that prevented his zealous 
representation of Koller on various legal matters. 
6. Whether George Preston timely pursued discovery issues and whether he 
allowed opposing parties to sanitize records in litigation with the Town of Cornish. 
7. Whether George Preston enforced Roller's contract rights in regards to the 
Town of Cornish. 
8. Whether George Preston failed to adequately request attorney's fees from 
the Utah Supreme Court arising out of the 1983 trial with the Town of Cornish. 
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Preston & Chambers cannot imagine how the aforementioned allegations of legal 
malpractice are obvious as testified to by Koller. As pointed out by the trial court, some 
of these malpractice claims couldn't be understood by 50% of the licensed members of 
the Utah State Bar. (R. 826) Therefore, a jury could not understand the legal 
malpractice claims without expert testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue on appeal in this case is whether the trial court properly granted 
Preston & Chambers' motion for partial summary judgment on the legal malpractice 
counterclaims. 
It was well within the trial court's discretion to require Koller to retain and provide 
an expert for deposition within 60 days when Koller's malpractice claims had been 
pending for 34 months and when the need for an expert was obvious in light of the 
complex nature of Koller's claims. 
It was within the trial court's discretion to grant Preston & Chambers' motion for 
partial summary judgment when it was undisputed that Koller had not retained an expert, 
as ordered by the court, by the 60-day deadline. 
The trial court's partial summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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Dated this 3 c ? day of December, 1996 
STRONO&yMAN 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorneys for Preston & Chambers 
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THE CLERK: Case number 93-019, Preston and 
Chambers vs. Roller. Appearance of counsel for the 
record , please. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Can we have counsel make their 
appearances for the record. 
MR. HANNI: Glenn Hanni representing the 
plaintiffs. 
MR. MALOUF: Ray Malouf representing the 
defendant and counterc1 aimant, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing on 
the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 
Let me advise counsel of a couple of circumstances. I 
apologize at the outset. I know it always frustrated 
me when I would prepare concise and well-researched 
memoranda and affidavits and then come to court and 
the hearing and found out the judge hadn't reviewed 
thos e . 
I looked at this file this mornina for the 
first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar. I 
think there's possibly 200 pages there. I've done 
some speed reading this morning between hearings, but 
T don't think I've reviewed more than half of what's 
there. I have reviewed all of the memoranda, but the 
exhibits and the affidavits and suooortina 
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documentation I've only partially worked through. 
I fll go ahead and hear your arguments this 
morning on that. I've got another hearings scheduled 
at 11:30. but I tell you that simply so you'll 
understand where I'm coming from* It's not likely 
that I'll be able to give you a decision this morning 
on the issue. Go ahead, Mr. Hanni. 
MR. HANNI: If it please the court, the hearing 
this morning is based on the plaintiffs' motion for 
partial summary judgment. Now, this lawsuit was filed 
in May of 1992. The defendant got served in October 
of 1992. It was a suit to recover attorney's fees. 
Mr. Roller, the defendant, has filed a 
counterclaim, claiming, among other things, that there 
is an accounting problem between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. That's not involved this mornina. The 
17 only thing that's involved is the counterclaim 
involving claims of legal malpractice against Mr. 
Preston . 
Now, the plaintiff has filed a motion for 
summary judgment hfr-. T shouldn't say the plaintiff, 
the defendant has filed a motion for ^iT^ary judgment. 
That is not on for hearing this morning. It h =i s not 
been responded to yet by Mr. Preston, but will be. 
There will be a timelv resoonse filed. 
pu. 
Now, basically what we're after here, Your 
2 I Honor, the bottom line, is we have been asking for 
3 well over two years for the defendant to name an 
4 expert. When you charge a lawyer with malpractice 
5 you've got to have expert testimony that says that he 
6 has deviated from the standard of care. We have 
7 served interrogatories twice, we've written letters 
8 and asked for the name of the expert. And each time 
9 we get a response we don't have one yet. That's the 
I 0 response. 
II There's got to be some time when the 
12 defendant has to name who they're going to get up 
13 there and testify that Mr. Preston, in the various 
14 ways they claim, deviated from the standard of care. 
15 Now, they are claiming here that the 
16 deviations are so obvious that Mr. Roller, a layman. 
17 can get up there and testify what the standard of care 
18 was for Mr. Preston as a practicing lawyer. 
19 We submit, if you look at the affidavit of 
20 Mr. Koller and look at the varying claims that have 
21 been made, the mere fact that that affidavit is so 
22 many pages and talks about the Utah regulations and 
23 federal regulations dealing with water rights,, and j 
24 whether Mr. Preston should have cited those or whether 
25 he shouldn't have, it's pretty obvious that these are 
1 matters that deal with the judgment call of a lawyer 
2 in handling a lawsuit involving water rights. There's 
3 no way in the world that a layman can get up on this 
4 stand and testify as to what the standard of care was 
5 and testify that Mr. Preston deviated from that 
6 standard and that that caused damage. 
7 Now, to give you just a few examples, in 
8 our reply brief we went through and gave several 
9 examples of the claims of malpractice. First is 
10 they're claiming that Mr. Preston was negligent 
11 because he failed to raise certain Utah and federal 
I 
12 regulations pertaining to a certain water system. 
13 Well, that's clearly — you have to know what the 
14 statute says. Then you have to get all of the 
15 background behind why it was raised or why it wasn't 
16 raised. And then a lawyer's got to look at that and 
17 has to say, well, under the facts and circumstances of 
18 this case the standard of care would have required A, 
19 B and C. Mr. Preston complied with those or he didn't 
20 comply with them. 
21 I A second claim, failure to cite a Utah 
22 | statute to get the town of Cornish's condemnation suit 
23 | dismissed. If that isn't a legal question I don't 
24 I know that one ever exists. Whether or not a 
25 condemnation lawsuit is claimed, whether it's properly 
1 brought, whether or not there is a statute out there 
2 that would be dispositive of that lawsuit and would 
3 get it thrown out, all of that involves the judgment 
4 of a lawyer. What should he do if he is defending a 
5 condemnation case? And if there's going to be 
6 negligence on his part, a layman can't get up on that 
7 stand and tell this court and the jury that Mr. 
8 Preston deviated from the standard of care. 
9 Now, that basically is our position, Your 
10 Honor. We think that after two-and-a-half years of 
11 waiting to be told who is your lawyer that's going to 
12 get up there as an expert witness and say that Mr. 
13 Preston was guilty of legal malpractice, that if they 
14 don't have one by now they ought -- this case ought to 
15 be di smi s sed. 
16 Now, there's several other examples here. 
17 For example, failure to pursue discovery in the 
18 Cornish lawsuit that would have revealed fraud on the 
19 part of the Town of Cornish. What kind of discovery a 
20 lawyer is going to engage in is a matter of judgment 
21 on his part, professional judgment. And whether or 
22 not he can find facts that will amount to fraud is 
23 something else. 
24 Fraud's a pretty technical thing. A 
25 layman can't testify as to what amounts to fraud. The 
Ttl7 
1 I law has about seven or eight different things that 
2 | you've got to prove. Only a lawyer can tell a jury. 
3 1 They need the help of the lawyer, an expert up there, 
4 to say whether or not Mr. Preston should have done 
5 this or done that discovery-wise. And if he had 
6 whether or not he would have uncovered fraud or 
7 whether he wouldn't have. 
8 The next thing they're claiming is that 
9 Mr. Preston had a conflict of interest. Conflicts of 
10 interest problems are legal problems. They can't be 
11 testified to by a layman. And whether or not the 
12 conflicts were of such a nature that they impinged on 
13 his professional capabilities of handling this case, 
14 again, is a legal question and a lawyer has to tell a 
15 jury about it, give them the assistance to make their 
16 j udgment . 
17 Then the next one, failure to pursue 
18 contract and deeded rights to water. Again, what a 
19 lawyer does in the context of a lawsuit always 
20 involves judgment, always involves a judgment call. 
21 You've got to have expert testimony to help that jury. 
22 Now, very quickly, some other things that 
23 they are claiming. Cornish improperly used a 
24 condemnation statute against Roller. A layman can't 
25 testify about that. That's a legal issue, whether 
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1 they used the statute improperly against him. It's a 
2 legal question whether Mr. Preston handled that kind 
3 of problem appropriately or whether he deviated from 
4 the standard of care. 
5 Failure to adequately defend against a 
6 motion. A motion is pending in this lawsuit and Mr. 
7 Preston is — they are claiming that he didn't do what 
8 he should have done in response to that motion. 
9 Again, that's a judgment call. That's a legal issue 
10 on how do you deal with a certain motion. Again, 
11 you've got to have expert testimony on that. 
12 Failure to ask for attorney's fees, 
13 they're claiming here. Well, whether you ask for 
14 attorney's fees in a certain circumstance or whether 
15 you don't, again, is a judgment call. 
16 Failure to prepare findings, conclusions 
17 and decree and failure to do them properly. If that 
18 isn't a legal issue — a layman can't get up and say 
19 those findings, conclusions and decree are wrong. 
20 Only a lawyer can do that. 
21 Your Honor, that's the bottom line of our 
22 position. All of these malpractice claims that have 
23 been pending now for well over two years and that 
24 we've been asking repeatedly to find out who the 
25 expert is, can only be addressed by an expert, by a 
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1 lawyer. We think that it's time that we be told that 
2 they have an expert, which they have not told us yet 
3 to this day, as I now speak. On that basis, we submit 
4 that the counterclaim should be dismissed. 
5 It's also interesting to note that there 
6 were three appeals that Mr. Preston handled for Mr. 
7 Koller. They lost in the trial court and they got it 
8 reversed. He's had pretty good success in handling 
9 matters for Mr. Koller, but that isn't the point. 
10 That's just something Your Honor ought to know about. 
11 The point is they've got to have expert testimony and 
12 if they can't get it, then this case ought to be 
13 thrown out. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Malouf. 
15 MR. MALOUF: Your Honor, I think that the motion 
16 made by the plaintiffs in this case would be more 
17 appropriately made if we were on the eve of trial and 
18 we were trying to argue whether Mr. Koller could 
19 himself testify as to some of these issues. There's a 
20 question as to whether the evidence would or would not 
21 be received by Mr. Evan Koller speaking to these 
22 issues. 
23 Even the case that the plaintiffs,have 
24 referred to in their briefs said that some issues can 
25 be heard by a jury without an expert if they are 
1 obvious issues. We have not said that all of the 
2 issues are obvious, but we have said that enough of 
3 them are obvious that Evan Roller, given his 
4 experience and given his research of the code, and 
5 given his familiarity with the particular facts in 
6 this case, and given his knowledge of what he asked 
7 Mr. Preston to do, such as ask for attorney's fees on 
8 appeal, are issues to which Mr. Roller could testify. 
9 We have not said that his testimony would be the best 
10 testimony. We have said that he could testify to 
11 these . 
12 Undisputed is the following: There has 
13 not been a pretrial conference. There has not been a 
14 discovery cutoff date set. There has not been a time 
15 beyond which the defendant could not retain an expert, 
16 Mr. Rollpr is aware that retaining an expert and 
17 getting the expert educated and keeping the expert 
18 educated until trial and through trial can be an 
19 expensive process. 
20 We have always maintained that he has not 
21 retained an expert yet and that is true. We are not 
22 hiding the expert that we have. We have not retained 
23 an expert yet. Therefore, there is no reason that he 
24 could not still retain an expert even if an expert's 
25 testimony is required for all of the issues. 
I'T However ; some of the issues are not really 
2 that difficult. For example, there's a reference in 
3 Mr. Roller's affidavit to section 78-34-2 of the code. 
4 One of the lawsuits involved condemnation proceedings. 
5 The title of this section deals with estates and 
6 rights that may be taken. It specifically says that a 
7 fee simple in land can be taken for certain things* 
8 And subparagraph two in that section says "an easement 
9 may be taken for other uses." 
10 One of the things which is extensively 
11 developed by Mr. Roller's affidavit, Your Honor, is 
12 that in the lawsuit in which Cornish sought to condemn 
13 part of his property, Cornish insisted on having fee 
14 simple to the property. And it was only, according to 
15 Mr. Roller's affidavit, with the assistance and 
16 prodding of the trial court, that the defense of fraud 
17 was raised as an opposition -- was not even raised in 
18 opposition to the motion to condemn. And the fact 
19 t h a t t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e f e e s i m p l e w a s n o t 
2 0 required . 
21 THE COURT: Just a minute. Back up. You lost me 
22 on that statement. You said with the assistance of 
23 the trial court that defense was not raised? 
24 MR. MALOUF: Well, what went on, and we have 
2 5 transcripts referred to in Mr. Roller's affidavit, and 
C , n 
1 I I've got some here. Ifm mindful of the time- I'm 
2 | also mindful of what you said initially in terms of 
3 | how much time you may wish to spend with this, but — 
4 | THE COURT: I'm just trying to follow what you 
5 | said. It sounds to me like --
MR. MALOUF: Cornish's counsel argued that, hey, 
you can't bring up — we have to have a fee simple of 
this property and we're entitled to get it. Mr. 
Roller's point simply is this: You cannot take fee 
simple ownership of the land, mineral rights, surface 
rights, ownership of the land in order to condemn for 
the purpose that you're seeking to condemn. You may 
only have an easement. That would have been the 
simple, would have been the obvious defense. It was 
not raised in a timely manner. 
That is one example that Mr. Koller would 
argue is something that is easily enough shown to a 
jury. It's not a statute of limitations question, 
but, on the other hand, it deals with a state statute 
which is written not only for lawyers, but also for 
town council people and lay people who work with it 
all the time. 
Similarly, state water regulations dealing 
with the quality and type of water for culinary 
purposes can be presented and if -- and the 
<C I 0 
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1 enforcement and application of those regulations need 
2 not be discussed by an expert but may be referred to 
3 by lay persons, as well as an expert, in terms of how 
4 those are to be interpreted. 
5 In general, I'm inclined to agree that 
6 prudence would require that Mr. Roller should have an \|f 
7 expert, but he, A, has never been faced with a 
8 deadline by which he must have an expert; B, has not 
9 found it appropriate yet to retain an expert in this 
10 case because we are still in the discovery phase; and, 
11 C , he is able to testify as to several items of 
1 2 things. 
13 For example, in the Supreme Court brief 
14 which Mr. Preston wrote, notwithstanding a request 
15 that fees be asked for, there is nothing in the brief 
16 asking for attorney's fees on appeal. Yet, on 
17 reversal, which the appeal was won, was a denial of 
18 Mr. Roller's civil rights, or procedural rights in a * 
19 hearing by Cornish's counsel. On remand you would 
20 think, or at least I would think, that the trial court 
21 would consider attorney's fees and so would the 
22 Supreme Court, but Judge Low said, well, because 
23 attorney's fees were not asked for in the appeal we 
24 cannot consider these on remand. 
25 I don't think it requires an attorney to 
O / u 
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testify that if attorney's fees had been asked for 
that the possibility of them being awarded would 
exist. Now, an attorney could testify that maybe it 
is frequently done or always done. As a tactic, it's 
hard to imagine why one would intentionally omit it f 
but it was omitted. 
We refer, in the memorandum, to the 
exchange of documents. And under attachment number — 
letter C in the defendant's memorandum I photocopied a 
letter which I addressed to Mr. Hanni and in which 
there is reference to his client's request to review 
certain files that Mr. Roller had. And this was in 
December of 1994. We suggested that "since you 
believe Evan has files that Mr. Preston wants to see 
again, you could make an appointment through me to go 
to his home and look at these things." 
"Likewise, we request a comprehensive list 
of the files Mr. Preston has remaining and would like 
thp opportunity to look through these." 
This request was not responded to. At the 
time it was written we were having a fairly easy 
exchange and it was appropriate to ask for things this 
way. After all, the request that came to me from Mr, 
Hanni was written in a letter rather than a formal 
disc overy. 
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So if there is to be a time by which an 
expert needs to be retained, we really need to go 
through the pretrial procedure and have discovery 
cutoff dates and have dates by which experts or other 
witnesses need to be revealed. 
I think, in view of the amount of time 
allowed for the hearing, the court could well make its 
decision to deny the motion on that basis alone. 
There's not been a cutoff data, there's no reason to 
expect that it should have cutoff yet without having 
had a pretrial. The court could still impose a 
deadline if it agrees there must be an expert. If it 
does not think there must be an expert it can state 
that . 
I suspect you may wish to take some of 
these things under advisement, in view of how much 
you've read, and I think you may well be understating 
when you say there's 200 pages- I did file a motion 
on behalf of the defendant, that the court would 
officially have as part of its record, Mr. Roller's 
answers to first interrogatories as well as 
supplemental answers. Each of these pages is 
approximately a half inch thick of materials. I 
submitted the originals of these to the court with 
those motions because those are sworn statements in 
\ -> i 
which Mr. Roller's own familiarity with the facts is 
explained. 
Now, we did file a motion for partial 
summary judgment of our own, which is not noticed for 
hearing today. Among the issues, however, in that, 
when the court considers it, is the fact that even 
though Mr. Preston sued Mr. Roller for about $5700 in 
fees, when we asked in discovery how much he had 
received we were shown a total of so many dollars, 
which was approximately $11,000 short of what Mr. 
Roller could demonstrate was paid. 
We are arguing that the fee issue and the 
billing for the fees is intertwined with malpractice 
issues. 
You're wanting to stop me. 
THE COURT: It seems to the court that those 
issues you've raised are separate. In other words, an 
attorney performs adequately or commits malpractice 
independent of the amounts he charges, I understand 
there are issues there and disputes, but it seems to 
me that that's on your countermotion that you've 
raised . 
MR. MAI.OUF: We are not trying to get that 
resolved today but among other things in the 
countermotion. Your Honor, is the araument that the 
r> ^ ^r -v 1 c O T ? , 
fees in total would have been much less but for 
2 I certain choices made by the plaintiff, which choices 
3 | could be malpractice and which would affect the total 
4| billing. So, besides asking for an accounting of it, 
5 | he has argued that there are specific offsets as well 
6 | as perhaps additional offsets. In his affidavit he 
7 | has identified areas which could include billing for 
8 I the same matter a second time that had been paid for. 
9 Those issues, with exhibits, are 
10 extensively developed in Mr. Roller's responsive 
11 affidavit to this motion. And references in the 
12 memorandum and his affidavit exist to his answers to 
13 interrogatories, which are also sworn statements, and 
14 which also refer to specific billings and specific 
15 examples of issues where this exists. 
16 My point is not to resolve that in the 
17 long run, but to say that if we — if the court were 
18 to make an isolated ruling on malpractice, we still 
19 have the accounting issues which are broad enough to 
20 include questions of malpractice, which, if part of 
21 the case was missing, would make it more difficult to 
22 say what is and what is not being resolved. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Hanni, I'll give you about two 
2 4 minutes to respond. 
25 MR. MALOUF: Before I quit, Your Honor, I have a 
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1 pile of additional materials which, if time permitted, 
2 I would present to the court in terms of here are 
3 copies from transcripts, here are copies from 
4 regulations, here's correspondence. I would also 
5 refer to the exhibits which are part of the court 
6 record now* 
7 I would ask that if the court is seriously 
8 considering granting the motion that an additional 
9 date be allowed to continue oral argument. But before 
10 I sit down now I would ask the court if it will 
11 confirm whether the motion for the publishing of the 
12 answers to interrogatories and so forth has been 
13 granted so that those are part of the record? 
14 THE COURT: I don't know that there's any order 
15 for me to sign to grant that motion. They are on 
16 file . 
17 MR. MALOUF: I submitted an order, a one page 
18 order, with the motion. 
19 THE COURT: I don't know where the one page order 
20 went. The original answers themselves are in volume 
21 two of this file. They are in the record. 
22 Go ahead, Mr. Hanni. 
23 MR. HANNI: Your Honor, it's pretty obvious, from 
24 what has gone on here, that most of the -- essentially 
25 all of the malpractice claims are complex legal 
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1 questions. They're going to require expert testimony. 
2 I don't think this court is going to let a layman get 
3 up on that stand and tell a jury what a lawyer ought 
4 to do or not do under a complicated legal situation 
5 with a complicated factual background. I don't think 
6 this court is going to let a layman get up there and 
7 say that a lawyer deviated from the standard of care. 
8 We think that this case has been pending 
9 long enough. We have asked many times for the naming 
10 of an expert. The defendant has done absolutely 
11 nothing to try and find an expert. They've had lots 
12 of time and lots of requests. We submit that this 
13 case -- the counterclaim should be dismissed. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to give you a 
15 partial ruling right now. I have read, as I've 
16 indicated, all of the memoranda. I have reviewed 
17 some, but not all, of the supporting documentation, 
lft As c o u n s e l have pointed o u t , t h e r e ' s c e r t a i n l y an 
19 abundance being provided. 
20 I want to make a couple of observations. 
21 It's been 34 months since the defendant's counterclaim 
22 was filed. 34 months. It's difficult for me to 
23 comprehend when the defendant and counsel were going 
24 to get around to having the case ready for trial. In 
25 other words, when one alleges malpractice, at some 
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1 point one has to have one's proof* Usually that's 
2 lined up at the time one makes one's allegations. 
3 I recognize that there's not a discovery 
4 cutoff, but even the eminent domain issue that counsel 
5 has cited, the statute you referred to, counsel, 
6 78-34-2, in the court's opinion requires a certain 
7 level of expertise possibly even beyond 50 percent of 
8 those who are licensed members of the Bar, who have no 
9 background whatsoever in condemnation, eminent domain, 
10 and wouldn't be qualified to address those issues even 
11 though they're licensed attorneys. So to suggest that 
12 it's so obvious that no attorney or expertise would be 
13 necessary is, in the court's mind, rot credible. Even 
14 that illustration seems to me to make the point that 
15 the plaintiff has raised. 
16 I'm going to do the following. There has 
17 not been a discovery cutoff. I'm going to 
18 conditionally grant the request of plaintiff as 
19 follows: T will allow the defendant 60 days from 
20 today's date in which to not only obtain an expert, 
21 but also to make that expert available to be deposed 
22 by plaintiffs' counsel. That deposition has to occur 
23 within 60 days. Tf that is not done, the plaintiffs* 
24 motion is granted. 
25 If that occurs I'll allow von to revisit 
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1 these issues. I'm not going to go through the file at 
2 this point and read his 32 page affidavit, plus all 
3 the interrogatory answers and other things, and start 
4 identifying this issue doesn't need expertise, this 
5 one does, this one doesn't. Ifm not going to get into 
6 that kind of exercise at this point. 
7 If the attorney is not retained, the 
8 expert is not retained, and the deposition given 
9 within 60 days, then the motion is granted. That 
10 still leaves the defendant ample opportunity to make 
11 his case. 
12 MR. MALOUF: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, the attorney that we've 
14 hired on attorney's fees, Tom Willmore, has filed in 
15 this court a notice of withdrawal. As a result, we 
16 will be representing ourselves on the case. 
17 With regards to the motion for summary 
18 disposition by Mr. Roller as it relates to attorney's 
19 fees, W P will bp making an appearance in court and 
20 would like an additional ten days to reply to that, if 
21 we may. 
22 THE COURT: Ten days from today's date? 
23 MR. PRESTON: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: I'll grant that. Has Mr. Willmore 
25 filed a notice of withdrawal? 
on 7 
MR. PRESTON: He has 
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MR. MALOUF: He has, Your Honor, some months ago 
THE COURT: All right. That will give you until 
— have your response filed on or before September 
8th. 
MR. PRESTON: Thank you. 
MR. HANNI: I'll prepare an order, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, if you would, Mr. Hanni. Thank 
you . 
(Concluded at 11:40 a.m.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped motion 
hearing was transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Certified Court Tape 
Transcriber in and for the State of Utah, residing 
at Brigham City, Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription from 
the videotape, to the best of my ability, is set forth 
in the pages numbered 2 to 22, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript 
was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, 
Cache County, Logan, Utah. 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not 
interested in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham 
City. Utah, this 16th day of September, 1996. 
"7 
C2^lL±^±jll±Jl£-^h±Qz^ 
Rodney M.'- Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R 
My Commission Expires: 
January 4 , 2000 f™ 
I 
_ Notary Public T | 
"WffiSS1"' 
43 H. Main • 
Bngh^qiy, Utah 84302 1 
My Comtiaaton Expires . 
JMuary4,2000 I 
^ State of Utah . 
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Raymond N. Malouf 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
ISO East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321-4036 
RE: Preston l i liamh^ i 
Dear Mr. Malouf: 
l^an Koller 
This case has lied dormant for some months now. You have made 
no effort to pursue your counterclaim and, therefore, we are 
compelled to proceed with the original complaint for collection of 
attorneys' fees. To that end, we have reviewed your answers to 
plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and second request for 
production of documents. We find that several of your answers are 
incomplete. I will detail below what information you have failed 
to give us: 
Interrogatories 
Interrogatory No. 1: iuu did list the 11 matters tipon which 
Koller was billed. However, you failed to answer subparts (b) 
through (e) of the interrogatory. These subparts specifically 
request that you substantiate the allegations of your counterclaim 
by identifying the matters from which billings were transferred 
from and which matters billings were transferred to* In^addition, 
to identify the amount of the transfers and describe how such 
transfers breached the standard of care owed to the defendant. You 
were also asked to identify the specific damages defendant has 
incurred as a result of the alleged conduct* Your client has 
alleged the improper billings, he has the burden to prove the same, 
and we are now asking for that proof. The answer you have provided 
gives us none of the information requested* You indicate that 
"previous documents have already been furnished to the plaintiff 
that contain some of the information requested." In addition to 
providing us with a complete answer, you need to identify what 
documents you were referring to 
Interrogatory No, 2: Though Mr. Koller has made the allega-
tions of over-billing, he claims that answering in detail each and 
every request as to these over-billings is duplicative and burden-
some . For this reason, you provide information concerning only two 
T E L
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matters where you claim over-billing occurred, that being the 
Buttars case and the 3/4 Inch Water Tan Appeal. The wording of 
your answer would indicate that there are other allegations of 
over-billing which you have chosen not to describe because it would 
be overburdensome. I do not believe that the court would agree 
with your position. I would ask again that you detail each and 
every allegation of over-billing so that we can fully understand 
the basis of your counterclaim. 
Interrogatory No. 3: You have wholly failed to answer this 
interrogatory. We specifically asked for you to identify every 
fact, document, person, and date relative to your allegation that 
the plaintiff was confused about several issues. Your response 
simply refers to court records, correspondence, government rules 
and regulations that support the allegations, but in no way detail 
what these documents are. This is an interrogatory and not a 
request for production. We asked for specific answers to our 
questions relative to your allegation. You claim that Mr. Preston 
failed to lay a foundation as to Cornish's responsibilities as a 
public water supplier and that Mr. Preston failed to hire a 
qualified expert which proved damaging to the case. These are not 
answers but allegations. You need to provide specific information 
on this matter, i.e., what foundation did he fail to establish, and 
who was the expert used, and specifically how was his testimony 
damaging. Please fully answer each of the subparts of the 
question. 
Interrogatory No. 4: You give no information in response to 
this interrogatory. You simply refer generally to correspondence, 
records and files pertaining to the matter and that the same is 
voluminous and that it would be burdensome and inappropriate to 
have to form an answer. I do not think that the court would 
sanction such an answer. You have made the allegation that Evan 
Roller failed to prepare and complete the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree in the original 1983 
case and that such conduct compounded lawsuits and costs to 
defendant Roller. As a result, we demand complete and specific 
answers to each subpart of this interrogatory. Your answers to 
Interrogatories 1 through 3 in no way constitute a sufficient 
answer to Interrogatory No. 4. These answers, as incomplete as 
they are, have dealt predominantly with billing matters and not 
with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Interrogatory No. 5: You claim that the plaintiff failed to 
adequately argue the law in a 1983 trial regarding issues of 
contract, water rights, regulations pertaining to municipal water 
systems, and respective rights and obligations of litigants in 
Raymond N. Malouf 
July 27, 1994 
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relationship to these laws and regulations. This is not an answer, 
it is an allegation. You need to specify the case that was 
involved in 1983, and specifically what contract, water rights, and 
regulations plaintiff failed to adequately argue and this needs to 
be answered within the context of each subpart question of Inter-
rogatory No. 5. You go on to mention Mr. Roller's failure to 
directly plead issues regarding the town of Cornish's motion for 
immediate occupancy. You claim he failed to properly cite a 
statute regarding condemnation which specifically allows for only 
an easement. You need to identify that statute, and answer this 
matter in context of each of the subparts of Interrogatory No. S. 
For example, subpart (b) asks for a specific description of the law 
that Mr* Preston failed to argue. Subpart (c) asks for dates 
wherein plaintiff failed to argue this law. Subparts (d) and (e) 
ask for facts and documents supporting the allegations. Subpart 
(f) asks for names of individuals who have knowledge regarding the 
same. Finally, subparts (g) and (h) ask for a description of the 
breach of the standard of care that was owed defendant Roller and^  
a description of the damages incurred. You attempt to discuss the' 
damage issue by simply saying that this failure by Mr. Preston to 
argue the law cost additional attorneys' fees, loss of rights, and 
emotional distress. How much did it cost in attorneys' fees? How 
did this matter cause emotional distress to Mr, Koller, and what 
treatment did he receive for it? Please fully answer the question. 
Interrogatory No. 6: You have not provided an answer to this 
interrogatory* I have already identified the inadequacies of your 
answers to Interrogatories 1 through 5, Now, you would like to 
solely rely upon those answers to constitute your answer i;fc Inter-
rogatory No. 6. This will not suffice. You have made* the 
allegation that Mr, Preston failed to raise issues and,jdefenses 
which would have been to the defendant's advantage, saved time, 
saved attorneys' fees, improved the outcome and which caused 
emotional distress, expense, loss of property, and special and 
general damages. We are entitled to answers to each of the 
subparts of Interrogatory No. 6 relative to this allegation. 
Interrogatory No. 7: You gave us no information in response 
to this interrogatory. You specifically alleged that the plaintiff 
had conflicts of interest which interfered with his representation 
of defendant Roller, causing damage• Your answer indicates that 
lfthe plaintiff should be aware of this affiliation.w The plaintiff 
is not aware of what affiliations you were talking about. Your 
general references to affiliations with opposing counsel in a 
lawsuit involving the Thatchers in Cache County gives us no 
information about what you were talking about. Furthermore, your 
reference to Mr. Roller's failure to press charges against a Mr. 
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Buxton; or wanting to drop charges against an A.J. Simmonds; and 
failing to obtain records from the Bear River Association of 
Governments, simply constitutes allegations and gives us no dates, 
case names, or details as to what conflicts Mr. Preston had with 
your client and how they affected the representation of your 
client. We are entitled to a complete answer to each of the 
subparts of Interrogatory No. 7 as to each and every conflict that 
you are alleging. 
Interrogatory No. 8: Your answer to this interrogatory is so 
broad and general that it cannot be comprehended. What "deputy" 
suggested that you obtain records in March of 1984? What case is 
this allegation referring to? What records are you referring to 
that came from the "Town" and "BRAG." This answer needs to be 
developed fully in response to each of the subparts to Interroga-
tory No. 8. We need to know all the records that were "sanitized,ff 
how they were "sanitized," and the parties involved in the same. 
You are the one making the allegation and you are the one that has 
to provide the information. It is also very important to know, 
pursuant to subpart (f) of the interrogatory, how any failure to 
obtain records jeopardized any case of Evan Roller's. 
Interrogatory No. 9: Again, 'this answer simply makes an 
allegation and gives no specifics. What "contract obligation" are 
you referring to? Simply indicating that a meeting was held' on 
November 20, 1979, and describing the parties present Un no way 
answers this interrogatory. You need to respond according to the 
subparts of this interrogatory so that we know what contract rights 
were not enforced. You have given some general information in 
respdnse to this interrogatory. However, we need answers to *each 
subpart to the interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 10: You need to answer all of the subparts 
of the question. Specifically, as per subpart (c), we need 
citations to all statutory and case law authorities that you claim 
entitled Koller to attorney's fees. 
Interrogatory No. 11: Because this answer is not given within 
the context of the subparts of Interrogatory 11, it is much too 
general and broad of an answer to understand. What "issue of 
contract and appropriated water rights" are you referring to that 
was not raised by the plaintiff? How did the plaintiff "want to 
restrict your client's access to use of the water reserved by a 
Contract Deed?" You allege that the plaintiff failed to research 
the Statute authorizing condemnation prior to the trial for 
immediate occupancy and refer to transcripts of October 10, 1986 
and February 9, 1982. What statute are you referring to? What 
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transcripts are you referring to? You claim that Preston failed to 
show that there were nitrate tests taken of the waters that Cornish 
was trying to protect. What case does this allegation refer to, 
what parties were involved, and specifically what nitrate tests are 
you referring to? You also assert to plaintiff's failure to intro-
duce state and federal regulations regarding the history of water 
flows, regulations for pipe sizes, location of service connections 
and quality requirements. You need to specify what regulations you 
were referring to, what case these regulations should have been 
alleged in, etc. Finally, you discuss Mr* Preston's failure to 
properly oppose a motion brought by counsel prior to a trial . This 
allegation is incredibly unspecific. Please respond to Interroga-
tory No. 11 in detail in response to each of the sub-allegations* 
Interrogatory Ho. 12: This answer, though not responding to 
the subparts of Interrogatory No. 12, does give some indication as 
to the allegation regarding lack of due process. However, there is 
no indication whatsoever as to the basis of your claim for viola-
tion of defendant's civil rights. We do not understand how any 
alleged conflict in the Thatcher v. Cache County case, plaintiff's 
failure to understand contract and appropriated rights of Koller, 
and the State of Utah's Public Drinking Water Regulations consti-
tute a violation of civil rights. Perhaps we could understand the 
basis for this allegation if you would properly respond to the 
subparts of Interrogatory No. 12. 
Interrogatory No. 15; You have not described in derail the 
loss of property referred to in defendant's counter claim. As the 
interrogatory requests, we need the dates the property was lost and 
the correspondent conduct of Mr. Preston that directly caused the 
property loss. You claim attorney's fees, and other costs consti-
tute a property loss. Clearly, to have a complete answer, we need 
to know the amount of attorney's fees, witness fees and other costs 
that constitute a loss, and specifically what conduct caused the 
loss and the dates of the same. You refer to "protection zones, 
right-of-ways, loss of crops and other expenses11 that constitute a 
property loss. Again, this is simply an allegation which produces 
no facts. What "protection zone, right of way, lost crops and 
other expenses" are you referring to? What is the value of these 
lost properties? What are the dates that they were lost? What 
conduct of the plaintiff caused these losses? The answers to these 
questions would constitute a complete answer to this interrogatory. 
Simply reciting allegations is insufficient. 
Interrogatory No. 16: Plaintiff understands your allegation 
that he is in possession of overpayment on billings. However, in 
Interrogatory No. 15, you have referred to "witness fees, other 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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costs, protection zones, right-of-ways, loss of crops and other 
expenses'1 that constitute property loss. As a result, you need to 
give the name, address, and telephone number of those individuals 
who are in possession of this lost property. 
Interrogatory No. 18: We take it from your answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 18 that you have not consulted or retained any expert 
relative to the allegations in your counterclaim. If we have mis-
understood your answer, then please supplement it. If you have 
consulted or retained any expert relative to your counterclaim, we 
are entitled to a complete answer to Interrogatory No. 18. 
Interrogatory No. 21: Your answer to this interrogatory is 
incomplete and wholly inappropriate. Plaintiff is entitled to know 
the basis upon which you deny a specific allegation in his 
complaint, i.e., paragraph 2 of the same. You cannot avoid this 
interrogatory by saying that the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff. Please specifically answer each of the subparts of 
Interrogatory No. 21. 
Interrogatory No. 22: Your answer to this interrogatory is 
the same as your answer to Interrogatory No. 21. As a result, our 
request for you to fully answer this interrogatory is the same as 
our request to Interrogatory No. 21, 
Interrogatory No. 23: It is not sufficient to ariswer this 
question by referring to a Supreme Court opinion and letters and 
flboxes of documents11 which are in the plaintiff's possession. The 
Supreme Court opinion refers to error made by the court below. The 
Supreme Court opinion does not address and discuss your response to 
paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint that "plaintiff'sr work in 
1983, and later, required a rehearing and caused damages to the 
plaintiff that should have [been] avoided." We are entitled to a 
complete written answer to each subpart of Interrogatory No. 23. 
Furthermore, if there are specific documents that you are referring 
to and relying upon, then you must identify those documents so that 
plaintiff can determine whether the same should be produced. You 
must remember that your client has all of the documents which were 
produced in the various cases in which Mr. Preston represented Mr* 
Koller, with the exception of certain parts of the Water Appeal 
File that Mr. Preston has a copy of. 
Interrogatory No. 24: For the reasons explained as to Inter-
rogatory No. 21, you have failed to give us an answer to this 
interrogatory and we are entitled to the same. 
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Interrogatory No. 25: For the reasons set forth as to Inter-
rogatory No- 21, we are entitled to an answer to Interrogatory No. 
25-
Interrogatory No, 26: For the reasons set forth as to Inter-
rogatory No. 21, we are entitled to an answer to Interrogatory No. 
?6. 
Interrogatory No. 27: For the reasons set forth as to Inter-
rogatory No. 21 , we are entitled to an answer to Interrogatory No. 
27-
Interrogatory No- 28: Based on the reasons set forth as to 
Interrogatory No. 21, we are entitled to an answer to Interrogatory 
No. 28. 
Requests for Production 
You have ignored our request for production by simply stating 
that you object to providing any additional documents because they 
are contained in plaintiff's files. As mentioned, plaintiff has a 
very small portion of the entire file generated during his repre-
sentation of Mr. Koller. Mr. Koller specifically came and picked 
up all of his files. Therefore, your assertion is without merit 
and it would appear that you are intentionally avoiding production 
of documents. We demand a full production of each '.and every 
document which falls within the categories of our requests for 
production. This would include any and all exhibits that^you rely 
upon as requested in Interrogatory No. ?o. 
We look forward to your immediate and complete response to our 
discovery requests* 
Very truly yoursf 
STRONG & HANNI 
PHC:nh\205sm 
1192.0X6 . 
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IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
PRESTON S CHAMBERS, P.C., 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
EVAN 0. KOLLER, ET UX, 
DEFENDANTS, 
CIVIL NO. 92-690 
DEPOSITION OF 
EVAN 0. KOLLER 
DEPOSITION OF EVAN 0. KOLLER, THE WITNESS 
NAMED HEREIN, TAKEN PURSUANT TO THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE ON THE TENTH DAY OF MAY, 1993, COMMENCING AT ABOUT 
TEN O'CLOCK A.M., AT 31 FEDERAL AVENUE, LOGAN, UTAH, BEFORE 
GEORGE A. PARKER, A NOTARY PUBLIC AND REGISTERED PROFESSION-
AL REPORTER. 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR PLAINTIFF ON 
THE COUNTERCLAIM 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS 
ALSO PRESENT 
STRONG £ HANNI 
GLENN C. HANNI, ESQ. 
SIXTH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, ESQ. 
150 EAST 200 NORTH, SUITE D 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
GEORGE W. PRESTON, ESQ. 
GEORGE A. PARKER, R. P. R. 
559 EAST 1150 NORTH 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
PH. 752-5394 
- C. M. 
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-2-
1 
2 II INDEX OF EXHIBITS1 
3 NUMBER DESCRIPTION 
4 1 LETTER, PRESTON TO KOLLER DTD 10-30-89 
5 2 STATEMENT RE CIVIL RIGHTS 
6 3 STATEMENT RE WATER APPEAL 
7 *t STATEMENT RE CONDEMNATION 
8 5 MONTHLY STATEMENTS RE CIVIL RIGHTS 
9 6 STATEMENT OF 12-27-89 RE CIVIL RIGHTS 
10 II 7 MONTHLY STATEMENTS RE WATER APPEAL 
LETTER OF 6-7-91, KOLLER TO PRESTON 
12 || 9 LETTERS OF 10-1-90, 9-23-90, AND 9-21-90 
13 
11 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
COPY ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL DEPOSITION. 
IDENTIFIED 
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8 
9 
9 
16 
25 
29 
38 
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1 
2 || P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 II EVAN 0. KOLLER, THE WITNESS NAMED HEREIN, 
5 CALLED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF, BEING FIRS T DULY 
6 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
7 EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. HANNI: 
9 II Q WOULD YOU S' ~S YOUR NAME, PLEASE. 
10
 || A EVAN 0. KOLLi.,. 
11
 Q WHAT IS YOUR HOME ADDRESS? 
12 A STREET ADDRESS OR POST OFFICE BOX? 
13 Q STREET, IF YOU'VE GOT ONE. 
14 A STREET? 
15 Q UH-HUH. 
16 A IT'S 12693 NORTH 5800 WEST, CORNISH, UTAH 84308. 
17 Q HOW OLD ARE YOU? 
18
 A SIXTY-THREE. 
19 Q YOUR OCCUPATION IS WHAT? WHAT DO YOU DO FOR A 
20 LIVING? 
21 A AGRICULTURE, AGRIBUSINESS. 
22 Q ARE YOU PRETTY MUCH A NATIVE OF THE CORNISH AREA? 
23 A YES. LIVED MOST OF MY LIFE IN WESTON, IDAHO, 
24 ACROSS THE BORDER. 
25
 Q ARE YOU MARRIED? 
-4-
A YES. 
Q AND YOUR WIFE'S NAME IS WHAT? 
A LORENE. 
Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN MARRIED? 
A OH, ABOUT TWO MONTHS; SOMETHING LIKE THAT. 
Q WERE YOU MARRIED BEFORE THIS --
A YES. 
Q -- MARRIAGE? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOUR WIFE PASS AWAY? IS THAT WHAT HAPPENED? 
A YES. 
Q HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU HAVE? 
A PARDON ME? 
Q HOW MANY CHILDREN? 
A SIX CHILDREN. 
Q WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH GEORGE 
PRESTON? WHEN DID YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM AS ATTORNEY 
AND CLIENT FIRST START? 
A ON THE CORNISH ISSUE? OR PRIOR TO THAT? 
Q PRIOR TO THAT. 
A I DON'T KNOW. IT MAY HAVE BEEN BACK IN THE SIX-
TIES. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME JUST GENERALLY WHAT KIND OF WORK 
HE DID FOR YOU BACK IN THE SIXTIES, WHAT KIND OF PROBLEMS YOU 
HAD? 
- 5 -
1 A OH, I THINK HE DREW UP SOME DEEDS FOR US ON SOME 
2 PROPERTY ACQUISITION OR SOME NG LIKE THAT. PROBABLY DID 
3 SOME WILLS FOR MY MOTHER. WE PURCHASED SOME PROPERTY BACK 
4 IN THEN, AND I THINK HE DID SOME WORK ON SOME OF THAT. 
5 Q WHEN DID THE CORNISH MATTER GET UNDERWAY? 
6 A IN THE LATE SEVENTIES. 
7 Q WERE THERE A NUMBER OF CASES INVOLVED IN THE COR-
8 NISH LITIGATION? 
9 A TEN OR ELEVEN OF THEM, I BELIEVE, DIFFERENT BIL-
10 LINGS. 
11 Q WHAT WERE SOME OF THOSE? WHY DON'T YOU TELL ME 
12 THE KINDS OF CASES THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT? 
13 A OH, I DON'T KNOW AS I CAN REMEMBER ALL OF THEM OFF-
14 HAND. 
15 Q DID YOU HAVE WHAT WAS CALLED A CONDEMNATION CASE? 
16 A YES, THERE WAS A CONDEMNATION CASE. 
17 Q OKAY. 
18 A AND THERE WAS A CIVIL RIGHTS CASE. 
19 Q AND DID YOU HAVE A CASE KNOWN AS THE WATER APPEALS 
20 CASE? 
21 A YES, THERE WAS. LET'S SEE. SOME OF THOSE CASES 
22 I THINK IN THAT NUMBER WERE A WINN CASE, THAT'S W-I-N-N, RAY 
23 WINN, I BELIEVE, AND THERE WERE SOME COLLECTIONS, I BELIEVE, 
24 F--OM SOME OTHER PEOPLE. THERE WERE SOME DEER CASES AND SOME 
25 OF THOSE TYPE THINGS. 
4 
10 
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1 II Q DESCRIBE FOR ME WHAT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GEORGE 
2 WAS OVER THE YEARS UNTIL THIS LAWSUIT GOT GOING. 
3
 II A I DON'T KNOW FOR SURE HOW YOU MEAN THAT. 
Q WELL, I MEAN --
5
 || A HE JUST DID WORK FOR US. 
6 Q HE WORKED FOR YOU AS YOUR LAWYER? 
7 A YES. 
8 Q AND DID HE TRY THE FIRST TOWN OF CORNISH CASE? 
9
 || WAS HE THE ONE THAT TRIED IT FOR YOU? 
A YES. HE WAS PRESENT, I BELIEVE, WHEN WE FIRST MET 
11
 II WITH THE TOWN AND VARIOUS HEALTH AGENCIES IN THE BEAR RIVER 
12
 HEALTH DEPARTMENT BUILDING AT THAT TIME. 
13 Q THAT RELATIONSHIP STARTED, AS FAR AS THE CORNISH 
14 LITIGATION WAS CONCERNED, IN THE LATE SEVENTIES, IS THAT' 
15 RIGHT, OR WAS IT LATER THAN THAT? 
16 A YES, THAT WOULD BE RIGHT. 
17 Q NOW, DID MR. PRESTON BILL YOU FROM TIME TO TIME 
18
 FOR HIS SERVICES AND THE COSTS HE INCURRED? 
19
 A YES, THERE WERE PERIODIC BILLINGS. 
20
 Q AND DID YOU PAY THOSE BILLS? 
21
 A YES, I DID. 
22
 Q PAID ALL OF THEM I MEAN, OVER THE YEARS YOU PAID 
23 THEM ALL EXCEPT THE ONE THAT IS INVOLVED IN THIS LAWSUIT? 
24
 || A AS FAR AS I KNOW. 
Q DO YOU RECALL THAT IN OCTOBER OF 1989 YOU -- WELL, 25 
4 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1
 II LET ME ASK YOU THIS. OVER THE YEARS DID MR. PRESTON SOME-
2
 TIMES CHARGE CERTAIN OF HIS SERVICES ON THE WRONG CASE? DID 
3
 || THAT HAPPEN? 
A I DISCOVERED THIS PARTICULARLY WHEN -- OH, CORNISH 
5
 II AGREED TO PAY OUR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, 
6
 AND I ENDEAVORED TO DETERMINE WHAT THE FEES WERE IN THE CIVIL 
7
 RIGHTS CASE, AND I TRIED TO SEGREGATE AT THAT TIME WHAT 
8
 PORTION OF HIS FEES WERE RELATED TO THAT CASE, AND I HAD A 
9
 || VERY DIFFICULT TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS AN AWFUL LOT OF CROSS 
BILLING AND OTHER THINGS THERE. IN FACT, I WORKED AT IT FOR 
A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, AND I HAD PAPERS STRUNG ALL OVER MY 
OFFICE, AND I FINALLY GAVE IT UP. I DID THE BEST I COULD 
DO, AND THEN I SAID, "THAT'S ENOUGH, I QUIT." I GOT A 
14
 || HEADACHE OUT OF IT. IT'S ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT THINGS 
15 II I FACED IN TRYING TO DO THIS, BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF IT 
16 II Q DO YOU REMEMBER IN OCTOBER OF 1989 THAT YOU MET 
17
 || WITH MR. PRESTON AND WENT OVER THE BILLINGS THAT HAD BEEN 
SENT TO YOU ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, THE CONDEMNATION CASE, 
AND THE WATER APPEALS CASE? CASES. 
A I THINK THERE WAS A NUMBER OF MEETINGS ALONG ABOUT 
THEN WHERE WE WENT OVER SOME OF THESE BILLINGS, AND THERE WAS 
22
 II ONE IN OCTOBER OF '89. I THINK I PAID HIM A CHECK AT THAT 
23
 || TIME ON THE CASE WHICH YOU ARE DISCUSSING HERE TODAY. AND 
WE NOTED OR I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF 
MIXUP IN THE BILLINGS AND THINGS AT THAT TIME. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 
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1 || Q AND AT THAT TIME DID MR. PRESTON MAKE CERTAIN 
2 TRANSFERS FROM ONE CASE TO ANOTHER OF CHARGES AND CREDITS? 
3 A HE DID AFTERWARDS. I PAID HIM WHAT I THOUGHT WAS 
4
 A FAIR PAYMENT ON THAT BILL THAT DAY, AND AFTERWARDS HE 
6 SENT ME A LETTER WHERE HE HAD TRANSFERRED A NUMBER OF THINGS 
6
 BACK AND FORTH, AND AS I LOOKED IT OVER I THOUGHT THERE WERE 
7
 'I SOME ERRORS WITHIN THAT, AND IN FACT I DIDN'^T REALLY UNDER-
8
 || STAND WHAT HE WAS TRY-ING TO "DO. 
Q I'M GOING TO — C-TO COUNSEL) HERE, RAY, I'LL 
GIVE YOU A COPY OF THESE AS I MARK THESE SO YOU KNOW WHAT 
11
 |l WE'RE TALKING, ABOUT, I'M SOIUG-TO SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN 
MARKED AS EXHIBIT ONE. DO YOU RECALL GETTING THAT LETTER 
13
 || ON OR ABOUT THE DATE THAT IT BEARS OR SOON AFTER? 
A DID THIS LETTER COME WITH A BREAKDOWN OF THE BIL-
LING OR WERE THEY SEPARATE OR WHAT? I DON'T REMEMBER THE 
LETTER, RECEIVING IT, PARTICULARLY. I DO REMEMBER HAVING 
SEEN IT IN THE FILE, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THERE WAS A BREAK-
DOWN OF HOW HE HAD TRANSFERRED BILLINGS BACK AND FORTH THAT 
I RECEIVED. THAT I DO RECALL SEEING. 
Q I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT WE'VE MARKED HERE AS EXHIBIT 
TWO, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A STATEMENT ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
CASE DATED OCTOBER 26, 1989. 
MR. MALOUF: AM I SUPPOSED TO JUST PULL THESE OFF 
THE TOP AS YOU DO THESE, GLENN? 
MR. HANNI: LET'S SEE IF I HAVE THE RIGHT ONE. 
9 
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1 II THAT'S THE CONDEMNATION CASE. LET ME GET YOU THE CIVIL 
2 RIGHTS. THERE'S YOU A COPY OF IT. 
3 MR. MALOUF: THANK YOU. 
4 Q DO YOU RECALL SEEING A COPY OF EXHIBIT TWO? 
5 A I'VE SEEN SOME OF THESE, THEY'RE IN THE FILE, YES. 
6 I' I'VE SEEN SOME OF THESE. WHETHER THIS ONE SPECIFICALLY OR 
7 I NOT, THERE ARE SOME OTHERS IN ADDITION TO THIS, ISN'T THERE? 
8 Q WELL, WE'LL GIVE YOU --
9 A THERE'S A WATER APPEALS CASE, ISN'T THERE, OR IS 
10 THIS THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE? 
11 Q UH-HUH. AND WE'LL GET TO THAT IN ABOUT A MINUTE. 
12 MAYBE IT WILL BE BETTER IF I SHOW THEM ALL TO YOU AT ONCE, 
13 AND IT MIGHT HELP REFRESH YOUR MEMORY A LITTLE BIT. I'LL 
14 SHOW YOU EXHIBIT THREE, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A STATEMENT 
15 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1989, ON THE WATER APPEALS CASE. 
16 MR. MALOUF: IS THAT THIS ONE? 
17 MR. HANNI: THAT'S THE CONDEMNATION AGAIN. LET 
18 ME GIVE YOU THE WATER APPEALS. 
19 MR. MALOUF: THANK YOU. 
20 Q (MR. HANNI) AND I'LL SHOW YOU EXHIBIT FOUR, WHICH 
21 APPEARS TO BE ANOTHER STATEMENT DATED OCTOBER 26, 1989, ON 
22 THE CONDEMNATION CASE. 
23 MR'."lMALOUF: WOULD THAT BE THE TOP ONE ON THIS 
24 PILE? 
25 II (CONVERSATION OFF THE RECORD IN LOCATING 
EXHIBITS.) 
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1 II Q (MR. HANNI) NOW IF YOU'LL LOOK AT EXHIBIT ONE, 
2 WHICH IS THE LETTER THAT I GAVE YOU -- DO YOU HAVE EXHIBIT 
3 ONE IN FRONT OF YOU? 
4 A YES, I DO. I DO. 
5 Q ALL RIGHT. AND YOU WILL NOTICE IN THERE THAT 
6 THIS IS A LETTER FROM MR. PRESTON TO YOU AND HE TALKS ABOUT 
7 "SINCE YOUR LAST VISIT TO THIS OFFICE, I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO 
8 REVIEW EACH OF THE BILLS SENT TO YOU OVER THE LAST FOUR 
9 YEARS AND TO TRANSFER ANY BILLINGS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE 
10
 WRONG ACCOUNT TO THE CORRECT ACCOUNT." 
11
 DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR MEMORY THAT YOU --
12 A HE STATES THAT THERE. 
13 Q WELL, DO YOU RECALL GETTING THIS LETTER ABOUT THE 
14 TIME? 
15 A I WOULD SUSPECT THE LETTER MUST HAVE COME WITH 
16 THESE ITEMS. I HAVE SEEN THE LETTER IN THE FILE SOMEWHERE, 
17 SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. I DON'T RECALL IT SPECIFICALLY, 
18
 BUT I DO RECALL THIS SHEET HERE. 
19 Q AND THAT'S EXHIBIT WHAT? 
20 A THIS IS EXHIBIT FOUR. 
21 Q AND THAT'S ON WHICH CASE? 
22 A THAT'S ON THE --
23 Q IT SAYS RIGHT THERE ON THE TOP. 
24
 || A I'M SORRY, THAT'S THE WRONG SHEET. IT'S EXHIBIT 
THREE ON THE WATER APPEAL. 25 
10 
11 
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1 Q OKAY. NOW, ACCORDING TO THIS LETTER IT SAYS, 
2 "ACCORDINGLY, ADJUSTMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN EACH ACCOUNT TO 
3 REFLECT TRANSFERS OF CREDIT: ND CHARGES, AND I ENCLOSE 
4 COPIES OF CURRENT BILLINGS IN EACH OF THE ACCOUNTS." 
5 NOW IF YOU WILL LOOK AT EXHIBIT TWO, THREE, AND 
6 FOUR, EACH OF THOSE BEARS THE SAME DATE, DO THEY NOT, OCTO-
7 BER 26, '89? 
8 A THEY DO. NOW THERE'S ONE OF THESE, NUMBER ONE HAS 
9 || AN OCTOBER 30 DATE. THAT'S THE LETTER. 
Q OKAY. BUT THE ACCOUNTS THEMSELVES, EXHIBITS TWO, 
THREE, AND FOUR, BEAR THE SAME DATE, OCTOBER 26? 
12 A YES, THEY DO. 
13 Q ONE OF THEM IS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, ONE IS ON 
14 THE CONDEMNATION; IS THAT RIGHT? 
15 A AND ONE ON THE WATER APPEAL. 
16 Q AND ONE ON THE WATER APPEAL. OKAY. 
17 A THEY'RE DESIGNATED CODE 'NUMBERS 07, 03, AND 10. 
i8
 Q NOW, THE LETTER GOES ON TO SAY, "YOU WILL NOTE 
19 THAT THE CONDEMNATION CASE HAS A ZERO BALANCE NOW, HOWEVER, 
20 HAD A $1,500 CREDIT THAT WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE WATER AP-
21 PEAL." 
22 A NOW WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? THAT THE CONDEMNATION 
23 CASE HAS BEEN OVERPAID? 
24 Q WELL, DOES YOUR CONDEMNATION CASE SHOW A ZERO 
25
 BALANCE? 
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1 II A IT DOES ON THIS PAPER. 
2 Q THEN IT GOES ON TO SAY, "THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNT 
3 IS $4,133." DOES THAT SHOW ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILLING? 
4 A ON THE SECOND SHEET IT DOES. 
5 Q OKAY. "AND THE BALANCE ON THE WATER APPEALS, WHICH 
6 ACCOUNT NOW RELATES BACK TO 1978, IS $5,732.43." DOES THAT 
7 SHOW THAT AS A BALANCE? 
8 11 A THIS SECOND SHEET SHOWS $5,792.43. 
9 Q 792? LET ME SEE THAT A MINUTE, MAY I? 
10 (PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL CONFER.) 
11 Q (MR. H A N N O THE LETTER SAYS ?5,732.43 -- WOULD YOU 
12 CHECK THAT? -- BUT THE BILLING ITSELF IS $5,792.43; IS THAT 
13 RIGHT? 
14 A TYPICAL. 
15 Q OKAY. "GIVING YOU CREDIT FOR THE $2,393.45 RECENT-
16 LY PAID." 
17 A IT SHOWS A CREDIT OF THAT AMOUNT. THE LETTER 
18 STATES THAT, YOU MEAN. OKAY. THE BILLING SHOWS A CREDIT 
19 OF THAT AMOUNT. 
20 Q AND THE LETTER SAYS SO TOO; RIGHT? 
21 A YES, IT DOES. 
22 Q "THE PRESENT BALANCE" -- FOLLOW ME ON THIS LETTER 
23 NOW, MR. KOLLER -- "THE PRESENT BALANCES ARE AS CLOSE AS I 
24 CAN SEPARATE THE ACCOUNTS. INITIALLY THE WATER APPEAL CASE 
25 STARTED TO BE THE ACCOUNT IN WHICH CIVIL RIGHTS WAS CREDITED 
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1 II TO PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE SEPARATION 
2 OF THE ACCOUNTS. WE HAVE GONE BACK AND SEPARATED THOSE 
3 ACCOUNTS OUT. WHEN YOU HAVE MADE PAYMENTS, WE HAVE CREDITED 
4 THAT PAYMENT TO THE ACCOUNT YOU HAVE DESIGNATED AND WHERE 
5 NO DESIGNATION HAS BEEN MADE THEY HAVE BEEN CREDITED TO 
6 PROBABLY CONDEMNATION AND WATER. HOWEVER, I THINK IN THE 
7 VAST MAJORITY OF INSTANCES YOU DESIGNATED THE ACCOUNT TO 
8 RECEIVE THE CREDIT." 
9 WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT? 
10
 A I DID DESIGNATE WHICH ACCOUNTS NEEDED TO BE PAID 
11
 UP, AND I TRIED TO KEEP THOSE ACCOUNTS IN ORDER. IN THE 
12 CIVIL RIGHTS CASE HE HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WAIT ON 
13 HALF OF THE BILLING OF THAT UNTIL THAT CASE WAS OVER WITH, 
14 AND THERE WAS SOME UNDERSTANDING THAT POSSIBLY THAT BILLING 
15 MIGHT BE DISCOUNTED DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE, 
16 AND AS I WENT THROUGH THIS THING IN TRYING TO FIND OUT HOW 
1 7 (I MUCH WAS DUE ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, WHICH CORNISH AGREED 
TO PAY, I FOUND THAT THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE HAD BEEN OVERPAID, 
AND THEN WHEN I GOT THIS MATERIAL FROM HIM I WAS QUITE CON-
20 || FUSED AS TO WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO HERE. IT LOOKED TO ME 
21 LIKE HE STARTED TRANSFERRING THINGS OUT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
22 CASE INTO THE WATER APPEAL CASE IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE PAYMENT, 
23 AND I THINK IF YOU SEARCH THE RECORDS YOU'LL FIND SOME OF 
24
 || THOSE BILLS WHICH WERE TRANSFERRED HAVE ALREADY BEEN PAID. 
Q WELL, MR. KOLLER, WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET AT HERE, 
18 
19 
25 
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1 II IF I CAN, IS TO SEE IF YOU RECALL THAT IN OCTOBER OF 1989 
2 YOU CAME INTO MR. PRESTON'S OFFICE AND SAID TO HIM, "LOOK, 
3 YOU HAVE CHARGED CERTAIN OF YOUR SERVICES TO AN INCORRECT 
4
 ACCOUNT OR YOU HAVE GIVEN ME -- OR YOU HAVE CREDITED CERTAIN 
5
 PAYMENTS I HAVE MADE TO AN INCORRECT ACCOUNT," AND DIDN'T 
6 YOU AND MR. PRESTON SIT DOWN AND GO THROUGH THE CONDEMNATION 
7 CASE, THE WATER CASE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, AND DIDN'T 
8 YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT CHARGES SHOULD BE MADE TO WHAT CASE AND 
9
 II WHAT CREDITS SHOULD BE MADE TO WHAT CASE, AND AREN'T THESE 
EXHIBITS ONE THROUGH FOUR THE RESULT OF THAT MEETING IN OCTO-
11
 BER OF 1989? IS THAT A FAIR CHARACTERIZATION OF IT? 
12
 A IT SEEMS TO ME THAT I WAS IN HIS OFFICE BACK IN 
13 JUNE, JULY, PRIOR TO THIS OCTOBER THING, AND WE WBNT OVER 
14 SOME OF THESE THINGS, AND I BELIEVE THERE'S SOME CORRESPON-
15 DENCE OR SOMETHING, AS I RECALL, FROM HIM AT THAT TIME RE-
16 GARDING THE BILLINGS, AND AT THE OCTOBER MEETING IT SEEMED 
17 TO ME THAT I HAD PAID HIM EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
18
 II CASE. AND THEN WHEN I GOT THIS THING TRANSFERRING THESE 
THINGS AROUND THIS WAY, I WAS QUITE CONFUSED. IN FACT, IT 
SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE SOME LETTERS WHERE HE SAYS, "THESE 
21
 II ACCOUNTS HAVE BEEN PAID UP EXCEPT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE 
22
 AND THE WATER APPEAL CASE," AND NOW WHEN WE START CHANGING 
23 THESE THINGS AROUND I WAS REALLY -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT — I 
24
 || WAS CONFUSED AT THAT SITUATION. 
Q DIDN'T MR. PRESTON BILL YOU ON A MONTHLY BASIS, 
19 
20 
25 
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1 GENERALLY SPEAKING? 
2 A GENERALLY. 
3 Q OVER THE YEARS THAT WAS TRUE? 
4 A YEAH, GENERALLY. AND GENERALLY I JUST PAID THOSE 
5 BILLINGS WITHOUT QUESTIONING THEM. THEY GOT DOWN TO WHERE 
6 I STARTED LOOKING INTO THOSE BILLINGS ALONG IN THAT YEAR, 
7 AND THERE WERE SOME PROBLEMS THEREIN, AND IT WAS PRIOR TO 
8 THIS OCTOBER MEETING THAT SOME OF THIS WAS DONE. WHEN I CAME 
9 IN THE OCTOBER MEETING, I DO NOT RECALL GOING OVER ALL OF 
10 THESE BILLINGS AT THAT TIME BUT PAYING HIM A CERTAIN AMOUNT 
11 AND TELLING HIM I THOUGHT THAT THAT WAS PAID, AND EVIDENTLY 
12 IT'S AFTER THAT THAT HE WENT THROUGH HIS BILLINGS AND TRIED 
13 TO STRAIGHTEN THEM OUT. 
14 Q WELL, IF YOU'LL LOOK AT EXHIBIT ONE, DOESN'T IT' 
15 TELL YOU THERE THAT YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN A CREDIT FOR THE 
16 $2393 -^5 RECENTLY PAID? 
17 A SEE, THAT'S THE AMOUNT I PAID HIM THAT DAY. 
18 Q THAT WAS THE DAY YOU MET WITH HIM? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q RIGHT? 
21 A YES. 
22 Q AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AROUND IN OCTOBER OF '89? 
23 A I THINK IT WAS THE THIRD OF OCTOBER, TO BE EXACT. 
24 Q AND THEN YOU DID RECEIVE THIS LETTER THAT WE'VE 
25 MARKED AS EXHIBIT ONE, WHICH IS DATED OCTOBER 30 OF '89? 
10 
11 
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1 II A YES, EVIDENTLY. I'VE SEEN THE LETTER SOMETIME. 
2 WHAT I DO RECALL IS THIS ONE RIGHT HERE ON THE WATER APPEAL, 
3 AND THE REST WERE PROBABLY WITH IT. 
4 Q AND WITH IT YOU GOT A COPY OF THE STATEMENTS ON 
5 EACH OF THE CASES, THE CONDEMNATION, THE CIVIL RIGHTS, AND 
6 THE WATER APPEAL. IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? 
7 A I PROBABLY RECEIVED THEM. AS I SAID, I DON'T 
8 RECALL THEM, BUT IF I START DIGGING THROUGH I THINK I COULD--
9 || THEY MAY BE THERE. 
Q NOW FOLLOWING THAT, WHEN YOU CAME INTO MR. PRES-
TON'S OFFICE, IF WE CAN FIND, JUDD, THESE SUBSEQUENT BIL-
1 2 II LINGS --
13 (COUNSEL AND PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
14 MR. MALOUF: DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THAT FOR ME? 
15 MR. HANNI: I THINK I'VE GIVEN YOU THE OCTOBER 26. 
16 MR. MALOUF: OH, YOU'RE GETTING ANOTHER ONE. 
17 MR. HANNI: I'M JUST FINDING MINE HERE NOW. WHAT 
18 EXHIBIT NUMBER DID WE MARK THAT? 
19 MR. MALOUF: THAT WOULD BE HIS EXHIBIT TWO, THE 
20 CIVIL RIGHTS ONE. 
21 MR. HANNI: OKAY. 
22 (COUNSEL AND PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
23 MR. HANNI: OKAY, LET'S MARK THIS AS THE NEXT 
24 ONE, GEORGE. 
25
 II Q (MR. HANNI) WE HAVE MARKED HERE EXHIBIT FIVE, AND 
10 
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1 || THIS IS A SERIES OF BILLINGS, FOR THE RECORD, ON THE CIVIL 
2 RIGHTS CASE, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS NOVEMBER 30, 1989. 
3 MR. MALOUF: DO YOU HAVE COPIES FOR ME? 
4 MR. HANNI: YEAH, I WILL IN JUST A SECOND. 
5 Q (MR. HANNI) DECEMBER 27, '89; FEBRUARY 1, 1990; 
6 MARCH 1 OF 1990; MARCH 30, 1990; MAY 31, 1990; AND JUNE 28, 
7 1990. ALL RIGHT, GOING TO EXHIBIT FIVE -- WELL, FIRST OF 
8 ALL, WHAT'S OUR EXHIBIT NUMBER ON THE OCTOBER -- THAT'S 
9
 II EXHIBIT TWO. TAKE A LOOK AT EXHIBIT TWO, WILL YOU, AND 
TELL ME WHAT THE BALANCE DUE IS AS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT TWO. 
11
 A SHOWS $4,133.41. 
12 Q OKAY. NOW GOING TO EXHIBIT FIVE, THE FIRST SHEET 
13 OF THAT SHOWS A STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 30, 1989; IS THAT 
14 RIGHT? 
15 A YES, IT DOES. 
16 Q AND THE BALANCE IS WHAT? 
17 || A SAYS $4,133.41. 
Q OKAY. THEN WE GO TO THE NEXT ONE, WHICH IS DECEM-
BER 27, 1989. DOES THAT SHOW A BALANCE FROM PREVIOUS BAL-
ANCE OF $4,133.41? 
21 || A NO, THIS ONE SHOWS $ 4 , 193.41. THERE'S SOMETHING 
22 ELsE FOR SOMETHING. 
23 Q WELL, YOU SEE UP ABOVE THERE, BALANCE FROM PREVI-
24
 || OUS BILL? 
A OH, OKAY. IT DOES SHOW THAT. 
18 
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1 II Q AND THEN DO YOU SEE AN ENTRY THERE TRANSFER FROM 
2 204-07 IN HANDWRITING, $60? 
3 A WHAT DOES THAT SAY, X FOR WHAT? 
4 Q TRANSFER. X-FER. 
5 A TRANSFER FROM 204-07. 
6 Q YEAH. DO YOU SEE THAT? 
7 A PLUS $60. 
8 Q THE 60. AND THAT LEAVES A BALANCE OF $4,193.41. 
9 IS THAT WHAT --
10
 A THIS WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THIS BILL THAT WAS 
11
 ZEROED OUT? 
12 MR. PRESTON: 07 WOULD BE YOUR — 
13 THE WITNESS: CONDEMNATION. 
14 MR. PRESTON: YES, CONDEMNATION ACCOUNT. 
15 THE WITNESS: SEE, THAT HAD A ZERO BALANCE ON 
16 OCTOBER 26. HOW DID HE TRANSFER $60 FROM IT ON DECEMBER 27? 
17 Q (MR. HANNI) WELL, ALL I'M ASKING YOU, DO YOU SEE1 
18
 THAT ENTRY ON THAT BILL? 
19
 A WELL, I SEE IT ON THIS SHEET OF PAPER. THIS IS 
20 THE FIRST TIME I'VE SEEN THIS SHEET OF PAPER. 
21 Q WELL, ALL RIGHT, LET'S KEEP GOING NOW. LET'S GO 
22 TO YOUR FEBRUARY FIRST, 1990, PAGE THREE. 
23 A AND IT STILL SAYS $4,133.41. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 
24 $60? 
25 Q OKAY. GO TO YOUR NEXT PAGE, MARCH 1 OF 1990. 
A THIS STILL SHOWS $4,133.41. 
Q GO TO YOUR NEXT, MARCH 30, 1990. 
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1 II A STILL SHOWS THE SAME. 
2 Q $4,133.41. 
3 A NOW IS THAT MARCH Oft MAY? 
4 II Q THAT'S MARCH 30. 
5 A YEAH, I'VE GOT A MARCH 30. 
6 II Q ALL RIGHT. 
7 A MAYBE I SKIPPED A PAGE HERE. I DON'T KNOW. I 
8 THOUGHT I WAS FOLLOWING IT PAGE BY PAGE. MAYBE I GOT TWO 
9 OF THEM. OKAY, THERE'S FEBRUARY, MARCH 1, MARCH 30, MAY 
10 31. WHAT HAPPENED TO APRIL? THAT WOULD BE THE MARCH 31, 
11 WOULDN'T IT? MARCH 30. 
12 Q ALL RIGHT. OKAY. NOW, DO YOU SEE YOUR STATEMENT 
13 WHICH IS PART OF EXHIBIT FIVE DATED MAY '31, 1990? 
14 A YES. 
15 MR. MALOUF: I DON'T HAVE A COPY OF THAT. 
16 A MAY 31, 1990. SHOWS PAID $4,133.41, 6-7-90. 
17 THAT'S WRITTEN ON THE MAY 31ST STATEMENT. 
18 Q RIGHT. 
19 MR. MALOUF: IT'S WRITTEN ON JUNE 28 FOR MY COPY. 
20 I DON'T HAVE A COPY OF THAT PAGE. HAVE YOU GOT AN EXTRA 
21 ONE? 
22 MR. HANNI: LET'S SEE IF WE'VE GOT THEM IN THE 
23 WRONG CHRONOLOGY. 
24 II MR. MALOUF: I ALREADY REORDERED THEM AS BEST I 
COULD. THEY WERE STAPLED IN A DIFFERENT ORDER, AND I PUT 25 
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THEM IN ORDER AS THEY EXIST, BUT THAT PAGE IS MISSING. 
MR. PRESTON: THERE'S NO MAY BILLING IN THERE. 
MR. HANNI: NO, THERE ISN'T. YEAH, THERE IS. 
MR. PRESTON: OH, RIGHT ON TOP. OKAY. 
MR. HANNI: YEAH. THERE'S YOUR MAY. 
MR. MALOUF: WAIT A SECOND. WHERE IS MY COVER 
SHEET THEN? OH. EXCUSE ME, YOU'RE CORRECT. WHAT IS THE 
FIRST SHEET ON YOUR COPY? 
MR. HANNI: MY EXHIBIT FIVE? 
MR. MALOUF: EX-IBIT FIVE, YES. 
MR. HANNI: THE FIRST ONE IS NOVEMBER 30, 198^. 
MR. MALOUF: ALL RIGHT. THAT WILL HELP ME. 
THE WITNESS: THEN THE NEXT ONE IS THIS ONE. 
MR. MALOo": YEAH, I'VE GOT THAT. 
Q CMR. HANNI) ALL RIGHT, NOW GOING AGAIN TO EXHIBIT 
FIVE AND THE STATEMENT DATED MAY 31, 1990. DO YOU SEE 
THERE'S A NOTATION ON THERE PAID $4,133.41 ON JUNE 7, 1990? 
A CORRECT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION 
THAT YOU DID PAY THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILLING — 
A WELL, YEAH. 
Q -- AT ABOUT THAT TIME? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. THE CORNISH PEOPLE WANTED TO 
DROP THAT CASE, VOLUNTEERED TO PAY OUR BILLING. THEY DIDN'T 
VOLUNTEER, I REQUIRED IT. AND THEY AGREED TO DO SO, AND I 
10 
11 
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1 II HAD TO COME UP WITH AN ACCOUNTING OF HOW MUCH WAS IN THIS. 
2 IT WAS PROBABLY A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GEORGE ABOUT 
3
 THAT TIME AS TO HOW MUCH THAT BILLING WAS, AND I PAID IT. 
4
 Q ALL RIGHT. THEN LOOK AT YOUR LAST PAGE OF EXHIBIT 
5
 II FIVE. DO YOU SEE THAT? 
A JUNE 28, 1990 
7
 || Q YES. AND WHAT KIND OF A BALANCE DOES IT SHOW? 
8
 A THE END FIGURE THERE IS ZERO. 
9
 || Q OKAY. ALL RIGHT, NOW I'VE GONE THROUGH THAT WITH 
YOU, MR. KOLLER, JUST TO HELP REFRESH YOUR MEMORY. IT'S 
BEEN A LONG TIME AGO. BUT DOES IT REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION 
12
 II NOW THAT YOU CAME IN IN OCTOBER OF 1989? 
13
 A I WAS IN THERE ON THE THIRD AND PAID HIM. 
14
 Q OKAY. AND YOU GOT THE LETTER OF — WHICH WE HAVE 
15 MARKED EXHIBIT ONE; RIGHT? 
16 A APPARENTLY I DID WITH THESE OTHER BILLINGS. 
17
 || Q AND YOU GOT EXHIBITS TWO, THREE, AND FOUR THAT 
18
 " CAME WITH THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 30? 
19
 || A APPARENTLY. 
Q AND FOLLOWING THAT YOU GOT BILLED STARTING WITH 
NOVEMBER 30 OF 1989 FOR THE $4,133.41, AND THAT WENT ON 
THROUGH UNTIL MAY 31, 1990, BILLING SHOWS THAT ON JUNE 
SEVEN OF 1990 YOU PAID THE $4,133.41. 
A ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE. 
Q YES. AND YOU AGREE THAT THAT OCCURRED? 
20 
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1 A EVIDENTLY. 
2 Q OKAY. 
3 A WHAT I CAN'T VERIFY FOR YOU IS IF THE BILLINGS 
4 ARE CORRECT ON THAT. I DID THE BEST I COULD DO WITH THEM, 
5 AND MAYBE GEORGE HAD DONE THE BEST HE COULD DO WITH THEM, 
6 BUT I CANNOT VERIFY THE VERACITY OF THOSE BILLINGS. IN 
7 FACT, THERE ARE SOME VERY REAL QUESTIONS. 
8 Q BUT YOU DID THE BEST YOU COULD AND GEORGE DID THE 
9 BEST HE COULD; RIGHT? 
10
 A EVIDENTLY. 
11
 Q AND YOU PAID THE BILL ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS? 
12 A YES. 
13 CCOUNSEL AND PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
14 Q CAN YOU GIVE ME THE EXHIBIT NUMBER OVER THERE ON 
15 THE CONDEMNATION? 
16 A THE EXHIBIT NUMBER HERE IS NUMBER FOUR ON THE 
17 CONDEMNATION. 
18
 Q LET ME SEE THAT. (CONFERS WITH PLAINTIFF.) 
19 SO THIS WAS EXHIBIT -- TELL ME AGAIN. 
20 A THAT'S THE CONDEMNATION. 
21 Q AND WHAT'S THE EXHIBIT NUMBER? 
22 A 07. OH, THE EXHIBIT NUMBER. OH. I JUST GAVE IT 
23 || TO YOU. WHAT HAPPENED TO IT? NUMBER FOUR. 
Q HERE WE GO. HERE WE GO. ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT, 24 
25
 NOW LOOKING AT EXHIBIT NUMBER FOUR, THIS IS YOUR BILLING ON 
8 
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1 J| THE CONDEMNATION CASE THAT LAME WITH YOUR LETTER OF EXHIBIT 
2
 ONE. WE'VE At READY IDENTIFIED THAT; IS THAT RIGHT? EXHI3IT 
3
 ONE IS THE LETTER. THIS IS YOUR LETTER, RIGHT HERE. 
4
 A I WOULD THINK. THERE'S A DIFFERENCE IN DATES ON 
5
 THFM. ONE IS DATED OCTOBER 26, THE OTHER IS OCTOBER 30, AND 
6
 WHETHER THEY CAME TOGETHER OR NOT 1 DON'T RECALL AT THIS TIME 
7
 II 0 WELL, JUST SO THAT WE -- I THINK WE'VE BEEN THROUGH 
THIS MR. KOLLER, BUT LET'S LOOK AT YOUR -- LET'S LOOK AT 
9
 || THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 30. ALL RIGHT, LOOKING NOW AT EXHIBIT 
10
 " ONE, ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN ON THE FIRST PARAGRAPH. YOU NOTICE 
WHERE IT SAYS, "YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE CONDEMNATION CASE HAS 
A ZERO BALANCE NOW." DO YOU SEE THAT? 
A THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. 
Q AND SHOWING YOU EXHIBIT FOUR, THAT SHOWS A ZERO 
BALANCE, DOESN'T IT? 
16
 || A YES, IT DOES. 
17
 || Q OKAY. (CONFERS WITH THE PLAINTIFF.) 
THE WITNESS: COULD YOU HELP ME A LITTLE BIT WITH 
EXHIBIT FOUR AND WHAT THOSE FIGURES MEAN THERE ON THAT? 
Q ON EXHIBIT FOUR? 
A YEAH. 
Q WHAT IS YOUR QUESTION? 
A WELL, IT STARTS OUT HE'S TRANSFERRED FROM THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS 65 AND FROM CIVIL RIGHTS 85 AND FROM CIVIL RIGHTS 55, 
AND HE TRANSFERS TO A BASSETT CASE A HUNDRED FORTY DOLLARS. 
11 
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1
 II DOES THAT MEAN THAT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THEN THE CONDEMNATION 
2
 AND TRANSFERRED TO BASSETT? 
3
 (I Q THAT'S SOMETHING THAT I CANNOT ANSWER FOR YOU. I 
WOULD IF I COULD, BUT YOU'LL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY, OR YOUR 
LAWYER WILL, LATER ON, TO ASK MR. PRESTON ABOUT THAT, AND 
6
 || I'M SURE HE CAN STRAIGHTEN IT OUT. 
7
 || A WELL, AM I TO UNDERSTAND THE BOTTOM OF THIS COLUMN 
OF FIGURES THAT THERE'S A CREDIT TRANSFERRED TO THE WATER 
APPEAL OF $1,500? 
MR. HANNI: THAT'S WHAT T- T SAYS, ISN'T IT? 
MR. PRESTON: THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT IT SAYS. 
Q (MR. HANNI) THE ANSWER TS YES, BUT IF YOU'LL LOOK 
AT EXHIBIT ONE, THE FIRST PARAGRA* THAT'S THE LETTER, IT 
SAYS -- YOU NOTICE ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN -- "YOU WILL NOTE THAT 
15
 || THE CONDEMNTION CASE HAS A ZERO BALANCE NOW. HOWEVER, HAD A 
16
 II $1,500 CREDIT THAT WAS TRANSFERRED TO WATER APPEAL." 
17
 || A OKAY. AND THEN THAT REFLECTS UPON EXHIBIT THREE 
I BELIEVE IT IS. IT SHOWS A MINUS $1,500 THERE THAT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUBTRACTED OUT OF THE BALAN " OWED ON THE WATER 
APPEAL? IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. HANNI: IS THAT TRUE? 
MR. PRESTON: YES. EXACTLY. 
MR. HANNI: THE ANSWER IS YES. 
THE WITNESS: ALL RIGHT. JUST SO WE UNDERSTAND 
WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE. 
18 
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1 Q (MR. HANNI) WHAT EXHIBIT NUMBER IS THIS (HANDING 
2 THE WITNESS A DOCUMENT)? IS THAT THREE? 
3 A YES, THAT WOULD BE EXHIBIT FOUR, WOULDN'T IT? 
4 MR. MALOUF: IT'S EXHIBIT NUMBER FOUR. 
5 Q EXHIBIT FOUR. I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU NOW WHAT HAS 
6 BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT SIX, AND THIS APPEARS TO BE A STATE-
7 MENT DATED DECEMBER 27, 1989, ON THE CONDEMNATION CASE. 
8 (CONFERS WITH THE PLAINTIFF.) NOWT YOU WILL NOTICE WE'VE 
9 ALREADY GONE THROUGH THE FACT THAT EXHIBIT FOUR SHOWS THE 
10 CONDEMNATION CASE BEING ZEROED OU'. THAT'S THE STATEMENT 
11 DATED OCTOBER -- NO, EXHIBIT FOUR YOU'LL HAVE TO LOOK AT. 
12 YOU'RE LOOKING AT SIX, AREN'T YOU? 
13 A YES. YES, I AM, BUT THAT'S --
14 Q BUT FOUR SHOWS IT BEING ZEROED OUT. DO YOU SEE 
II 
15 THAT? 
16 A YES. 
17 Q ALL RIGHT. THEN EXHIBIT SI WHICH IS DATED 
18 DECEMBER 27, 1989, SHOWS THE CONDEMNATION CASE WITH A BAL-
19 ANCE OF $1,486.65. DO YOU SEE THAT? 
20 A $1,486.65 TOTAL CHARGES. 
21 Q TOTAL CHARGES, RIGHT. 
22 A UH-HUH. 
23 (COUNSEL AND THE PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
24 Q NOW LOOKING AT THE SECOND PAGE OF EXHIBIT SIX, 
25 YOU'LL NOTICE SOME WRITING THERE, HANDWRITING. 
10 
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1 A YES, I DO. 
2 Q WHERE THERE ARE SOME PLUSES AND MINUSES, AND OVER 
3 ON THE --
4 A WELL, IT SHOWS THE $1,440 AND THEN IT SHOWS A 
5 MINUS 60 THAT BRINGS IT DOWN TO 1,366, OR IS THAT 1,410? 
6 WHAT IS IT? CAN YOU TELL ME? 
7 (COUNSEL AND THE PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
8 MR. PRESTON: NOW WHY THE 1,410 I DON'T KNOW. 
9 || (CONFERS FURTHER WITH COUNSEL.) 
Q (MR. HANNI) IN ANY EVENT, YOU NOTICE OVER THERE 
11
 ON THE LEFT IT SAYS PAID $1,606.65 ON JANUARY FIFTH OF 1990? 
12 A FROM THIS BILLING I CAN'T SEE WHY. 
13 Q WELL --
14 A I SEE THAT NOTATION ON THERE, BUT FROM THIS BILLING 
15 I CAN'T SEE WHY. 
16 Q WELL, DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE YOU DIDN'T 
17 PAY THAT AMOUNT ON THAT DAY? 
18
 || A I PROBABLY DID. I THINK WE'VE SUBMITTED TO YOU THE 
AMOUNTS WHICH WE PAID, AND IN LOOKING AT THIS BILLING I CAN'T 
20 II JUSTIFY THAT PAYMENT. 
21 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE, AS YOU SIT HERE 
22 TODAY, THAT YOU DIDN'T PAY THE $1,606.65? 
23 A I DON'T HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE I DIDN'T PAY IT, 
24
 || BUT I'M WONDERING IF THIS PAYMENT INCLUDED PAYMENT ON SOME-
THING ELSE, BECAUSE I CAN'T JUSTIFY THAT PAYMENT FROM THIS 
19 
25 
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1 BILLING. 
2 Q IN OTHER WORDS, YOU CAN'T, LOOKING AT THESE NUMBERS^ 
3 YOU CAN'" "AKE THEM ADD UP TO $1,606.65; IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE 
4
 SAYING? 
5 A YEAH, THAT'S CORRECT. DOES 60 FROM 1410 COME TO 
6 1366? SIXTY-FIVE OR WHATEVER IT IS. AND THEN THERE'S A 
7 60 ADDED IN, AND WHAT'S THAT FOR? IT BRINGS THAT UP TO 
8 $1,420.65, AND THEN THERE'S $10 EVIDENTLY TAKEN OFF, AND 
9 THAT'S EVIDENTLY FOR A TRAFFIC TICKET OR SOMETHING UP THERE 
10
 THAT'S CIRCLED, AND THAT BRINGS IT DOWN TO $1,410.65. AND 
11
 THEN TncRE'S A MINUS 60, WHICH INSTEAD OF MINUSING IT IT WAS 
12 ADDED, WHICH BRINGS UP TO $1,470.65. THEN THERE'S A FIGURE 
13 OVER HERE OF $1,536.65 AND THEN BELOW THAT THERE'S A $1,496.-
14 65, AND THEN UP HERE IT SHOWS AS PAID $1,606.65, AND I 
15 CANNOT MAKE HEADS OR TAILS OUT OF IT FROM THIS BILLING. BUT 
16 IT DOES SHOW THAT WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP OUR BILLINGS CUR-
17 II RENT. 
Q NOW IF YOU LOOK AT THE FRONT PAGE, MAYBE THAT HELPS 
19
 || US IN SOME WAY, I DON'T KNOW. 
20 || A WELL, THE FRONT PAGE SHOWS THAT THERE'S SOME OF 
THIS THAT WAS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, IT'S SO LISTED. GOT 
22 II THREE HOURS THERE FOR RESEARCH CIVIL RIGHTS, AND YET THIS IS 
23 II BILLED TO THE CONDEMNATION CASE. AS I TOLD YOU, IT BECAME 
IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE ALL THE BILLINGS THAT WAS IN THIS 
THING AND COME UP WITH A FIGURE THAT ANYONE WOULD BELIEVE. 
18 
21 
24 
25 
-28-
1 Q WHEN YOU LOOK AT EXHIBIT SIX DO YOU SEE THE NUMBER 
2 $1,496.65? 
3 A UP AT THE TOP, YES. 
4 Q AND DO YOU SEE A HUNDRED TEN? 
5 A ADDED TO IT. 
6 Q AND THAT GIVES 1,606. 
7 A WHAT'S THE HUNDRED TEN FOR? IS THERE ANY BREAKDOWN 
8 OF WHAT THAT'S FOR? 
9 Q I'M JUST ASKING YOU, DO YOU SEE THOSE NUMBERS? 
10
 A I SEE THEM THERE, BUT WHAT I'M WONDERING, HOW DID 
11
 WE ARRIVE AT THIS FIGURE? 
12 Q WELL, I CANNOT ANSWER YOU ON THAT, BUT DO YOU NO-
13 TICE ON THE SECOND PAGE IT SHOWS THAT YOU PAID $1,606.65? 
14 A YES, AND MY QUESTION IS, WAS PART OF THIS PAYMENT 
15 ON ANOTHER BILL? 
16 Q AND THE LAST QUESTION, YOU HAVE NO REASON TO BE-
17 LIEVE YOU DIDN'T PAY $1,606.65 ON JANUARY FIFTH OF 1990? 
18
 A NO, I DON'T. 
19 Q OKAY. 
20 A BUT I OFTEN PAID HIM FOR MORE THAN ONE OF THE CASES 
21 AT A TIME IN ONE CHECK, AND THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE CASE HERE. 
22 I DO NOT KNOW. BUT LOOKING AT THIS IT'S EVIDENTLY BEEN 
23 II OVERPAID. 
Q IF IT'S OVERPAID, HOW MUCH IS IT OVERPAID, IN YOUR 24 
25
 MIND? 
10 
11 
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1 II A WELL, IF YOU MINUS THIS $60 DOWN HERE INSTEAD OF 
2 ADD IT FROM THE 1,410, THAT BRINGS THAT DOWN TO ABOUT 1,350; 
3 1,350 FROM 1606 IS APPROXIMATELY -- WHAT IS IT, $150? SOME-
4 WHERE IN THAT NEIGHBORHOOD. 
5 (COUNSEL AND THE PLATNTIFF CONFER.) 
6 Q NOW LOOKING AT EXHIBIT THREE, WE'VE ALREADY TOUCHED 
7 ON THAT, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT YOUR LETTER EXHIBIT ONE YOU WILL 
8 NOTE IN THAT IN EXHIBIT ONE, NEAR THE END OF THE FIRST PARA-
9 II GRAPH, THE LETTER SAYS, "THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNT IS 
$4,133 AND THE BALANCE ON THE WATER APPEALS, WHICH ACCOUNT 
NOW RELATES BACK TO 1978, IS $5,732.43." DO YOU SEE THAT --
12 || A THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. 
13 Q — IN THAT LETTEP 0 
14 A THAT WHAT IT SAYS. 
15 Q OKAY. AND WE'VE ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS, BECAUSE 
16 IF YOU LOOK AT EXHIBIT THREE, INSTEAD OF IT BEING $5,732.43 
17 IT SHOWS A BALANCE OF $5,792.43. 
18
 A THAT'S WHAT IT SHOWS. 
19
 Q DO YOU NOTICE THAT? 
20 A THAT'S WHAT IT SHOWS. 
21 Q OKAY. 
22 A I DISPUTE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THAT, BUT THAT'S 
23 WHAT IT SHOWS. 
24 Q I SHOW YOU EXHIBIT NUMBER SEVEN. (CONFERS WITH 
25
 THE PLAINTIFF.) I'M SHOWING YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS 
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1 II EXHIBIT SEVEN, AND THIS CONSISTS, IF MY COUNT IS RIGHT, OF 
2 TWENTY PAGES AND APPEARS TO BE MONTHLY BILLINGS OR APPROXI-
3 MATELY MONTHLY BILLINGS STARTING NOVEMBER 30, 1989, AND 
4 ENDING AUGUST 2, 1991, ON THE WATER APPEALS CASE. WOULD YOU 
5 JUST THUMB THROUGH THOSE AND SEE IF YOU AGREE THAT THAT'S 
6 WHAT THIS APPEARS TO BE? 
7 A A LOT OF BILLINGS HERE. THEY APPEAR TO ALL BE 
8 WATER APPEALS AS FAR AS I'VE GONE, LISTED AS SUCH. 
9 Q OKAY. 
10
 A I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY IN HERE SO FAR THAT'S ANY DIF-
11
 FERENT THAN THAT. 
12 Q NOW, YOU'LL NOTICE ON VARIOUS OF THESE MONTHLY 
13 STATEMENTS, IN HANDWRITING, THERE'S REQUESTS THAT THE BILL 
14 BE PAID. DO YOU NOTICE THAT ON CERTAIN OF THEM? 
15 A YES. ALSO NOTICE THERE'S BEEN A CREDIT HERE FROM 
16 THE CIVIL RIGHTS ON DECEMBER 27, 1989. 
17 Q OKAY. 
i8
 A I DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT THE BILLING CONTINUES 
19 TO GO RIGHT ON AFTER THAT CREDIT. 
20 Q NOW, THIS BILL ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS -- OR ON THE 
21 WATER APPEAL HAS NEVER BEEN PAID, HAS IT? 
22 A YES, I FEEL IT HAS BEEN PAID. 
23 Q YOU THINK IT HAS BEEN? 
24
 || A YES. 
Q OKAY. WHEN DID YOU PAY IT? 25 
10 
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1 II A I FELT THAT I PAID THAT THING UP AT THE END OF 
2 OCTOBER, AND ANY SUBSEQUENT BILLINGS THAT WERE ACCRUED 
3
 AFTER THAT TIME THROUGH ALL OF THIS I TRIED TO KEEP EVERY-
4
 THING CURRENT. 
5
 Q DO YOU HAVE A CHECK THAT SHOWS THAT YOU PAID THIS 
6 WATER APPEAL BILL? 
7 A I THINK I DO. 
8 Q ALL RIGHT. WILL YOU PRODUCE THAT FOR --
9
 II A MAYBE NOT IN THESE FIGURES THAT ARE SHOWN HERE, 
BUT I FELT THE BILL HAD BEEN PAID. 
11
 || Q WILL YOU PRODUCE THOSE FOR US? 
12
 A AT TRIAL. IT CAN'T BE DONE --
13 Q WELL, WE WANT IT NOW. NOT TODAY, BUT WE WANT THEM, 
14 CAN WE GET THOSE, RAY? 
15 MR. MALOUF: HE'S ASKING, IF WE HAVE CANCELLED 
16 CHECKS OR ANY PROOF OF PAYMENT FROM OCTOBER OF '89 FOR PAY-
17 || MENT ON THIS THING, HE'S ASKING THAT IF WE HAVE SUCH A CHECK 
WILL WE PRODUCE THAT VOLUNTARILY AFTER WE HAVE LOCATED IT. 
A WELL, YES. WHATEVER WE HAVE WE CAN PRODUCE. I 
DO KNOW THAT IT WAS PAID AT OCTOBER THIRD, AND ANY BILLINGS 
21 || FROM THAT DATE FORTH I TRIED TO KEEP EVERYTHING CURRENT. 
22 Q (MR. H A N N O ALL RIGHT. 
23 || A EXCEPT THE CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THAT WAS PAID AS YOU 
HAVE GONE THROUGH I THINK IT -- WAS IT MAY, THE NEXT YEAR, 
JUNE? IN THERE SOMEWHERE IT WAS PAID. 
18 
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1 II Q WELL, WE'VE ESTABLISHED HERE BY MR. PRESTON'S RE-
2 CORDS THAT THE OCTOBER 26 BILLING, WHICH WAS ON THE CONDEMNA-
3 TION CASE, WAS PAID. WE ESTABLISHED THAT WAS PAID ABOUT IN 
4 JUNE OF 1990. 
5 MR. PRESTON: NO, THE CONDEMNATION CASE WAS PAID 
6 OFF IN JANUARY OF '90. 
7 Q JANUARY OF '90. AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS WAS PAID UP 
8 IN JUNE OF 90? 
9 MR. PRESTON: UH-HUH. 
10 Q DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT? 
11 A I THTINK THAT'S CORRECT. 
12 Q OKAY. ALL RIGHT. TO RESTATE IT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
13 CASE WAS PAID OFF IN JUNE OF '90 AND THE CONDEMNATION CASE 
14 WAS PAID OFF IN JANUARY FIFTH OF '90. THOSE ARE OUR DATES. 
15 A APPROXIMATELY, YEAH, AS I RECALL I THINK THAT'S 
16 APPROXIMATELY RIGHT. 
17 Q OKAY. AND NOW YOU SAY IN LOOKING AT EXHIBIT SEVEN, 
18 WHICH IS THE BILL ON THE WATER APPEALS CASE, "OU SAY THAT YOU 
19 BELIEVE THAT WAS PAID IN OCTOBER OF 1989? 
20 A YES. WE NOTE HERE A CREDIT ON THIS DECEMBER 27 
2A BILLING IN THIS EXHIBIT SEVEN. IT'S ON THE SEtOWD PMVE. THM 
22 THERE'S TO BE A CREDIT OF $2,047 FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, 
23 WHICH LEAVES A BALANCE OF $3,748, BUT FOR SOME REASON THAT 
24 CREDIT IS NOT CARRIED FORWARD. 
25 (COUNSEL AND THE PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
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1 II Q NOW, DID YOU ON THE BILLINGS, DID YOU NOTICE THE 
2 VARYING NOTES WHERE MR. PRESTON WAS ASKING THAT THE BILL BE 
3 PAID? 
4 A YES. I COULDN'T UNDERSTAND. HE WAS ASKING A BILL 
5 BE PAID WHICH I FELT HAD BEEN PAID. 
6 Q DID YOU EVER CALL HIM AND TELL HIM THE BILL WAS 
7 PAID AND TO QUIT BILLING YOU? 
8 A I'M SURE I DID. I DIDN'T TELL HIM TO QUIT BILLING 
9 ME. IF HE WANTS TO KEEP BILLINGS, THAT'S HIS BUSINESS, 
10
 WASTING HIS POSTAGE, BUT I'M SURE THAT IN PAYING THESE BILLS 
11
 HE WAS AWARE OF OUR FEELINGS THAT THESE THINGS HAD BEEN PAID. 
12 Q THE QUESTION IS: DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC RECOL-
13 LECTION OF EVER CALLING MR. PRESTON AND SAYING, "LOOK --" 
14 A I THINK THIS WAS DONE --
15 Q "-- GEORGE, I'VE PAID THIS WATER APPEAL BILL, DON'T 
16 BILL ME ANY MORE"? DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY MEMORY OF DOING 
17 THAT OR HAVING SUCH A CONVERSATION? 
18
 A NOT SPECIFICALLY, NOT "DON'T BILL ME ANY MORE," 
19
 BUT I THINK THAT HE WAS INFORMED THAT THIS THING HAD BEEN 
20 PAID AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED. 
21 Q I DON'T WANT YOU TO GUESS AT IT. I WANT YOU TO 
22 TELL ME, DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF CALLING HIM AND TELLING 
23 HIM THAT YOU HAD PAID THE WATER APPEALS BILL? 
24
 A YES. 
25
 Q ALL RIGHT. 
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1 II A NOT SPECIFICALLY ON DATE AND WORD, BUT I DISCUSSED 
2 THESE BILLINGS WITH HIM AS I'VE NOTED, AND I PAID THESE BILLS 
3 THAT WERE DUE FROM THAT TIME ON. THE ONLY BILL WHICH WAS 
4 OUTSTANDING SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED WAS A CIVIL RIGHTS 
5 BILL. NOW, WHEN THAT THING WAS FINISHED UP I PAID MR. PRES-
6 TON. 
7 Q OKAY, AND YOU'VE GOT A CHECK THAT WILL TELL US 
8 THAT; RIGHT? 
9 A I THINK I DO HAVE. 
10 Q AND ABOUT WHEN DO YOU BELIEVE YOU PAID THE WATER 
11
 APPEAL BILL? 
12 A I THINK THE LAST CHECK THAT I HAVE ON THE WATER 
13 APPEAL BILL IS PROBABLY OCTOBER THIRD OF 1989. 
14 Q AND YOU BELIEVE WHATEVER THAT CHECK WAS IT PAID 
15 THE BILL, IT PAID THE WATER APPEAL IN FULL? 
16 A YES. AS YOU WILL NOTE ON THE DECEMBER 27, HE HAS 
17 CREDITED $2,047 FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNT, AND IN THE 
18 EXHIBIT THREE IT IS HE HAS TRANSFERRED $2,358.98 OUT OF 
19 THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNT WHICH HAS BEEN PAID, AND NOW HE'S 
20 BILLING US FOR IT AGAIN. WHEN YOU START ADDING UP ALL THE 
21 BILLS THAT WERE PAID WHICH HE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRING BACK AND 
22 FORTH HERE, IT GETS TO WHERE HE HAS BEEN OVERPAID. 
23 Q SO IT'S YOUR TESTIMONY AS YOU SIT HERE TODAY THAT 
24 YOU PAID THE WATER APPEALS BILL IN FULL ON OCTOBER 3, 1989. 
25
 IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TELLING US? 
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A IT'S MY FEELING THAT BILL WAS PAID UP AS OF THAT 
DATE. 
Q OKAY. HAVE YOU HAD AN ACCOUNTANT CHECK THESE 
ACCOUNTS WITH MR. PRESTON TO DETERMINE THEIR ACCURACY AT ALL? 
A NO, I HAVEN TT. ITVE ONLY GONE THROUGH THEM MYSELF 
AND GONE THROUGH THEM SOMEWHAT WITH COUNSEL. 
Q NOW LOOKING AGAIN AT EXHIBIT ONE, THAT'S THE LET-
TER -- IS THAT IN FRONT OF YOU? SEE THE LETTER? DO YOU SEE 
AT THE END OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH, THE LAST SENTENCE, WHERE 
THAT LETTER SAYS, "THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNT IS $4,133, AND 
THE BALANCE ON THE WATER APPEALS, WHICH ACCOUNT NOW RELATES 
BACK TO 1978, IS $5,732.43, GIVING YOU CREDIT FOR THE 
$2,393.^5 RECENTLY PAID." DO YOU SEE THAT? 
A THAT'S WHAT THE LETTER SAYS. 
Q DID YOU EVER IN WRITING RESPOND TO THIS LETTER OF 
OCTOBER 30, 1989, EXHIBIT ONE, AND SAY, "GEORGE, I PAID YOU 
FOR THE WATER APPEAL, I'VE PAID YOU THE $5,732.43, I DON'T 
OWE THAT TO YOU"? DID YOU EVER DO THAT? 
A I DIDN'T SEND HIM A LETTER. 
Q OKAY. 
A NOT THAT I RECALL. NOT THAT I RECALL. HOWEVER, 
WE HAVE SENT HIM LETTERS DOWN THROUGH THE YEARS, WHICH I 
WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT, THAT HAVE PROBABLY DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE 
24 Q NOW, YOU HAVE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED TODAY THAT YOU GOT 
25 EXHIBIT THREE, WHICH WAS THE BILL ON THE WATER APPEALS, WHEN 
10 
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1 II YOU GOT THIS LETTER EXHIBIT ONE. ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
2 A YES. HOWBEIT, AS YOU NOTE ON THIS LETTER IT 
3 SAYS, "AND THE BALANCE ON THE WATER APPEALS, WHICH ACCOUNT 
4 NOW RELATES BACK TO 1978." YOU WILL NOTE THE NUMBER OF THIS 
5
 WATER APPEALS ACCOUNT IS CLIENT CODE KOL204-10. THAT ACCOUNT 
6 DOES NOT RELATE BACK TO 1978. 
7 Q NOW, MR. KOLLER, YOU THEN RECEIVED THESE MONTHLY 
8 BILLINGS CONTAINED IN EXHIBIT SEVEN BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER 
9
 II OF '89, ON THROUGH TO AUGUST TWO OF '91; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YOU'RE LOOKING AT EXHIBIT SEVEN? 
Q YES. 
12
 A THIS EXHIBIT GOES UP THROUGH MAY 31, JULY SECOND, 
13 AUGUST SECOND. 
™ Q OF '91? 
15 A OF '91. 
16 Q OKAY. AND YOU GOT THOSE STATEMENTS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
17 || A WELL, I CAN'T VERIFY THAT TODAY, BUT I'D HAVE TO 
LOOK AT THE FILE. 
Q DID YOU EVER AT ANY TIME BETWEEN NOVEMBER OF '89 
AND AUGUST OF '91, WHICH IS THE LAST STATEMENT IN EXHIBIT 
SEVEN, WRITE MR. PRESTON A LETTER AND SAY TO HIM, "I HAVE 
PAID YOU THIS WATER APPEALS BILL"? DID YOU EVER DO THAT? 
23 II A I RECALL WRITING HIM SOME LETTERS. I CAN'T --
24
 || Q DID YOU EVER WRITE HIM A LETTER? 
A I CAN'T GIVE YOU THE DATE OF THOSE LETTERS FROM 
18 
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1 II MEMORY AT THIS TIME, BUT I DO RECALL WRITING HIM SOME LETTERS 
2 AND DISCUSSING SOME OF THIS. WE CAN PRODUCE THE LETTERS IF 
3 YOU NEED THEM. 
4 Q WELL, WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE THEM, BUT FROM YOUR 
5 MEMORY AS YOU SIT HERE TODAY CAN YOU TELL US THAT YOU DID 
6 WRITE HIM A LETTER SAYING, "HEY, I HAVE PAID THE WATER 
7 APPEALS BILL"? DID YOU EVER DO THAT? 
8 II A IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THAT WAS DONE. I CAN'T RECALL 
9 SPECIFICALLY THE CONTENT OF ALL THOSE LETTERS. 
1° Q ALL RIGHT, BUT YOU'LL PRODUCE THAT LETTER? 
11 A YES, WE'LL PRODUCE THE LETTER. 
12 Q AND THAT'S THE LETTER WHERE YOU BELIEVE YOU TOLD 
13 MR. PRESTON, "I HAVE PAID YOU THE WATER APPEALS BILL"? 
14 A I SPECIFICALLY RECALL INFORMING HIM IN ONE OF 
15 THOSE LETTERS WHERE HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO FILE SUIT TO COL-
16 LECT THIS BILL, THAT IF HE DID THAT WE WOULD MOUNT A COUNTER-
17 CLAIM AND A MALPRACTICE ACTION. 
18 Q AND THAT IS THE FIRST LETTER THAT YOU WROTE AFTER 
19 RECEIVING ALL OF THESE BILLS, MONTHLY BILLS, CONTAINED IN 
20 EXHIBIT SEVEN; IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? 
21 A I CAN'T VERIFY THAT. I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT THE LET-
22 TERS AND THE DATES THEREON AS TO WHAT THE CONTENTS ARE. YOU 
23 HAVE SAID AFTER, AND I DO NOT RECALL WHETHER THIS IS AFTER 
24 OR NOT. 
25
 MR. HANNI: LET'S TAKE A SHORT BREAK WHILE WE COPY 
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1 II THIS. 
2 (RECESSED FOR A FEW MINUTES. FOLLOWING THE 
3 RECESS:) 
4 Q OKAY, BACK ON THE RECORD. I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU 
5 WHAT WE HAVE MARKED AS EXHIBIT EIGHT, MR. KOLLER, WHICH AP-
6 PEARS TO BE A LETTER FROM YOU TO GEORGE PRESTON DATED JUNE 
7 7, 1991. IS THAT THE LETTER THAT YOU WERE REFERRING TO THAT 
8 YOU WROTE TO MR. PRESTON BEFORE WE TOOK THIS BREAK? 
9 A IT'S ONE OF THEM APPARENTLY. 
10 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY LETTERS THAT YOU WROTE TO MR. PRES 
11 TON PRIOR TO EXHIBIT EIGHT? 
12 A I WOULD THINK SO. 
13 Q YOU THINK YOU DO HAVE? 
14 A I WOULD THINK SO. 
15 Q WELL, WE WOULD CERTAINLY APPRECIATE GETTING A COPY 
16 OF ANY LETTER THAT YOU WROTE TO MR. PRESTON PRIOR TO THIS 
17 EXHIBIT EIGHT. AND LET ME NARROW THAT DOWN. I'LL WITHDRAW 
18 THAT FOR A MOMENT AND WE'LL COME BACK TO IT. 
19 YOU'LL NOTICE THAT IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR 
20 LETTER EXHIBIT EIGHT YOU SAY, "IT IS NOTED IN YOUR HANDWRIT-
21 || ING ON A BILLING SENT TO EVAN 0. KOLLER ON MAY 31, 1991, 
22 || THAT 'I'M GETTING TO THE POINT THAT I MUST TAKE ACTION TO 
23 || COLLECT THIS ACCOUNT.'" DO YOU SEE THAT? 
24 A YES. 
25
 Q AND IF YOU LOOK AT EXHIBIT SEVEN AND LOOK AT THE 
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1 II STATEMENT DATED MAY 31, DO YOU SEE A NOTE ON THAT BILLING? 
2 A I DO. 
3 Q IN MR. PRESTON'S HANDWRITING, AND IN EFFECT HE SAYS 
4
 HE IS GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE ACTION TO COLLECT THIS ACCOUNT, 
5
 DOESN'T HE? 
6 A I CAN'T SEE WHERE HE'S GOING TO TAKE ACTION. CAN 
7 YOU? 
8 Q WELL, LOOK AT YOUR LAST THREE LINES. WHAT DOES IT 
9
 SAY? 
10
 || A "WE HAVE DONE GOOD WORK FOR YOU AND OUGHT TO BE --" 
11
 || MR. MALOUF: MAY 31 IS THE ONE WE SHOULD BE LOOKING 
12
 AT, EVAN. 
13 A OH, WAS I LOOKING AT THE WRONG ONE? 
14 MR. MALOUF: YES. 
15 Q MAY 31, '91. 
16 A OKAY. "I'M GETTING TO THE POINT THAT I MUST TAKE 
17 ACTION TO COLLECT THIS ACCOUNT." THAT'S RIGHT. 
18
 || Q OKAY. AND IN RESPONSE TO THAT YOU WROTE HIM THE 
LETTER THAT WE'VE MARKED AS EXHIB/IT EI GHT; i RIGHT? 
A IT APPEARS TO BE SO. 
2 1 II Q OKAY. LOOKING AT EXHIBIT SEVEN, LOOK AT PAGE THREE 
22 OF EXHIBIT SEVEN, THE STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1990. 
23 A YES. 
24
 || Q YOU NOTICE WHERE IT SAYS, "EVAN, PLEASE PAY THIS 
BILL. I UNDERSTAND YOUR FEELING, BUT IT WAS, AFTER ALL, YOU 
19 
20 
25 
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1 WHO REQUESTED THE APPEAL." SEE THAT? 
2 A YES, I DO. 
3 Q DID YOU WRITE ANY KIND OF A LETTER AFTER YOU READ 
4 THAT NOTE TO MR. PRESTON AND TELL HIM YOU'VE PAID THE BILL? 
5 A WELL, IT'S EVIDENT I DISCUSSED THIS ON YOUR DECEM-
6 BER '27, 1989, BILLING, BECAUSE HE TALKS ABOUT IT IN HIS OWN 
7 HANDWRITING HERE. NOW DO WE HAVE TO PUT IT IN WRITING OR CAN 
8 WE JUST TELL HIM? 
9
 Q JUST ANSWER MY QUESTION. 
10
 A I DO NOT KNOW. I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT THE FILE. 
11
 Q ALL RIGHT. 
12 A BUT YOU PUT ME UNDER OATH TO TELL THE TRUTH AND 
13 THE WHOLE TRUTH. 
14 Q THAT'S WHAT I EXPECT. NOW TURN TO YOUR BILLING OF 
15 MAY 31, 1990. THAT'S PART OF EXHIBIT SEVEN. 
16 A MAY 31, 1990? 
17 || Q YES. DO YOU SEE THAT? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU SEE THE LAST TWO LINES, "THIS BILL SHOULD 
20
 II BE PAID IN FULL AT THIS TIME"? DO YOU SEE THAT? 
21
 A YES, I DO. 
22
 Q DID YOU WRITE TO MR. PRESTON, WRITE HIM A LETTER 
23 || AND SAY, "LOOK, I'VE PAID THIS BILL"? 
A I BELIEVE I WAS IN MR. PRESTON'S OFFICE --
Q WELL, JUST ANSWER MY QUESTION. 
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A NO, I DIDNfT WRITE HIM A LETTER. I BELIEVE I WAS 
IN HIS OFFICE RIGHT AFTER THAT DATE AND PAID THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS BILL, AND I'M SURE I SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT THIS MATTER 
AT THAT TIME. 
Q DO YOU HAVE A CLEAR RECOLLECTION OF THAT? 
- A NO, BUT I SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT THIS THING AND THAT 
BILL WAS PAID, AND IT'S MY FEELING THAT OUR BILLS HAD COM-
PLETELY BEEN CLEARED UP BY THAT TIME. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF A SPECIFIC CONVERSATION 
WITH MR. PRESTON ABOUT THE WATER APPEALS BILL AFTER YOU GOT 
THIS MAY 31, 1990, STATEMENT? 
A IT IS MY FEELING THAT WE HAD A NUMBER OF CONVERSA-
TIONS THAT THESE BILLS WERE PAID --
Q THAT ISN'T MY QUESTION. 
A AND I HAD THE FEELING THAT THIS THING WAS PAID. 
Q I DON'T WANT -- I DIDN'T ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR FEEL-
ING. 
A I CAN'T RECALL MY WORDS. 
Q I'M ASKING YOU, DO YOU HAVE A SPECIFIC RECOLLEC-
TION OF ANY CONVERSATION WITH MR. PRESTON ABOUT THIS WATER 
APPEALS BILL AFTER YOU GOT THIS MAY 31, 1990, STATEMENT? 
A I HAD A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM WHEN I 
PAID THESE BILLS. 
Q DID YOU HAVE ANY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ABOUT THE 
WATER APPEALS BILL, DO YOU HAVE A MEMORY OF IT? 
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1 II A IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THERE, BECAUSE IT'S MY 
2 RECOLLECTION THAT THESE BILLS WERE PAID IN FULL. 
3 Q AND YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE CANCELLED CHECKS TO SHOW 
4 THAT; RIGHT? 
5 A YES, I HAVE CHECKS. BUT NOT AS THIS BILLING SHOWS 
6 THERE'S A DISPUTE ON THIS BILLING, AND YOU ARE AWARE OF THAT. 
7 AND JUST BECAUSE HE SENDS A BILLING DOESN'T MEAN THAT IT'S 
8 ACCURATE. HIS OWN FIGURES SHOW THAT HE'S TRANSFERRING FIG-
9 URES BACK AND FORTH, AND YOU MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BECAUSE 
10 YOU HAVE NOW HANDED US THESE EXHIBITS AND THEY SO SHOW. 
11 Q NOW, MR. KOLLER, TURN TO THE JULY 31, 1990, STATE-
12 MENT, WHICH IS PART OF EXHIBIT SEVEN. 
13 A JULY 31? 
14 Q JULY 31, 199C . 
15 A I DON'T HAVE A JULY 31. 
16 MR. MALOUF: HE'S CORRECT. THE EXHIBIT DOESN'T. 
17 IT GOES FROM -- LET'S BACK UP. 
18 A I GO FROM MAY 31. 
19 MR. MALOUF: THE NEXT ONE SHOULD BE JUNE 28, I 
20 THINK; IS THAT RIGHT, MR. HANNI? 
21 MR. HANNI: IT SHOULD BE JUNE 28, THAT'S RIGHT. 
22 MR. MALOUF: AND THE NEXT ONE SHOULD BE JULY 31. 
23 MR. HANNI : YEAH. 
24 THE WITNESS: I GO FROM MAY 31 TO JULY SECOND. 
25
 IS THERE A JUNE BILLING? 
10 
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1 II MR. MALOUF: THERE'S A JUNE 28 BILL. START ON 
2 MAY 31. I HAVE A JUNE 28, THE EXHIBIT DOES NOT HAVE A JUNE 
3 28. I HAVE A JULY 31, THE EXHIBIT HAS A JULY SECOND. I 
4 NEXT HAVE AN AUGUST 30, THE EXHIBIT HAS AN AUGUST SECOND. 
5 MR. HANNI: WHY DON'T YOU GIVE US THE ORIGINAL 
6 EXHIBIT AND LET'S SEE IF WE CAN STRAIGHTEN THAT OUT. 
7 MR. MALOUF: AND I THEN GO TO OCTOBER FIRST AND 
8 22ND AND HE ENDS WITH AUGUST SECOND. 
9 II MR. HANNI: LET'S SEE WHAT HAPPENED TO US HERE. 
MR. PRESTON: LET ME HAVE YOUR COPY OF IT, COUNSEL, 
H MR. MALOUF: OKAY. 1 NEED TO HAVE THIS, BECAUSE 
12 I'VE GOT MY NOTES ON IT. 
13 MR. PRESTON: I WOULDN'T READ YOUR NOTES FOR THE 
14 WORLD. 
15 (CONVERSATION HELD OFF THE RECORD.) 
16 THE WITNESS: NOW, YOU ASKED ME TO READ ONE I 
17 || DIDN'T HAVE. WHICH ONE WERE YOU ASKING? 
Q (MR. HANNI) JULY 31, *90. 
19 || A '90. OKAY. JULY 31, '90. 
20 || Q ALL RIGHT. IT SAYS THERE, "FUTURE BILLINGS WILL 
INCLUDE INTEREST, PAST AND PRESENT." DID YOU EVER, AFTER 
22 || GETTING THAT JULY 31, 1990, STATEMENT, CALL MR. PRESTON AND 
23 TELL HIM THAT YOU'D ALREADY PAID THIS WATER BILL, WATER AP-
24 PEAL BILL? 
25
 A HOW MANY TIMES DO I HAVE TO TELL HIM? 
18 
21 
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1 Q JUST ANSWER MY QUESTION. DID YOU OR DIDN'T YOU? 
2 A I'M TRYING TO THINK OF THE DATES ON WHICH THESE 
3 VARIOUS BILLS WERE PAID. SIXTH MONTH, SEVENTH DAY, '90, 
4 SHOWS THAT I PAID SOME OF IT. 
5 MR. MALOUF: THIS ONE WAS THE -- THAT DATE WAS THE 
6 CIVIL RIGHTS PAYMENT. 
7 A YES, THAT WAS A CIVIL RIGHTS PAYMENT. 
8 MR. MALOUF: WHICH WAS --
9 A I THINK THAT'S ABOUT THE END OF THE PAYMENTS WHICH 
10 I MADE, WHEN I MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS PAYMENT. 
1*> Q (MR. H A N N O ALL RIGHT, BACK TO MY QUESTION NOW. 
12 AFTER YOU GOT THE JULY 31, 1990, STATEMENT ON THE WATER AP-
13 PEAL, WHERE HE SAYS, "FUTURE BILLINGS WILL INCLUDE INTEREST 
14 PAST AND PRESENT," DID YOU HAVE ANY DISCUSSION WITH MR. 
15 PRESTON AND TELL HIM YOU'D ALREADY PAID THE WATER APPEALS 
16 BILL? 
17 A THAT OTHER ONE WAS MADE IN JUNE? SO THE NEXT 
18 MONTH HE BILLED ME WITH THIS? I DON'T RECALL AT THIS POINT. 
19 I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT WHAT FILE THERE IS AND STUFF, BUT I DON'T 
20 RECALL. 
21 Q DID YOU WRITE MR. PRESTON A LETTER AT ALL AFTER 
22 YOU GOT THAT JULY 31, 1990, STATEMENT? 
23 A I WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THE FILE. I CAN'T RECALL 
24 THE DATES OF ALL THOSE LETTERS. 
25
 Q IF YOU HAVE ANY WRITTEN LETTERS WHERE YOU HAVE TOLD 
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1 II MITSTER OR TALKED TO MR. PRESTON AT ALL ABOUT THE WATER AP-
2 PEALS BILL OTHER THAN YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 7, 1991, WHICH HAS 
3 BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT EIGHT, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THOSE 
4 LETTERS, WHERE THERE'S ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT THE WATER APPEALS 
5 BILL. 
6 - A WE HAVE ASKED MR. PRESTON IN DISCOVERY FOR ANY 
7 DOCUMENTS WHICH HE MAY USE, AND HE HASN'T PRODUCED ANY OF 
8 THESE. SURELY HE SHOULD HAVE THE LETTERS WHICH I HAVE WRIT-
9 TEN. IT'S EVIDENT HE HAS THIS ONE. 
10 Q MR. KOLLER, IF YOU -- AND LISTEN TO ME CAREFULLY --
11 IF YOU HAVE ANY LETTERS THAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN TO MR. PRESTON 
12 WHERE YOU DISCUSS THE WATER APPEALS BILL PRIOR TO YOUR LETTER 
13 OF JUNE 7, 1991 --
14 A WE COULD PRODUCE WHAT LETTERS WE HAVE. 
15 Q ALL RIGHT, THAT'S ALL WE ASK. 
16 A BUT MR. PRESTON SHOULD HAVE THESE IN HIS FILE. 
17 I'M WONDERING WHY, IF HE HAS THESE IN HIS FILE, HE HASN'T 
i8
 II GIVEN THEM IN THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
Q MR. KOLLER, WE WANT TO KNOW, IF SUCH LETTERS EXIST, 
20 || WE WANT TO SEE THEM. 
21 A I'M NOT SURE YOU DON'T HAVE THEM. 
22 Q WELL --
23 A MY QUESTION IS, WHY DON'T WE HAVE THEM IF YOU DO? 
24
 || Q I'M NOT THE ONE THAT'S ANSWERING QUESTIONS HERE, 
YOU'RE THE ONE THAT IS. NOW YOU GO TO THE OCTOBER 1, 1990, 
19 
25 
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1 STATEMENT. YOU NOTICE THE LAST SENTENCE THERE IN HANDWRIT-
2 ING? "YOUR PROMPT ATTENTION TO THIS ACCOUNT IS REQUESTED." 
3 SEE THAT? 
4 A NOW THIS IS THE OCTOBER 26, 1990? 
5 Q NO, OCTOBER 1, 1990. 
6 II "A OCTOBER 1, 1990. YES, IT SAYS, "YOUR PROMPT ATTEN-
7 TION TO THIS ACCOUNT IS REQUESTED." 
8 || Q DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF TALKING TO MR. PRESTON 
9 AFTER YOU GOT THAT STATEMENT ABOUT THIS WATER APPEALS BILL? 
10 A NOT RIGHT NOW. 
11 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF HAVING WRITTEN HIM A 
12 LETTER ABOUT THIS WATER APPEALS BILL AFTER RECEIVING THE 
13 OCTOBER 1, 1990, STATEMENT? 
14 A I HAVE MEMORY OF SOME LETTERS, BUT I CAN'T TELL 
15 YOU THE DATES. 
16 Q OKAY. LET'S GO TO THE OCTOBER 26 STATEMENT. THIS 
17 IS 1990. YOU NOTICE THERE HE SAYS, "MAY I PLEASE HAVE PAY-
18 MENT ON THIS ACCOUNT?" DID YOU HAVE ANY DISCUSSION WITH MR. 
19 PRESTON AFTER THAT ABOUT THIS ACCOUNT, AFTER YOU RECEIVED THE 
20 OCTOBER 26 STATEMENT? DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF THAT? 
21 A FAINTLY, BUT 1 CAN'T DATE IT. 
22 Q TELL ME WHAT WAS SAID. 
23 A ALONG BACK --
24 Q IF YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY. 
25 A ALONG BACK IN THERE SOMEWHERE THAT ATTORNEY DAINES 
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1 II REPRESENTED US, AND I VISITED MR. PRESTON'S OFFICE SOMEWHERE 
2 BACK IN THERE. WE DISCUSSED SOMETHING LIKE THAT. HE SAYS, 
3 "APPARENTLY MY PARTICIPATION IS CONCLUDED" -- WE DISCUSSED 
4 THAT AT ONE TIME. WHETHER THAT WAS AT THAT TIME OR ANOTHER, 
5 I DON'T KNOW, BUT I'D HAVE TO COMPARE DOCUMENTS. 
6 (COUNSEL AND THE PLAINTIFF CONFER.) 
7 MR. HANNI: WHY DON'T WE TAKE A BREAK FOR A MINUTE 
8 AND GET A COPY OF THAT? 
9 (RECESSED FOR A FEW MINUTES. FOLLOWING THE 
10 RECESS:) 
11 Q (MR. HANNI) THIS IS EXHIBIT NINE, AND EXHIBIT NINE 
12 CONSISTS OF THREE LETTERS, ONE FROM GEORGE PRESTON TO MR. 
13 KOLLER DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1990, ONE FROM MR. KOLLER DATED 
14 SEPTEMBER 23, 1990, AND ONE FROM MR. PRESTON DATED -- TO MR. 
15 KOLLER — DATED OCTOBER 1, 1990. WOULD YOU LOOK AT THE BACK 
16 OF EXHIBIT NUMBER NINE? 
17 A NUMBER NINE, IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT? 
18 Q YES. THE LETTER FROM MR. PRESTON TO YOU DATED 
19 SEPTEMBER 21, 1990. DO YOU RECALL GETTING THAT LETTER AND A 
20 COPY OF THE SUPREME* COURT OPINION? 
21
 A HE WROTE A LETTER TO ME AND SENT THE SUPREME COURT 
22 OPINION BACK IN THERE SOMEWHERE, AND WHETHER THIS IS IT OR NOT 
23 I DON'T KNOW. 
24
 || Q NOW LOOK AT YOUR LETTER TO MR. PRESTON DATED TWO 
DAYS LATER, SEPTEMBER 23, 1990. 25 
10 
11 
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1
 II A OKAY. 
2 Q DID YOU WRITE THAT LETTER TO MR. PRESTON? 
3
 A APPARENTLY SO. 
4
 || Q IS THERE ANY DOUBT IN YOUR MIND ABOUT IT? 
A NO, THAT LOOKS LIKE MY LETTER. 
6
 || Q I'D LIKE TO REFER YOU TO EXHIBIT SEVEN AGAIN. TAKE 
7
 A LOOK AT SEVEN, AND WILL YOU TURN TO THE STATEMENT ON THE 
8
 WATER APPEALS DATED JULY 31, 1990? 
9
 || A OKAY. 
Q YOU NOTICE THERE BILLING YOU ON THE WATER APPEAL 
CASE, AND HE'S SAYING, "FUTURE BILLINGS WILL INCLUDE INTEREST 
12
 || PAST AND PRESENT." 
13
 A THAT'S WHAT I T STATES. 
14
 || Q THEN TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND YOU'LL SEE ANOTHER 
BILLING OF AUGUST 3 0 , 1990 . 
16 || A I DO. 
17
 || Q NOW YOUR LETTER, YOU WROTE YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 7, 
18
 " 1991, WHICH IS PART OF EXHIBIT NINE. DO YOU SEE ANYTHING IN 
THAT LETTER — AND TAKE YOUR TIME LOOKING THROUGH IT -- WHERE 
YOU TALK ABOUT THE WATER APPEALS BILLS THAT HAVE BEEN SENT 
TO YOU MONTHLY? 
A THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THAT LETTER SAYS, "IF THERE'S 
23
 || ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO RECOVER THE COSTS FROM THOSE WHO 
CAUSED THE INJURY, PLEASE LET ME KNOW." 
Q WHERE ARE YOU READING? 
15 
19 
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1 II A FROM THE LAST PAGE, IT'S PAGE THREE OF THE SEPTEM-
2 BER 23, 1990, LETTER. 
3 Q ARE YOU SAYING THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE THREE? 
4 A YES. THE LAST SENTENCE DOWN THERE, OF THIS PARA-
5 GRAPH. 
6 II Q THAT'S THE ONLY THING IN THE LETTER THAT YOU SAY 
7 HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE MONTHLY BILLINGS THAT MR. PRES-
8 TON HAD BEEN SENDING YOU ON THE WATER APPEALS CASE; IS THAT 
9 RIGHT? 
10 A NO, THE SECOND PARAGRAPH ALSO POINTS OUT, "IT IS 
11 NOTEWORTHY THAT THE COURT'S OPINION," SPEAKING OF THE SU-
12 PREME COURT --
13 Q NOW ARE YOU READING THE --
14 A THE SAME LETTER. 
15 Q PAGE ONE? 
16 A PAGE ONE. "IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE COURT'S OPIN-
17 ION WAS UNANIMOUS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
18 TION, ERRED AND FAILED TO SAFEGUARD THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
19 OF THE KI LtgR-S. THIS IS NOT THE ONLY TIME THE KOLLERS HAVE 
20 BEEN ABUSED IN THAT COURT. THE COURT IS MADE UP OF PEOPLE, 
21 AND IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT IS THE INDIVIDUALS THAT PARTI-
22 CIPATE IN THE LEGAL PROCESS THAT FAILED TO SAFEGUARD KOLLERS' 
23 RIGHTS. IT HAS BEEN VERY TRAUMATIC, FRUSTRATING, AND EXPEN-
24 SIVE FOR THE KOLLERS. THE KOLLERS HAVE BEEN INJURED. WHO 
25
 IS RESPONSIBLE?" 
10 
11 
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1 II Q ANYTHING ELSE? 
2 A AND YOU NOTE THERE AT THE LAST, "IF THERE'S ANY-
3 THING YOU CAN DO TO RECOVER THE COSTS FROM THOSE WHO CAUSED 
4 THE INJURY, PLEASE LET ME KNOW." 
5 Q ANYTHING ELSE IN THAT LETTER THAT YOU SAY HAS 
6 ANYTHING TO DO WITH TALKING ABOUT THE MONTHLY BILLINGS THAT 
7 YOU GOT FROM MR. PRESTON ON THE WATER APPEALS CASE? 
8 || A I DON'T SEE ANYTHING SPECIFICALLY AT THIS TIME. I 
HAVEN'T READ THE WHOLE LETTER. 
Q NOW, BYRON FISHER HANDLED THE LAST, THE ORAL ARGU-
MENT, DID HE NOT, ON THE LAST WATER APPEAL? 
12 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
13 Q AND DIDN'T BYRON FISHER ASK FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
14 ON THAT ORAL ARGUMENT? 
15 A HE SAID IT WAS TOO LATE. SAID IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
16 IN THE COMPLAINT. 
17 Q HE DECIDED IT WAS? 
18 A EVIDENTLY. HE DIDN'T ASK FOR IT. THE COURTS HAVE 
19 SO ALSO RULED SINCE THAT TIME. 
20 MR. MALOUF: SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE BRIEF OR 
21 SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE COMPLAINT? 
22 A IN THE BRIEF OR IN THE COMPLAINT. MAYBE IN THE 
23 ORIGINAL BRIEF BEFORE THE -- IN THE ORIGINAL APPEAL, IT 
24 SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THERE. ANYWAY, IN THE ORIGINAL PAPERS. 
25
 Q NOW LOOKING AT THE LETTER FROM MR. PRESTON WHICH 
10 
11 
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1 II IS PART OF EXHIBIT NINE ADDRESSED TO YOURSELF DATED OCTOBER 
2 1, 1990, DID YOU RECEIVE THAT LETTER? 
3 A THE ONE ON THE FRONT HERE OF EXHIBIT NINE? 
4
 Q YES. 
5 A YES, I THINK SO. 
6 Q AND YOU RECEIVED IT WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE DATE 
7 IT BEARS? 
8 A WITH WHAT AGAIN? I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT. 
9
 II Q AND YOU RECEIVED THAT LETTER WITHIN A FEW DAYS 
AFTER THE DATE IT BEARS; IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? 
A WELL, I CAN'T VERIFY THAT. BUT I THINK HE MENTIONS 
12
 IN THERE, THE LAST QUESTION HE ASKS IS WHETHER THERE'S ANY 
13 RECOURSE FOR COLLECTION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
14 Q NOW, MR. KOLLER, IF YOU GO NOW AGAIN TO EXHIBIT 
15 SEVEN AND GO TO THE STATEMENT DATED OCTOBER 26, 1990; DO YOU 
16 SEE THAT? 
17 A OCTOBER 26, 1990, STATEMENT? 
18
 0 RIGHT. 
19
 || A I HAVE IT. 
Q YOU NOTICE THERE, "MAY I PLEASE HAVE PAYMENT ON 
21 || THIS ACCOUNT?" AFTER YOU RECEIVED THAT STATEMENT DID YOU 
22 HAVE ANY CONVERSATION WITH MR. PRESTON ABOUT THAT BILLING? 
23 A I DO NOT KNOW. I'D HAVE TO CHECK THE RECORD. IT'S 
24
 || EVIDENT THAT HE'S AWARE OF THE PROBLEM IN THIS OCTOBER 1, 
1990, LETTER. 
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Q WHAT RECORD DO YOU HAVE THAT WOULD TELL YOU WHETHER 
YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH HIM OR NOT? 
A WELL, I GOT THIS EXHIBIT NUMBER NINE IN MY HAND 
AT THIS TIME WHICH INDICATES THIS, AND I MAY HAVE SOME OTHER 
LETTERS WHERE I HAVE REFERRED TO HIM THE PROBLEM OF THE 
COSTS INVOLVED. 
Q OKAY. LET THE RECORD SHOW THAT WE ASK FOR ANY 
CORRESPONDENCE OR ANY OTHER KIND OF A DOCUMENT THAT YOU'VE 
GOT THAT WOULD TELL YOU THAT YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH 
MR. PRESTON OR ANY KIND OF COMMUNICATION WITH HIM ABOUT 
THESE BILLINGS ON THE WATER APPEAL. 
A OKAY. 
Q NOW WILL YOU GO TO THE DECEMBER 3, 1990, STATEMENT. 
A I HAVE IT. 
Q YOU NOTICE THERE WHERE HE SAYS, "WOULD YOU PLEASE 
BE KIND ENOUGH TO PAY THIS BILLING"? 
A THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY MEMORY OF TALKING TO MR. PRESTON 
ABOUT THIS ACCOUNT AT ALL AFTER YOU GOT THAT BILLING? 
A AFTER THE DECEMBER 3, 1990, STATEMENT? 
Q YES. 
A NOT SPECIFICALLY, NO. 
Q OR DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF WRITING HIM A 
LETTER ABOUT THAT? 
A NOT SPECIFICALLY, OTHER THAN THERE WERE LETTERS 
10 
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1 THAT WERE WRITTEN. 
2 Q YOU THINK THERE ARE SOME LETTERS THAT WERE WRITTEN 
3 AFTER YOUR JUNE 7, 1991, LETTER WHICH IS MARKED EXHIBIT 
4 EIGHT? 
5 A YES, THERE WERE SOME LETTERS WRITTEN AFTER THAT 
6 ONE." I THINK YOU JUST SHOWED ME ONE IN THIS EXHIBIT, DIDN'T 
7 YOU? HERE IS ONE OF SEPTEMBER 23. 
8 MR. MALOUF: STATE THE YEAR. 
9
 II A THIS IS '90 THOUGH. THIS IS '91, RIGHT? 
Q THAT'S RIGHT. I'M ASKING YOU, DO YOU HAVE ANY --
11
 DO YOU BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY LETTERS WRITTEN AFTER EXHIBIT 
12 EIGHT, JUNE 7, 1991? 
13 A I DO NOT RECALL. I'D HAVE TO LOOK AT THE FILE. 
14 Q AND FROM WHAT YOU'RE TELLING ME YOU DO HAVE A FILE 
15 PERTAINING TO YOUR DEALINGS WITH MR. PRESTON OVER THE YEARS; 
16 IS THAT RIGHT? 
17 A THERE WERE SOME LETTERS WRITTEN AFTER THAT TIME, 
18
 BUT I CAN'T RECALL THE DATES OF THOSE LETTERS WITHOUT DOCU-
19
 MENTATION. 
20 Q AND WHERE DO YOU PHYSICALLY KEEP THOSE FILES? 
21 A GENERALLY HOME. 
22 Q DO YOU HAVE AN OFFICE? 
23 A YES. 
24
 || Q OTHER THAN IN YOUR HOME? 
A NO. 25 
10 
11 
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1 II Q BUT YOUR BEST MEMORY, YOU DID HAVE CORRESPONDENCE 
2 WITH MR. PRESTON AFTER THE JUNE 7, 1991, LETTER? 
3 A YES. 
4 MR. HANNI: HAVE YOU GOT A COPY OF YOUR COUNTER-
5 CLAIM, RAY? 
6 MR. MALOUF: I THINK I'VE GOT ONE. HE'S ASKING 
7 US IF WE HAVE A COPY OF THIS. 
8 THE WITNESS: OKAY. 
9 II Q (MR. HANNI) GOING TO PARAGRAPH FIVE OF YOUR COUN-
TERCLAIM. BEFORE WE GET INTO YOUR COUNTERCLAIM, ON THE 
FIRST WATER APPEALS CASE, YOU APPEALED THAT, DID YOU NOT? 
12 A WHEN YOU SAY "YOU" --
13 Q KOLLER. MR. KOLLER APPEALED --
14 A MR. PRESTON FILED THE PAPERS. 
15 Q WELL, HE REPRESENTED YOU, BUT YOU WERE THE APPEL-
16 LANT IN THAT CASE? 
17 A YES, LISTED AS THE APPELLANT. 
18
 Q ALL RIGHT. AND THAT CASE WAS REVERSED? 
19 A PARTIALLY. 
20 Q WHICH MEANS THAT -- DID YOU WIN OR DIDN'T YOU WIN? 
21 A OH, WE LOST BADLY. 
22 Q YOU LOST BADLY? 
23 A YES. WE WON PARTIALLY. 
24 Q IN WHAT WAY DID YOU LOSE? 
25
 A IN THAT THE ARGUMENTS WERE NOT PUT FORTH STRAIGHT-
10 
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1 II FORWARD. 
2 Q WHAT DO YOU MEAN? 
3
 A WELL, TO BEGIN WITHiTHERE'S NO UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
4
 WATER RIGHTS ARGUED BEFORE THE COURTS. 
5
 || Q SPELL THAT OUT FOR ME. 
A WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE WATER RIGHTS YOU 
7
 || CAN ARGUE THIS CASE UNTIL THE END OF TIME, GO BACK AND FORTH. 
8 Q DO YOU CLAIM THAT MR. PRESTON WAS NEGLIGENT IN ANY 
9
 || WAY? 
A YES. 
11
 Q IN WHAT WAY? 
12
 A IN NOT UNDERSTANDING THE WATER RIGHTS AND IN 
13 ARGUING THIS CASE. 
14 Q BE SPECIFIC. WHAT DO YOU MEAN HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND 
15 THEM? 
16 A TO BEGIN WITH HE NEVER PLACED BEFORE THE COURTS THE 
1? || DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROPRIATED AND CONTRACT RIGHTS, AND THE 
NATURE OF THOSE RIGHTS IN THIS CASE, 
19
 || Q WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE IN YOUR MIND? 
20
 || A WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE? 
2i
 I' Q YES. 
22
 || A WELL, A CONTRACT RIGHT IS A RIGHT BETWEEN PARTIES 
23 UNDER CONTRACT. 
24
 || Q UH-HUH. 
A APPROPRIATED RIGHTS ARE RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE STATE 25 
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1 II TO APPROPRIATE WATERS. 
2 Q OKAY. AND HOW DO THEY DIFFER? 
3 A WELL, THE CONTRACT RIGHT IS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
4 TWO PARTIES TO A CONTRACT. APPROPRIATED RIGHTS IS AN AGREE-
5 MENT BETWEEN THE STATE AND AN INDIVIDUAL OR IT'S WHATEVER CAN 
6 BE CONSIDERED AN INDIVIDUAL. 
7 Q SO HOW DID THAT AFFECT YOU? 
8 II A BECAUSE WE HAD BOTH CONTRACT AND APPROPRIATED 
9 RIGHTS. 
10 Q OKAY. AND IN WHAT WAY DO YOU CLAIM THAT MR. PRES-
11 TON DID NOT PROPERLY DISTINGUISH THOSE AND IN WHAT WAY DO 
12 YOU CLAIM YOU'RE DAMAGED BECAUSE OF THAT? 
13 A WELL, THE CASE WAS EXTENDED FAR BEYOND WHERE IT 
14 SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXTENDED, BECAUSE THESE ISSUES WERE NOT PRO-
15 PERLY RAISED IN THE COURT AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE 
16 PLACED BEFORE THE COURT. IF THE JUDGE HADN'T BEEN KIND TO ME 
17 WE'D HAVE REALLY LOST IT. 
18 Q WHICH JUDGE? 
19 A CHRISTOFFERSEN. 
20 Q IN WHAT WAY, AND I'D LIKE YOU TO BE AS SPECIFIC 
21 AS YOU CAN, DO YOU CLAIM THAT YOU WERE DAMAGED BECAUSE OF 
22 ANYTHING -- FIRST OF ALL I'VE GOT TO HAVE YOU SPELL OUT FOR 
23 ME IN YOUR MIND EXACTLY WHAT MR. PRESTON DID OR DIDN'T DO 
24 THAT YOU THINK WAS NEGLIGENCE ON HIS PART. 
25 A THE CASE IS A RELATIVELY SIMPLE CASE. IT'S NOW 
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1 FIFTEEN YEARS OLD, BEEN THROUGH THE SUPREME COURT SEVERAL 
2 TIMES. THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ON IT BETWEEN CORNISH AND KOLLERS 
3 ARE PROBABLY AMOUNTING CLOSE TO A HALF MILLION DOLLARS. THE 
4 CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ARGUED IN TWO WEEKS AND BEEN DONE WITH. 
5 TO BEGIN WITH, WE HAVE A CONTRACT WITH THE TOWN OF 
6 CORNISH. THOSE CONTRACT RIGHTS ARE SPELLED OUT AND THOSE 
7 RIGHTS ARE DIFFERENT THAN APPROPRIATED RIGHTS BUT WERE NOT 
8 ARGUED IN THIS ENTIRE CASE. 
9 SECONDLY, WE HAVE APPROPRIATED RIGHTS FROM THE 
10
 STATE WHICH WERE ONLY PARTIALLY ARGUED, AND THESE THINGS 
11
 WERE NOT CLEARLY SET OUT BEFORE THE COURTS IN THIS CASE. I 
12 DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THEM. I WENT INTO THIS THING UTTERLY NAIVE, 
13 KNOWING NOTHING OF THE COURT PROCEDURE, KNOWING NOTHING OF 
14 THE RIGHTS, KNOWING NOTHING OF THE STATE WATER REGULATIONS 
15 RELATING THERETO. NOW I'VE HAD TO DISCOVER ALL OF THIS MY-
16 SELF, AND IT'S VERY PERSONAL TO THIS CASE. 
17 Q OKAY. WHAT SHOULD MR. PRESTON HAVE SAID ABOUT 
18
 APPROPRIATED RIGHTS THAT HE DIDN'T SAY? 
19 A HE SHOULD HAVE DOCUMENTED BEFORE THAT COURT TO 
20 START WITH THAT MOST OF THE RIGHTS WHICH KOLLERS HAVE IN THAT 
21 THING ARE CONTRACT RIGHTS AND THEY ARE NOT LOST BY NON-USE. 
22 THE TOWN TRIED TO PROVE NON-USE AND THE QUESTION WAS MOOT, 
23 THAT WE DON'T LOSE THOSE CONTRACT RIGHTS WITH THE TOWN BY 
24 NON-USE. THE CONTRACT RIGHTS. WE COULDN'T LOSE THE APPROP-
25
 II RIATED RIGHTS BECAUSE WE'D BEEN USING THEM. 
I DON'T KNOW TO THIS DAY -- I'VE EXPLAINED IT TO 
MR. PRESTON SEVERAL TIMES, AND SOME OF IT IN LETTERS, AS TO 
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1 II WHAT THE WATER RIGHTS ARE, AND I DON'T KNOW TO THIS DAY THAT 
2 HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE WATER RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
3 Q DO YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THEM? 
4 A YES, I DO. 
5 II Q OKAY. DID YOU LOSE ANY OF YOUR APPROPRIATED RIGHTS 
6 || A THE TOWN IS STILL FIGHTING OVER THOSE APPROPRIATED 
7 RIGHTS. 
8 || Q THAT ISN'T MY QUESTION. DID YOU LOSE ANY OF YOURS? 
9 A YES. 
10 Q WHICH ONES? 
11 A THE RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THE ONE-FIFTH INTEREST IN 
12 THE PEARSON SPRING. THE TOWN HAS TRIED TO SHUT THAT WATER 
13 OFF AND CLAIM IT'S ONLY A SEASONAL INTEREST. TO THIS DATE 
14 WE'RE STILL ARGUING OVER THIS BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEAR-
15 LY SPELLED OUT BEFORE THE COURTS AND PLACED WITHIN THE JUDG-
16 MENT. 
17 Q HAVE YOU GOT ANY WITNESS, A LAWYER, THAT'S GOING 
18
 TO GET UP AND TESTIFY ABOUT THAT? 
19 A WELL, I DON'T KNOW AS I NEED A WITNESS OR A LAWYER. 
20 I THINK I CAN TESTIFY TO IT MYSELF. 
21 Q THAT ISN'T THE POINT. 
22 A AND DOCUMENT IT. 
23 II Q DO YOU HAVE A LAWYER THAT'S GOING TO GET UP THERE 
AND TESTIFY THAT MR. PRESTON DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD OF 
25
 || CARE IN THE WAY THAT HE HANDLED THE WATER APPEALS CASES FOR 
1
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YOU? THE WATER CASES FOR YOU? 
A THE STANDARD OF CARE AS DELINEATED IN THE RULES OF 
THE BAR ASSOCIATION. I CAN READ THEM FOR THE COURT. 
Q MR. KOLLER, PLEASE ANSWER MY QUESTION. I DON'T 
CARE WHAT YOU CAN READ OR WHAT YOU CAN TESTIFY TO. 
• A I HAVE NOT ENGAGED A LAWYER TO THIS DATE TO DO 
SUCH A THING. 
Q HAVE YOU TALKED TO ANY LAWYERS ABOUT THAT? 
A I HAVE NOT TALKED TO ANY LAWYERS TO GET UP THERE 
AND TESTIFY TO THAT EFFECT. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY WITNESSES OTHER THAN YOURSELF 
THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF AS WE SIT HERE TODAY THAT YOU'RE GOING 
TO CALL IN SUPPORT OF YOUR CLAIMS THAT MR. PRESTON WAS 
NEGLIGENT IN SOME WAY IN THE WAY HE HANDLED YOUR WATER 
CASES? 
A I DON'T HAVE ANY LAWYER WITNESSES SUCH AS THAT 
THAT YOU'RE REFERRING TO. 
Q I DIDN'T ASK YOU FOR LAWYER WITNESSES. I ASKED 
YOU THAT BEFORE ABOUT LAWYERS. YOU'VE ANSWERED THAT YOU 
HAVEN'T TALKED TO ANY AND YOU DON'T HAVE ONE. NOW THE NEXT 
QUESTION IS: DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER WITNESSES OTHER THAN 
22 II YOURSELF THAT YOU INTEND TO CALL IN SUPPORT OF YOUR CLAIMS 
23 THAT MR. PRESTON WAS NEGLIGENT IN SOME WAY IN THE WAY HE 
24 HANDLED YOUR CASE? 
25 J A NOT AS OF TODAY. WE MAY ACQUIRE SOME. • IF WE DO, 
10 
11 
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1
 II WE WILL SO ADVISE YOU. 
2
 Q OKAY. YOU'VE TOLD ME THAT FROM YOUR VIEWPOINT 
3
 HE WAS NEGLIGENT BECAUSE HE DIDN'T SPELL OUT THE DIFFERENCE 
4
 BETWEEN APPROPRIATED RIGHTS AND CONTRACT WATER RIGHTS. IN 
5
 WHAT OTHER WAY WAS HE NEGLIGENT? 
6
 A HE ADVISED THAT WE DID NOT NEED ANY EXPERT WITNES-
7
 SES IN THE ORIGINAL TRIAL, THAT HE WOULD USE THE TOWN'S EX-
8
 PERT WITNESSES, AND WE WERE BADLY DAMAGED BY THOSE EXPERT 
9
 II WITNESSES. 
Q IN WHAT WAY? 
A TESTIFYING ERRONEOUSLY. 
12
 || Q ABOUT WHAT? 
13
 A WATER SYSTEMS, QUANTITIES, NITRATES, SOIL TESTS. 
14
 Q WHAT KIND OF WITNESSES DO YOU BELIEVE THAT MR. PRES 
15 TON SHOULD HAVE CALLED THAT HE DIDN'T? 
16 A WE NEEDED AN ENGINEER TO REFUTE SPECIFICALLY THE 
17
 || TESTIMONY OF VAUGHN HANSEN. 
Q SAY THAT AGAIN. 
A WE NEEDED AN ENGINEER SPECIFICALLY TO REFUTE THE 
20
 TESTIMONY OF VAUGHN HANSEN. 
21
 Q WHAT DID VAUGHN HANSEN TESTIFY ABOUT? 
22
 A WATER QUANTITIES, WATER LAW. ALL KINDS OF THINGS. 
23
 || WE ALSO NEEDED A SPECIALIST IN WATER RIGHTS. 
Q OKAY. 
A VAUGHN HANSEN PRETTY WELL COVERED THE WHOLE WATER-
18 
19 
24 
25 
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1 II FRONT. 
2 Q IS THAT V-O-N OR DON? 
3 A V-A-U-G-H-N, I BELIEVE. HE TESTIFIED TO WATER 
4 PRESSURES, QUANTITIES, QUALITIES. HE WAS A SOIL SPECIALIST. 
5 HE CLAIMED TO BE. SAID HE COULD LOOK AT THAT GROUND UP 
6 THERE AND TELL WHETHER IT WAS HIGH IN NITRATE OR NOT, WHAT 
7 NEEDED TO BE DONE WITH IT, DIDN'T HAVE TO RUN ANY SOIL TESTS 
8 Q DID YOU TALK TO ANY OTHER WITNESSES OR MAKE ANY 
9 OTHER KIND OF AN INVESTIGATION BEFORE YOU FILED THIS COUNTER-
10
 CLAIM OTHER THAN JUST YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE? ARE YOU THE ONLY 
11
 ONE THAT WAS INVOLVED IN IT? 
12 A I DID TALK TO SOME OTHER ATTORNEYS, BUT THEY WON'T 
13 BE CALLED AS WITNESSES. 
14 Q SO THE BASIS FOR THE COUNTERCLAIM COMES SOLELY 
15 FROM WHAT YOU TOLD YOUR OWN LAWYER? 
16 A YES. 
17 Q ALL RIGHT, WHAT ELSE DO YOU CLAIM NOW THAT MR. 
18 PRESTON DID OR DIDN'T DO THAT YOU THINK WAS WRONG? 
19 A ARE YOU SPEAKING OF THE ENTIRE CASES, THE ENTIRE 
20 SCOPE OF THIS THING? 
21 Q I WANT TO KNOW ALL ABOUT WHAT YOU'RE CLAIMING 
22 ABOUT WHAT HE DID OR DIDN'T DO. 
23 A SPECIFICALLY WHICH SECTION OF THE COUNTERCLAIM ARE 
24 YOU REFERRING TO? 
25
 Q WELL, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY SPECIFIC ONE RIGHT 
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1 II NOW. WE'LL DO THAT IN A MINUTE. I'M JUST TRYING TO GET AN 
2 OVERVIEW. 
3 A WELL, YOU STARTED ON PARAGRAPH FIVE. NOW YOU'VE 
4 AVANDONED FIVE AND YOU WANT A GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE 
5 PROBLEMS? 
6 Q YES. 
7 A OKAY. YOU WENT PAST ME. I CAN'T GRAB IT. IN THIS 
8 CONDEMNATION ISSUE, THE LAW SPECIFICALLY STATES THOSE ESTATES 
9 WHICH CAN BE TAKEN UNDER CONDEMNATION FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES. 
1
° THE TOWN SAID IT WAS WROTE A LETTER, I WROTE LETTERS TO 
11
 THEIR ATTORNEY, REED MARTINEAU -- I THINK YOU KNOW HIM WELL -• 
12 AND ASKED HIM WHAT RIGHTS DID THEY NEED TO ACQUIRE IN PRO-
13 TECTION ZONES THEY WERE SEEKING. HE WROTE A LETTER BACK 
14 SAYING IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THEY OBTAIN FEE TITLE TO THAT 
15 PROPERTY. THE LAW DOESN'T ALLOW THEM TO OBTAIN FEE TITLE TO 
16 THAT PROPERTY. THEIR CASE WAS FLAWED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
17 DISMISSED. 
18 THEY LATER AMENDED THAT CLAIM, BECAUSE WE PROVED 
19 THROUGH WITNESSES THAT THERE WAS VALUABLE MINERALS UNDER THE 
20 SOIL AND APPRISED THEM OF THIS AT TRIAL, AND THEN THEY AMEN-
21 DED THEIR CLAIM THAT THEY DIDN'T NEED FEE TITLE BECAUSE THEY 
22 COULDN'T AFFORD TO BUY THE MINERALS. 
23 Q WHAT HAPPENED TO THAT CONDEMNATION CASE? WHERE IS 
24 IT NOW? 
25
 A IT'S SITTING WAITING TO BE TRIED. CORNISH HAS 
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LEVEL IN THE CONDEMNATION CASE THAT THE TOWN WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO TRY AND GET A FEE SIMPLE TITLE, THAT CHRISTOFFERSEN WOULD 
HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE? 
A CHRISTOFFERSEN RAISED THE ISSUE HIMSELF IN THE 
TRIAL, AND IT'S A MATTER OF RECORD IN THE TRANSCRIPT. HE 
STATED BEFORE THAT COURT, AND THESE ATTORNEYS HEARD THAT, THAT 
THE TOWN COULD NOT BY LAW TAKE THOSE RIGHT OF WAYS IN FEE 
TITLE BECAUSE THE LAW DID NOT ALLOW IT. HE KNEW THAT. IT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE LAW ALSO DID 
NOT ALLOW THEM TO TAKE THOSE PROTECTION ZONES IN FEE TITLE, 
BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW THAT, BUT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO INFORMED. 
NOW IT'S IN THE RECORD, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU. 
Q WAS BYRON FISHER INVOLVED IN THE CONDEMNATION CASE 
AT THAT TIME, AT THE TRIAL LEVEL? 
A HE WAS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL, BUT HE WASN'T AT THE 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY HEARING, AND THAT'S WHERE IT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SHUT OFF. 
Q DO YOU CLAIM THAT BYRON FISHER DID ANYTHING WRONG? 
A I HAVEN'T BEEN CLAIMING THAT. 
Q DO YOU TODAY CLAIM HE EVER DID ANYTHING WRONG? 
A I THINK THE BURDEN OF THIS PROBLEM LIES WITH 
GEORGE PRESTON. 
Q IS BYRON FISHER STILL REPRESENTING YOU? 
A YES. 
Q IN WHAT? 
A BUT THE CASE HAS BEEN MOOT NOW FOR -- IT'S BEEN 
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1 II RESTING FOR -- OH, TWO YEARS, SOMETHING LIKE THAT, WAITING 
2 FOR THE TOWN TO GET A SUPPLY OF WATER. THEY HAVE INDICATED 
3 THAT IF THEY COULD FIND A GOOD SUPPLY OF WATER -- AND THEY'VE 
4 DRILLED ABOUT FOUR WELLS UP THERE, TWO OF THEM ON OUR PROPER-
5 TY, TRYING TO FIND WATER, AND THEY THOUGHT IF THEY COULD GET 
6 A GOOD SUPPLY OF WATER ALL OF THESE OTHER QUESTIONS WOULD 
7 GO AWAY. BUT AS OF TODAY IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE THEY'RE GOING 
8 TO GO AWAY, AND WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO SPEND A WHOLE LOT 
9
 MORE MONEY NOW IN COURT TO GET THIS RESOLVED. 
10
 Q IS BYRON FISHER HANDLING ANYTHING FOR YOU OTHER 
11
 THAN THE CONDEMNATION CASE? 
12
 ' A WELL, THERE WILL BE THE WATER APPEALS CASE, THERE 
13 WILL BE THE CONDEMNATION CASE AND ALL OF THAT STUFF. EVERY-
14 THING THAT'S LEFT TO CLEAN UP, AND THERE'S A BUNDLE OF IT. 
15 Q IS THERE ANYTHING ON THE WATER APPEALS STILL TO BE 
16 DONE? 
17 II A Y E S . 
Q WHERE IS THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME? 
A WELL, WE'VE GOT TO FINALIZE WHERE THAT TAP BELONGS. 
20
 || THAT'S ANOTHER PLACE WHERE MR. PRESTON SCREWED UP. THE FACT 
21
 OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE SERVICE CONNECTION OR THE TAP IS 
22
 WHERE THE WATER USER CONNECTS ONTO THE LINE OF THE WATER 
23 SUPPLIER. THAT'S DELINEATED IN THE STATE WATER REGULATIONS. 
24
 || THIS WAS NEVER ARGUED BEFORE THE COURTS. IT WAS A MOOT 
QUESTION TO BEGIN WITH, AND WE RUN UP A $20,000 BILL ARGUING 
18 
19 
25 
10 
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1 II ABOUT IT IN THE COURTS. 
2 YOU LAWYERS GOT A FANTASTIC WAY OF DOING THINGS. 
3
 LIKE GODFATHER SAID, A MAN WITH A BRIEFCASE, A LAWYER WITH 
4
 A BRIEFCASE CAN STEAL MORE MONEY THAN A HUNDRED MEN WITH 
5
 GUNS. HE'S RIGHT. I DON'T MEAN TO OFFEND YOU, BUT THAT'S 
6 THE WAY THE THING IS WORKING. I HAD AN ATTORNEY IN SALT 
7 LAKE TELL ME THAT YOU COULD FIND WITNESSES IN THAT TOWN TO 
8 TESTIFY TO ANYTHING YOU WANTED TESTIFIED TO, AND YOU CALL 
9
 II THAT A JUSTICE SYSTEM? I'VE BEEN THROUGH IT. 
Q OKAY. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE NOW YOU CLAIM THAT 
11
 MR. PRESTON DID? 
12
 A THERE MAY BE SOME OTHER THINGS. I DON'T KNOW AS 
13 I CAN RECALL THEM ALL AT THIS PRESENT TIME, BUT THOSE ARE 
14 REAL ISSUES. 
15 Q AS I UNDERSTAND IT, JUST TO KIND OF RECAP THINGS 
16 A LITTLE BIT, YOU BELIEVE THAT MR. PRESTON SHOULD HAVE — 
17
 THAT HE DIDN'T HANDLE THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN APPROPRIA-
18
 || TED RIGHTS AND CONTRACT RIGHTS PROPERLY? 
A THAT'S CORRECT, 
20
 || Q AND YOU CLAIM YOU GOT DAMAGED ON ACCOUNT OF IT? 
21
 I' A IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO THIS CASE. VERY IMPORTANT. 
22
 || IT'S GERMANE. 
23 || Q HOW MUCH DO YOU CLAIM YOU GOT DAMAGED? 
A WELL, AS I SAID, THERE'S BEEN CLOSE TO A HALF A 
MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF ATTORNEY'S FEES SPENT IN THIS. AND 
19 
24 
25 
11 
12 
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1 II AN ACCOUNTING OF THAT WILL BE FIGURED AT THE PROPER TIME. 
2 Q OVER THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS? 
3 A THAT'S RIGHT. ANOTHER THING IS IN THE ORDINANCES 
4 WHICH THAT TOWN PASSED. 
5 Q WHAT ABOUT THEM? 
6 - A CHRISTOFFERSEN MADE A REMARK IN THAT TRIAL, SAID 
7 THE ORDINANCE MUST BE VALID, IF IT ISN'T VALID WHAT DO THESE 
8 CITIES AND TOWNS DO WHEN THEY PASS ORDINANCES? BOTH GEORGE 
9 AND BYRON FISHER ARGUED THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE BEFORE THE 
10
 II FEDERAL COURT. THE MAGISTRATE SEIZED UPON THAT REMARK BY 
CHRISTOFFERSEN, IT WAS NOT A PORTION OF THE TRIAL, JUST CAME 
OUT OF THIN AIR, HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE TRIAL OF CONDEM-
13 || NATION. IT HAD TO DO WITH THE VALUATION OF THE LAND WHEN 
14 THE LAND WAS VALUED, THE DATE OF THE ORDINANCES, AND WHAT 
15 THEY DONE WITH THEM. 
16 BUT THAT MAGISTRATE USED THAT TO DECLARE THE ORDI-
17 NANCES VALID AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE MOOT. 
18 Q DO YOU CLAIM THAT PRESTON AND FISHER WERE RESPON-
DS SIBLE FOR THAT IN SOME WAY, THAT RESULT? 
20 A WHY WASN'T THE CASE ARGUED THAT IF THOSE ORDINANCES 
21 WERE IN FACT VALID, WHY DID THEY NEED PROTECTION ZONES AND 
22 PAY FOR THEM? ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS USE THE ORDINANCE. 
23 Q I'M HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME UNDERSTANDING HOW YOU 
24
 II THINK THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE WOULD HAVE COME OUT DIFFERENTLY. 
I JUST WANT TO KNOW WHAT YOU CLAIM. IF YOU CLAIM MR. PRES-
TON AND MR. FISHER WERE AT FAULT IN THE RESULT, IN THE CIVIL 
25 
8 
9 
10 
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1 II RIGHTS CASE BEING DISMISSED, I WANT TO KNOW HOW. 
2 II A WELL, THE FACT IS THAT THE PROPERTY OF KOLLER'S 
3 WAS BEING SOUGHT BY THE TOWN WITHOUT COST TO THE TOWN, AND 
4 THAT'S IN THE RECORD. AND I BELIEVE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
5 OF AMERICA, UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHICH CITIZENS 
6 I THEREOF ARE ENTITLED TO, WHEN YOU TRY TO APPROPRIATE ANOTHER 
7 || MAN'S PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYING HIM FOR IT, HE HAS BEEN DAM-
AGED AND HIS CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN HURT, AND THERE IS A 
VALID CASE. AND THIS IS THE NATURE OF THIS THING. 
Q WELL, ASSUMING WHAT YOU SAID IS SO, I WANT TO KNOW 
11
 || WHETHER YOU CLAIM THAT MR. PRESTON AND MR. FISHER OR EITHER 
12 ONE OF THEM WERE RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY FOR BRINGING ABOUT 
13 THE RESULT IN YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS CASE, IT BEING DISMISSED. 
14 A YES. 
15 Q HOW WERE THEY AT FAULT? 
16 A WELL, AS I POINTED OUT, THEY'VE USED IN THESE 
17 TRIALS TESTS OF WATER AND SUCH THINGS WHICH ARE NOT ACCURATE. 
18
 FURTHERMORE, IN DISCOVERY --
19
 Q WHAT DOES THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS END 
20 OF THINGS? 
21 A MISLEADING THE COURT. WHEN YOU START TO MISLEAD 
22 THE COURTS, ISN'T THAT FRAUDULENT? ISN'T THAT ONE OF THE 
23 || CONDITIONS OF FRAUD? AND DOESN'T THAT HAVE TO DO WITH YOUR 
CIVIL RIGHTS? FURTHER -- OH, IT WENT PAST ME. IN DISCOVERY 24 
25
 WE HAD A HARD TIME GETTING DISCOVERY FROM THE TOWN. MR. 
10 
11 
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1 II PRESTON WAS RELUCTANT TO PRESS THAT FOR SOMETIME, AND IT GAVE 
2 THE TOWN TIME TO SANITIZE THE RECORDS. IN DISCOVERY WE 
3
 DID FIND WHERE THE TOWN HAD THEIR ENGINEER, VAUGHN HANSEN, 
4
 DO A WATER STUDY FOR THEM IN 1981 WHICH SHOWED THAT THAT 
5
 TOWN COULD FOR THE PRICE OF $30,000 DEVELOP WATER WHICH THEY 
6 PRESENTLY OWNED AND PROVIDE FOR THE TOWN OF CORNISH A SUPPLY 
7 OF GOOD QUALITY WATER. THEY HID THAT RECORD FOR A NUMBER OF 
8 YEARS. WE FINALLY GOT IT PROBABLY BY ACCIDENT. THAT'S 
9
 II FRAUDULENT. WHEN THEY START USING PUBLIC MONIES AS THEY HAVE 
USED IN THE AMOUNT THAT THEY HAVE USED TO GO AFTER AN INFER-
IOR SUPPLY OF WATER WHEN THEY COULD HAVE DONE THIS, THAT'S 
12
 AN ABUSE OF THEIR OFFICE. WE SHOULD HAVE HAD DISCOVERY 
13 FROM THE VERY OUTSET OF THIS CASE. 
14
 Q WHAT FINALLY HAPPENED TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE? 
15 YOU SAY IT GOT DISMISSED? 
16 A IT WAS DISMISSED, 
17
 || Q DID YOU SETTLE IT? 
A THE TOWN AGREED TO PAY OUR ATTORNEY'S FEES IF WE 
19
 || WOULD DROP THE THING. IT WAS GETTING TO WHERE I WAS WEARY 
20
 || OF IT, MY ATTORNEYS WAS WEARY OF IT, I WAS GETTING TO WHERE 
21
 'I I COULDN'T COPE WITH IT ALL, SO I TOLD THEM I'D DROP IT 
22
 || IF THEY'D PAY THE FEES, AND THEY DID THAT. 
23 Q AND THEY DID THAT? 
24
 || A AND THEY DID THAT. THAT'S WHEN I PAID GEORGE PRES-
TON THE FEES THAT YOU'VE SPENT SO MUCH TIME ON, 25 
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1 II MR. HANNI: LET'S TAKE A FIVE-MINUTE RECESS, GIVE 
2 THE REPORTER A REST. 
3 (RECESSED FOR A FEW MINUTES. FOLLOWING THE 
4 RECESS:) 
5 II (CONVERSATION OFF THE RECORD AS TO EXAMINING 
DOCUMENTS.) 
7 II MR. MALOUF: IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT THE ORIGINALS 
8 OF THESE AFTER YOU'VE SEEN THESE, WHY DON'T YOU THEN SAY YOU 
9 NEED TO SEE THE ORIGINALS OF THESE FOR SOME REASON, BECAUSE 
10 THESE ARE THE ONES THAT I THINK WERE IN DIRECT RESPONSE OF 
11 WHAT WAS ASKED OF MR. WILLMORE. YOU HAVEN'T ASKED FOR ANY-
12 THING, HAVE YOU?-
13 MR. HANNI: NO, I WANTED TO SEE WHAT'S BEEN ASKED 
14 FOR, AND THEN — BECAUSE WE'LL BE SERVING INTERROGATORIES 
15 AND WE'LL BE SERVING ADDITIONAL REQUESTS PROBABLY. 
16 MR. KOLLER: THIS GETS VOLUMINOUS. I HOPE WE 
17 DON'T GET MANY MORE ATTORNEYS ON THE CASE. 
18 MR. MALOUF: BUT I THINK THIS MEETS -- I THINK THIS 
19 IS THE STUFF THAT'S CONSISTENT WITH THE ANSWERS TO WILLMORE'S 
20 INTERROGATORIES, AND AT THE TIME YOU GO THROUGH THIS I SUS-
21 PECT IF YOU CHOOSE TO DO IT NOW THAT YOU'LL HAVE USED UP OUR 
22 TIME UNTIL FIVE, WHEN MR. PARKER INDICATES WE'RE ENDING, BUT 
23 I CAN LET YOU TAKE THIS NOW AND DO WITH IT AS YOU WILL, MAKE 
24 COPIES OF IT OR WHATEVER. 
25
 MR. HANNI: WHY DON'T WE DO THAT, AND WHY DON'T 
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1 II WE JUST LOOK AT AS MANY DOCUMENTS AS WE CAN TODAY, GET THAT 
2 BEHIND US, AND THEN WE'LL RESCHEDULE AND FINISH THE DEPOSI-
3 TION. 
4 MR. MALOUF: THAT WOULD BE FINE. 
5 MR. HANNI: OKAY. 
6 MR. MALOUF: DO YOU HAVE DOCUMENTS HERE THAT WE 
7 MAY LOOK AT OR MUST WE GO TO MR. WILLMORE? 
8 MR. PRESTON: WELL, I DON'T KNOW IN WHAT RESPECT 
9 THEY'RE LOOKING AT DOCUMENTS. I HAVE A WHOLE --
10
 MR. HANNI: HAVE YOU MADE A REQUEST ON THIS? 
11 MR. PRESTON: I HAVE A WHOLE FILE IN THE WHOLE 
12 CASE. 
13 MR. HANNI: HAVE YOU SERVED REQUESTS ON US? 
14 MR. MALOUF: WE DID, AND WE GOT ANSWERS. 
15 MR. HANNI: HAVE YOU SERVED THEM ON WILLMORE? 
16 MR. MALOUF: OH, EXCUSE ME. WE'VE JUST SERVED 
17 THEM ON WILLMORE, AND HE IS THE ONE WHO HAS ANSWERED, BUT 
i8
 IN VIEW OF THE ANSWER WE RECEIVED I ASSUMED WE NEEDED TO GO 
19
 THROUGH HIM. I ALSO EXPECT THAT MAYBE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
20 INVITED TO BE HERE TODAY, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY IS NOT, BUT I'LL 
21 LET YOU TAKE THOSE COPIES OF THOSE TO LOOK AT IF YOU'D LIKE. 
22 MR. HANNI: ALL RIGHT. CAN WE KEEP THESE OR DO 
23 YOU NEED THESE BACK? 
24
 MR. MALOUF: UNLESS THERE'S SOMETHING IN THERE 
25 THAT LOOKS LIKE IT'S OUR ONLY COPY, I THINK YOU COULD KEEP 
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1 II THOSE. 
2 MR. HANNI: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 
3 MR. MALOUF: NOW, WE ASKED FOR SOME STUFF FROM 
4 MR. WILLMORE. 
5 MR. HANNI: IS THERE ANY REASON FOR THIS TO BE 
6 ON THE RECORD NOW, RAY? DO YOU WANT IT ON THE RECORD? 
7 MR. MALOUF: JUST A MOMENT. THERE MIGHT BE A 
8 BRIEF PORTION. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE A COPY OF THIS 
9 PLEADING OR NOT WHICH IS CALLED PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
10 DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND PRODUCTION OF 
11 DOCUMENTS. THIS IS IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. WILLMORE 
12 REFERS TO THE FACT THAT -- HE SAYS HE NOW HAS BILLINGS NOT 
13 TRANSMITTED WHICH COVER OTHER ACCOUNTS WHICH WE CAN LOOK 
14 AT. 
15 MR. PRESTON: WELL, I'LL TELL YOU, I'VE GOT 
16 ACCOUNTS, AND HE'S GOT THOSE. THOSE ARE ACCOUNTS SUCH AS 
17 THE CARL BASSETT ACCOUNT. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT'S EVEN 
18 AN ISSUE. 
19 MR. KOLLER: WELL, THERE ARE THINGS MIXED UP WITH 
20 IT. I DON'T THINK THE CARL BASSETT ACCOUNT PER SE IS AN 
21 ISSUE, BUT THE PROBLEM BEING IS WE GET ALL OF THESE ITEMS 
22 SCRAMBLED BETWEEN ALL OF THE ACCOUNTS. 
23 MR. PRESTON: THEN THERE IS -- GOES CLEAR BACK 
24 INTO UTAH POWER AND LIGHT CASE. IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH 
25 THAT? 
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1 MR. MALOUF: ONLY INSOFAR AS IT MAY PERTAIN TO 
2 TRANSFERS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MR. PRESTON. 
3 MR. PRESTON: WE'VE GIVEN A COMPLETE COPY OF THIS 
4 TO TOM. YOU CAN GO SEE IT THERE. I'M NOT GOING TO LET THIS 
5 ONE OUT OF MY HANDS. THIS IS MY ORIGINAL COPY, I AM NOT 
6 GOING TO LET IT OUT OF MY HANDS. 
7 MR. MALOUF: WELL, I CAN RESPECT THAT. YOU DON'T 
8 NEED TO LET IT OUT OF YOUR HANDS AS LONG AS TOM HAS A DUPE 
9
 OF IT. 
10
 MR. PRESTON: TOM'S GOT A DUPLICATE. IT GOES 
11
 CLEAR BACK INTO '83. A CASE WITH BUTTARS AGAINST KOLLER. 
12 AND THAT'S ALL WITH HIM. 
13 MR. HANNI : WELL, DO YOU WANT ANYTHING ELSE ON THE 
14 RECORD? 
15 MR. MALOUF: I DON'T THINK SO. 
16 (FURTHER CONVERSATION HELD OFF THE RECORD.) 
17 MR. HANNI: WE'RE STIPULATING YOU DON'T NEED TO 
18
 ATTACH TO THE COPIES OF THE DEPOSITIONS THESE EXHIBITS. 
19
 I'M WONDERING. WE MIGHT NEED THESE FOR FUTURE DEPOSITIONS. 
20
 MAYBE I SHOULD JUST TAKE POSSESSION OF THEM AND KEEP THEM 
21 AND I'LL BRING THEM TO THE DEPOSITION. YOU'VE GOT A COPY 
^ AND I'VE GOT A COPY. 
23 MR. MALOUF: THE ONLY REASON TO HAVE THEM IS IN 
24
 II CASE SOMEONE READING THE TRANSCRIPT WANTS TO REFER, AT THE 
TIME THEY'RE READING IT, TO THE EXHIBITS, AND I WOULD THINK 25 
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THAT AT LEAST THE ORIGINAL OUGHT TO HAVE EITHER THESE 
ORIGINAL EXHIBITS OR PHOTOCOPIES OF IT ATTACHED TO IT, 
BUT I'D BE HAPPY TO STIPULATE THAT THE COPIES NEED NOT HAVE. 
MR. HANNI: ALL RIGHT, JUST SHOW THAT YOU CAN 
ATTACH THE EXHIBITS TO THE ORIGINAL AND YOU NEED NOT ATTACH 
COPIES OF THE EXHIBITS TO THE COPIES OF THE DEPOSITION, BE-
CAUSE WE EACH HAVE A SET OF THEM. 
(RECESSED AT 4:30 P.M.) 
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1 || STATE OF UTAH , ) 
) SS 
2 II COUNTY OF CACHE . ) 
3 EVAN 0. KOLLER , BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
4 DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT _HE IS THE WITNESS NAMED IN THE FORE-
5 GOING DEPOSITION; THAT THE TESTIMONY THEREIN CONTAINED WAS 
6 GIVEN UNDER OATH; THAT _HE HAS READ THE SAID DEPOSITION; AND 
7 THAT THE SAME IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF Hj[S TESTI-
8 || MONY CAS CHANGED AND/OR CORRECTED BY H I_M, WHERE NECESSARY), 
9 
10 
11 
12 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS DAY OF 
13 II / 1 9 . 
14 
15 
16 
NOTARY PUBL IC 
17 || R E S I D I N G A T * 
MY COMM. EXP; 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
CERTIFICATE 
7 
8 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE DEPOSITION OF THE 
3 II WITNESS NAMED HEREIN WAS TAKEN BEFORE ME ON THE DATE, AT THE 
4 TIME AND PLACE, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF THOSE COUNSEL AS INDI-
5 CATED THEREIN; THAT THE SAID WITNESS WAS BY ME BEFORE EXAMI-
6 I NATION DULY SWORN TO TESTIFY TO THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, 
AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH IN SAID DEPOSITION; THAT THE WIT-
NESS WAS THEREUPON EXAMINED BY COUNSEL ON ORAL INTERROGATOR-
9 || IES AND GAVE ANSWERS THERETO; THAT THE QUESTIONS ASKED AND 
10 THE ANSWERS GIVEN WERE REPORTED BY ME IN SHORTHAND AND THERE-
11 AFTER TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING; THAT SAID TESTIMONY, SO 
12 REPORTED AND SO TRANSCRIBED, IS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING 
13 TYPEWRITTEN PAGES, NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY; AND THAT SAID 
WITNESS DEPOSED AND SAID AS IN THE FOREGOING DEPOSITION 
SET OUT. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT RELATED TO ANY PER-
17 || SON A PARTY TO THE WITHIN-NAMED LAWSUIT, NOR TO COUNSEL, 
18 AND THAT I HAVE NO PECUNIARY INTEREST WHATSOEVER IN THE OUT-
19 COME OF THE LITIGATION NAMED HEREIN. 
20 II WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL AT LOGAN, UTAH, THIS 
22ND DAY OF MAY
 f 1 9 93 
14 
15 
16 
21 
22 
23 
24 
NOTARY PUBLIC AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL 
25 |( REPORTER 
RESIDING AT LOGAN, UTAH 
MY COMM. EXP. 8-21-1995 
<^mt^ (7.4^/bL/ 
GEORGE fl.PHRKEBC.g.R.. C.IT1 
Registered Professional Reporter 
Deposition Notary 
Q{f%ct Mdrta 
559 E. 1150 N. 
Logan, Utah 8432) 
Homr Mdrm (SOI) 752-5394 
559 East 1150 No 
Logan, Utah 
JULY 2 7 , 1993 
GLENN C. HANNI, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SIXTH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RE: DEPOSITION OF EVAN KOLLER, IN KOLLER 
VS. PRESTON (LOGAN CITY CIRCUIT COURT) 
DEAR GLENN: 
PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING CORRECTION TO 
THE DEPOSITION OF EVAN KOLLER IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER: 
ON PAGE 49, LINE 19, THE NAME, OF COURSE, SHOULD 
BE "KOLLERS;11 AN OBVIOUS TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. 
I FILED THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT WITH THE CLERK 
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT TODAY. 
SINCERELY, 
COUR^F REPORTER 
P/P 
y _ 
Exhibit 4 
Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327 
Peter H. Christensen, #5453 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C., 
Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
EVAN O. KOLLER, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant• 
The motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment 
on all legal malpractice claims asserted in defendant's counter-
claim came on for hearing before the Court on the 29th day of 
August, 1995. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, 
Glenn C. Hanni of the firm of Strong & Hanni. Defendant was 
represented by his attorney, Raymond N. Malouf. The Court 
heard argument of counsel, and it appearing to the Court that 
the malpractice claims asserted in the counterclaim will require 
expert testimony, and it further appearing that defendant, having 
more than ample time to do so, has failed to designate an expert 
Addendum 4 
September 25, 1995 Order R 439-440 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930000019 CV 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
to address the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 
counterclaim, and the Court being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is 
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant on all legal malpractice .claims 
asserted in the counterclaim unless the defendant on or before 
October 28, 1995, designates an expert witness or witnesses 
who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to 
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case, and unless 
within said time the expert witness or witnesses are made 
available for their depositions to be taken by plaintiff. 
2. The deposition or depositions of defendant's expert 
witness or expert witnesses shall be completed within the time 
frame stated above. 
Dated this 2.-^ day of 5>rg1- , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ben H. Hadfield, J 
^2-
u 
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TELEFAX (SOU 596-1 SO© 
August 31 , 1995 
e s T A D L i s n E o t e a s 
G O R D O N R, S T R O N G 
( 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 6 9 ) 
Honorable Ben H, Hadfield 
District Judge 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah S4302 
Re: Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. 
Evan 0. Roller 
Civil No. 930000019 CV - Cache County 
Dear Judge Hadfield: 
Enclosed find the partial-summary judgment. Although 
the Court did not specifically say that defendant's expert 
witness or witnesses should be fully prepared and ready to 
express final opinions on the malpractice claims asserted in 
the counterclaim, I believe it was implicit in the Court's 
order that defendant not only designate his expert witness or 
witnesses within the 60 day time frame, but that they be 
fully prepared to express their opinions, and that they be 
made available for depositions to be taken and completed within 
the 60 days. As a consequence, I have included that in the 
partial summary judgment. 
Would you please hold this Order for the time prescribed 
by the rules, and in the absence of written objections to the 
form of the Order being timely served and filed, would you, 
if it meets with your approval, sign the judgment and give it 
to your clerk for filing. 
Enclosed also find a copy of the partial summary 
judgment. Would you please ask your clerk to conform the 
copy and return it to us in the enclosed self-addressed, 
stamped envelope. 
Sincerely, 
STRON 
Glenn C. Hanni 
GCH:pw 
Enc. &1 
